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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, positive and negative tensions among the “unit-ideas” of New Science 
and empiricism are explored as they relate to explanations of aspects of mind in the 
Modern period. Some constellations of ideas are mutually supporting, and provide 
fruitful discussion on how mind can fit into the natural world.  This project aims to 
clarify the adequacy of this type of framework in accommodating and explaining 
mind, and aspects of mind. I proceed by analyzing key texts via the “unit-ideas” of 
New Science and empiricism.  The three central chapters are case studies, looking at 
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. In each chapter I analyse an aspect of the mental as it is 
explained within a version of the framework created by that thinker’s particular 
constellation of New Science and empiricism.   
 
In evaluating the adequacy of these frameworks to handle the problem presented to 
them, new insights appear about the historical figures and the texts.  For example, in 
analyzing Hobbes’ framework for explaining mind, the impact of Hobbes’ view of 
mind on his political philosophy comes into relief, creating space for new research 
avenues.  Identifying underlying tensions within Locke’s explanatory framework, it 
becomes possible to put to bed an old debate about whether Locke was a libertarian, 
a compatibilist, or a necessitarian.  And in understanding clearly the ways in which 
Hume’s version of this constellation of ideas leads to his view of volition, at least 
one interpretation of Hume as a metaphysician can be decisively rejected. 
 
This project is intended partly as an illustration of the significance of the historical 
dimension to adequately understanding contemporary issues in Philosophy of Mind.  
It is important to recognize that there are certain conditions for possibility of the 
emergence of philosophical concepts and views, and that the way problems can be 
resolved depends very much on the way they are posed or articulated. This project 
straddles the sub-fields of Philosophy of Mind and History of Philosophy.  
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Foreward: How I Got Here 
 
This book does not run a straight course from beginning to end.  It hunts; and in the 
hunting…It drinks often from the same streams, and stumbles over some cruel 
country.  And it counts not the kill but what it learned of the territory explored.   
~ Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking 
 
When I first began to seriously approach issues of mind in graduate school, I felt 
very confused and out of place. I felt confused by the way I saw questions being 
posed and answered by my peers and colleagues, and didn’t understand why they 
had the particular concerns that they did.  I wasn’t bothered by the same things 
others were. On the other hand, I was bothered by problems and assumptions that 
others took for granted.  We lacked a shared foundation of background assumptions, 
and this not only took me some time to figure out, but it was also very disconcerting 
to me.  The main difference, as I see it, is that while I do not deny the idea of 
philosophical progress, I tend to view philosophical problems and solutions as 
features of a very broad spectrum of circumstances.  What I mean is that the way 
people think about problems depends very much on what is thinkable in the time and 
place in which they are working, as well as the social and political dimensions of 
life.  It’s not that my colleagues would deny these factors; it’s that they tend to 
recede into the background.  What appeared in the foreground for them, it seemed, 
was less these “textural” elements, and more the “scientific facts.”  This difference 
might be thought of as an expression of the analytic/continental distinction in 
Western philosophy. What I thought I was doing when I was doing philosophy, and 
what I thought philosophy was for, seemed to be very different from what those 
around me seemed to think.   
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In my very feminist-informed context, I decided this might be a gender issue.  I was 
exposed to a lot of talk about the pernicious effect of implicit sexism, not only 
within philosophy departments, but also hidden deeply within philosophical 
questions and methodologies.  I co-wrote a paper entitled, What Would a Feminist 
Approach Add to the Philosophy of Mind? and decided it was worthwhile to work in 
this area.  The easy recognition that the context of a conversation matters allowed 
me to feel more understood in feminist circles. But this was really more an 
understanding of my plight as a woman philosopher than it was resonation about the 
problems of mind that concerned me.  Frustrated with my experience, I decided on a 
whim to write the history of philosophy comprehensive exam rather than the 
philosophy of mind exam, in fulfillment of my program requirements. I passed that 
exam with distinction, and Lorne Falkenstein invited me to work with him to clarify 
Locke’s final position on volition.  The idea of working on mind from an angle that 
was self-reflective about the significance of context—time, space, politics, and 
social influences—appealed to me. 
 
The Modern period is especially interesting and significant when it comes to the 
development of theories of mind.  This is partly because with the advent of the 
Scientific Revolution people began to rethink what makes something explanatory, 
and to reconsider methods of gathering evidence, and testing it. The development of 
the scientific method, and the centrality of science to intellectual inquiry generally, 
as well as the “democratization” of knowledge, all bore significantly on both the 
methodology of studying mind, and on the nature of an adequate explanation of 
mind. There is an important connection between the knowledge-gathering enterprise 
of science, and studies into the nature of mind itself. This connection can be seen, 
for example, in Hume’s Treatise. There, Hume describes human beings not only as 
the scientists studying nature, but also the objects of scientific scrutiny.  
 
After exploring contemporary Philosophy of Mind, issues of gender and philosophy 
of mind, and historical explanations and models of mind, I began working to clarify 
my historiographical commitments and marrying them to my philosophical aims. 
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Turning toward historical philosophy of mind allowed me to exercise my 
“continental” commitments, perspective, and skill set. My approach tends toward 
continental philosophy in the sense that it is grounded in a robust appreciation for 
the literary elements of philosophical texts, as well as a healthy skepticism of the 
idea that the natural sciences are the only, or the most accurate, way to understand 
natural phenomena.  At the same time, my approach is analytic in the sense that it 
employs the rigorous tools and methods of conceptual analysis and logical relations 
that are characteristic of the analytic tradition.   
 
An important insight that arose during my academic development is that a telltale 
feature of my personal philosophical style is to innovate and deepen understanding 
by creating new combinations of seemingly disparate ideas, methods, and styles.  
Traditionally, it is characteristic of the masculine to create distinctions, while it is 
characteristic of the feminine to create connections.  Both are valuable and 
necessary, and yet the socio-historical context we find ourselves in is not neutral 
about the value of the masculine and feminine principles.  As a culture, philosophy 
still rewards what is traditionally masculine.  Yet the more I tried to fit that mold, the 
worse I felt.  In my lived experience, bringing seemingly disparate things together 
harmoniously and finding middle ground, is one exemplification of virtue, the 
middle path, and the golden mean. Hume advised, “Be a philosopher; but, amidst all 
your philosophy, be a man.”  It’s not easy to separate what it is to be a man or 
woman and what it is to be a philosopher, and it seems that there’s very little known 
about how exactly this is done.  Learning to be a woman amidst all of my philosophy 
has meant learning to stand for, and surrender to, my own deep desires and feelings, 
while still maintaining discipline, clarity, and rigor.  So each of my forays into 
different disciplines and aspects of philosophy of mind were necessary for the 
development of my thinking—both on what I wanted to say, and how I wanted to 
say it.  
 
Despite what I thought at more than one point on this journey, I love philosophy, and 
I can carry it out according to what makes sense to me. And that’s how I got here.
 1 
Chapter One 
 
Philosophizing must, inevitably have a historical dimension if it is to count as 
philosophizing at all. ~ Frederick Copleston 
What My Project Is and What It Isn’t 
 
Because I want to be clear about what my project is and what it isn’t, first I’ll 
describe some different approaches to history and clarify the approach I adopt here. 
Given that there are different approaches and methodologies to writing history, 
evaluating a historical work needs knowing which approach is taken and what its 
aims are.  There was a time before I studied historiography that I was naively under 
the impression that histories are essentially “factual” accounts of what went on.  My 
thought was that people, events, and circumstances were, for the most part, given or 
un-interpreted.  I thought that anyone who sought out the historical truth about some 
person or time period would come to a very similar view as any other person, given 
the factual nature of these stories.  This was after all, what makes the difference, I 
thought, between histories and fiction—the one adheres to the facts, while the other 
need not appeal to, or fit with the facts at all. 
 
What I didn’t realize was that this isn’t at all the way history is created.  My first 
mistake was in not realizing that interpretation takes place at almost every level.  For 
example, it may be a fact that a certain ledger indicates that a transaction took place 
on a specified date.  But the meaning of that document exists within a nexus of other 
facts and beliefs, within a perhaps implicit narrative going on in the mind of the 
researcher.  So that whether this document is actually relevant or not depends on the 
larger story one is telling. For example, from the perspective of ancient Roman 
historians, Cleopatra VII Philopater did not fit into any of the appropriate positions 
for a female to occupy according to Roman culture.  Perhaps because of this, she 
was described in almost wholly negative terms—they saw her as an exotic, ruthless 
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seductress and a murderer.  But from the standpoint of 20th century North American 
feminist historian Stacy Schiff, what appears relevant and left out of such 
perspectives is that Cleopatra spoke seven languages, was a shrewd strategist, and an 
ingenious negotiator.  The larger narrative that a historian has in mind bears heavily 
on which facts appear relevant and are included in support of that story. The data 
itself does not create a narrative.  Narrative must go beyond data, including it and 
making the case for what goes beyond it.  This is one sense in which historians are 
much more like constrained fiction-writers than they are cataloguers of what was the 
case.  Historians have a hypothesis of sorts—a story or a view about what they think 
was going on, and there are varying degrees to which data supports that view, and 
doesn’t.   
 
What I also didn’t realize was that historians also have a view about what history is. 
It wasn’t obvious to me that there are a great many views about what history is, what 
it is for, and how best to engage in it. A historian might believe in grand-narratives. 
Some familiar grand-narratives include the grand-narratives of progress or of 
enlightenment emancipation. Others might believe in the “great man” story, 
according to which history is explained by appeal to highly influential individuals 
who had a historically decisive impact. When it comes to the history of philosophy, 
depending on the nature and purpose of the project, the skills of the historian and the 
skills of the philosopher are not always exercised in equal proportions.  
 
In order to make clear what I mean, I draw a broad distinction between what I’ll call 
“Historically Informed Philosophy” (HIP), and “Philosophically Oriented History” 
(POH).  In order to get clear on the difference between the approaches of HIP and 
POH, I’d like to draw attention to the fact that there are a variety of reasons and 
motivations for taking up a project in the history of philosophy. One motivation for 
beginning a project in history of philosophy is to develop deeper understanding of 
certain historical figures and their thinking.  For example, Ray Monk’s (1991) 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, is a story of Wittgenstein designed to 
bring insight into the man, and the philosopher. The story of Wittgenstein cannot be 
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told without some deep examination of his philosophical work.  Because of this, the 
development of his thought has to be incorporated, explicated, and interpreted within 
the larger story of his life and intellectual development.  Doing this work requires 
both historical, as well as philosophical skills.  In this case, understanding, 
interpreting, and reconstructing Wittgenstein’s texts in terms of the historical 
circumstances of its production, as well as its propagation and reception, is 
particularly important.  The author of this kind of work looks for, among other 
things, sources, causes, or motives for what is said in the text.  But in this example, 
the aim is to understand Wittgenstein, as opposed to reach for the truth about the 
nature of reality, or language, which were Wittgenstein’s concerns.  Usually in a 
work like this, the historian looks not for the arguments, as much as she looks for the 
sources, or causes, or extra-philosophical motives that might have moved the thinker 
for taking on the views that they did (Kenny, 2005, 22-23). In other words, in 
Philosophically Oriented History (POH) the interest is in the fact that such-and-such 
was or was not Wittgenstein’s view, as well as the circumstances he was in such that 
he held those views.  
 
By way of contrast, a historian of philosophy might also aim to develop a deeper 
understanding of a philosophical problem.  In this case the researcher seeks out 
insight into a view or argument, as opposed to focusing on the details of a particular 
philosopher. I call work undertaken with this aim, Historically Informed Philosophy 
(HIP). Tom Lennon’s (1993) The Battle of the Gods and Giants: The Legacies of 
Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715 is an illustrative example of this kind of 
approach. In this book, Lennon argues for a major reinterpretation of Early Modern 
history.  Lennon’s aim is to show that the contest between the Cartesians and the 
supporters of Gassendi was the most important philosophical debate of the latter half 
of the seventeenth century.  He argues that the views of both sides of the debate 
proposed opposing views on space and the objects in it, and that these implied 
important moral and political differences.  The conflict was typical of Plato’s battle 
of the gods and giants –those who were friends of the forms, and the materialists.  
It’s not that who thought what is unimportant for this study.  Certainly the details of 
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who thought what are relevant.  But the author emphasizes the arguments and 
positions themselves, and this approach does not emphasize the details of those who 
espoused the views. It is a matter of historical interest to discover which thinker took 
which position, but it is a matter of philosophical interest what a view actually is, or 
entails.  In HIP, the larger aim is to establish a deeper understanding of the way that 
arguments may appear and be deployed within a particular context.   
 
It’s important to remember that the distinction that I’ve drawn is broad, and that in 
practice, a text may rely heavily on both philosophical and historical methods, and 
that it may aim at a variety of purposes.  For example, in writing POH, the historian 
of philosophy interprets and paraphrases the views of those they write about, at the 
same time that they speculate and provide reasons why these thinkers might have 
held the views that they did.  In order to interpret a view, the historian may make 
speculations about tacit premises left out of arguments, and evaluate the cogency and 
coherence of those arguments and of the inferences that were drawn.  Likewise, HIP 
requires its author to interpret, explain, and describe historical factors that have 
bearing on the philosophical work in question. An important distinguishing feature 
between POH and HIP is the extent to which each makes use of context. 
Understanding how certain thoughts became possible, and made sense in the minds 
of figures in question, depends very much on situating that person within their 
historical context.  Because of this, a POH study must be highly contextualized.   
This is key for understanding what a thinker’s view meant to that person, as opposed 
to what it means in the present context. The role of context remains important, 
though less so, in HIP. In either approach close reading, and interpretation of the text 
is essential.  Exegesis is the kernel of history of philosophy.   
 
What my project is not is philosophically oriented history (POH).  In other words, 
my larger aim is not to make the case that a particular thinker did indeed hold a 
particular view, and I don’t spend a lot of time giving reasons and evidence about an 
individual’s life that might make that case more plausible.  It is not the thinkers as 
individuals that are of ultimate importance to me.  My project is Historically 
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Informed Philosophy (HIP).  What this means is that my larger aim is to develop 
deeper understanding and clarification of philosophical positions, as opposed to 
those who held them.  I am less interested in reasons why a philosopher might have 
held a view than I am in how a particular view has advanced philosophical 
understanding, or how the way a view has been received or not received has 
impacted the longer discussion on that issue.  
 
To provide a preview, which I’ll go into in more detail later: my interest is in coming 
to a deeper understanding of the ways that the unit-ideas of empiricism and the New 
Science influenced the way that aspects of mind were theorized in the Hobbes, 
Locke, and Hume.  Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are case studies: the first deals with Hobbes 
on mental architecture; the second is focused on Locke on free will; and the third 
clarifies a misinterpretation of Hume.  Along with clarifying the role of these unit-
ideas in explaining aspects of mind, this project seeks also thereby to develop deeper 
appreciation and understanding of each of these three thinkers.  
What Are Unit-Ideas? 
 
I take the term ‘unit-ideas’ from Arthur O. Lovejoy’s 1936 landmark work, The 
Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea. In that work, Lovejoy 
expands on the concept of ‘unit-ideas’ as they pertain to a HIP-style historical study 
like mine. In working with unit-ideas, old arguments and views are broken up into 
their component parts.  Those component parts can then be re-examined in a 
different organization. It divides material up in a different way, bringing the parts 
into new relations, and viewing it from the standpoint of a specific purpose 
(Lovejoy, 3). For example, in The Great Chain of Being Lovejoy analyzes the 
origins of the ideas of plenitude, continuity, and graduation in the philosophies of 
Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists.  He traces the most significant of their 
ramifications in subsequent religious thinking, in ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics, 
as well as in astronomical and biological theories.   
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Unit-ideas can appear disguised in different regions of the intellectual world, and 
they can be traced through multiple phases of reflection.  The aim is to trace them to 
their historical sources, and to observe their fusion.  Through doing this, we may 
take note of some of the most significant influences, and to see how later generations 
may have derived conclusions from them that are very different from what their 
originators might have thought (21).  This process can reveal the fact that theoretical 
systems that appear disparate are actually quite similar, and clarify the ways that 
similar systems are different.  It can also show that the different logical 
combinations of elements of a philosophical doctrine are not always readily 
recognizable (4).1 
Broader Perspective, Enriched Conceptual Resources  
& Revealed Assumptions 
 
Gaining broader perspective is an important outcome achieved by analyzing 
philosophical work through the lens of unit-ideas. What readers may achieve is a 
livelier sense of the fact that most philosophical systems are original or distinctive in 
their patterns, rather than in their components. In looking at the views of mind 
offered by Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, what I find is that, uncovering their similar 
presuppositions, we see that what might appear very disparate at the surface level is 
actually very similar at a deeper, more fundamental level. These thinkers accepted 
similar components, and what differed was the degree to which they were committed 
to a particular view, as well as the patterns in which the ideas appeared. 
Appreciation of the fact that most systems are not unique or new in terms of their 
components is very helpful when it comes to identifying and situating evolved 
iterations of those ideas. As a result, we gain broader perspective on the shape(s) of 
views of mind produced by the combination of empiricism and New Science.  As a 
result, we’re in a very good position to identify problems and benefits of new                                                         
1 There has been some debate over Lovejoy’s methodology, particularly over what 
constitutes a unit-idea, however, I leave those debates aside here. 
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iterations or patterns comprised of these units.  The ability to recognize new patterns 
of familiar components is one way in which a broader perspective is gained.   
 
Conceptual resources are enriched by the development of genuine understanding of 
the landmark positions that frame contemporary discussions. Oftentimes concepts 
are at play in contemporary discussions, but the genealogy of these concepts is not 
understood.  This is important because the way that a concept or framework 
develops over time can point to an otherwise unseen aspect of a larger view. For 
example, Locke’s account of liberty and volition involves tensions that are inherent 
to the marrying of an account of volition that has power—which is to say, an 
account of volition that is not passive—and a mechanistic-style framework.  Locke’s 
work on volition informs what might motivate a thinker to adopt a determinist, 
compatibilist, or libertarian view of volition, working from within a mechanical 
empiricist framework.  Thinking of volition as having power in Locke’s sense is 
important – but without looking at what this meant and why it was considered that 
way leaves parts of that notion opaque and not as easily handled.  In uncovering the 
stages of evolution of certain concepts, we may attend more carefully to their 
philosophical significance. Changes in perspective may also engender doubt whether 
we are wholly immune from different but equally great confusions. 
 
In addition to enriched conceptual resources and broader horizons, this approach 
also helps develop deeper understanding of underlying assumptions.  Assumptions 
are often too familiar to be easily noticed; they may be deeply embedded, un-argued 
for, or un-avowed.  Identifying these assumptions can help us to ask better questions, 
diagnose current ills, and attend more perceptively to the ways that philosophers 
have been “received.” For example, in my case study on Hobbes, I question 
assumptions around the way that Hobbes has been received – or more accurately, 
has not been received—as a bona fide philosopher of mind. Taking Hobbes seriously 
as a philosopher of mind helps to re-orient contemporary empiricist approaches to 
explaining mind within a long-standing tradition.  From within that tradition, it is 
easier to evaluate the advances, as well as the problems still facing those views.  In 
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considering new ways of receiving historical figures such as Hobbes, we may re-
situate the way we think about how the story continues. This is just one example of 
how we may notice and question assumptions that may be implicit and unarticulated. 
The Particulars of My Study 
 
Now that I have said what kind of study mine is and what it isn’t, discussed the 
value of the approach of unit-ideas, and referred briefly to my study’s specific focus, 
I can be more direct about the particulars of my study. The main question under 
discussion is how mind can fit into the world as it was revealed by the New Science 
broadly construed, and within an empiricist approach? There are two overarching 
aims to this exploration.   
 
The aim of this study is to come to a fuller, deeper appreciation of these 
relationships amongst the unit-ideas of empiricism, the New Science, and aspects of 
mind in order to gain enriched conceptual resources, broader perspective, and deeper 
understanding of underlying assumptions. On the one hand, this involves 
highlighting how these connections among New Science, empiricism, and mind are 
mutually supporting, and why. On the other hand, there are also tensions that seem 
to be inherent to these constellations.   In order to highlight both of these, I have 
chosen to explore these ideas in three case studies, looking at portions of the texts of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume.  This project is structured both chronologically and 
thematically, and each case study is presented in a separate article.  I begin with the 
most distant thinker, and take them in chronological order: Hobbes, then Locke, and 
finally, Hume.  This helps to clarify how some aspects of concepts and views 
evolved in response to objections that were raised to previous patterns and iterations. 
 
In the first paper, I look at how Hobbes’ particular conception of empiricism and his 
version of the New Science support one another in his account of mental 
architecture. While Hobbes has not been received as a philosopher of mind so much 
as a political philosopher, his theory of mind is surprisingly sophisticated.  Even so, 
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it faces some very important problems and objections. Hobbes was Descartes’ 
contemporary, and while both philosophers put primary importance on 
epistemology, with well-articulated theories of mind, the one has gone down in 
history as a highly significant thinker on mind, while the other has gone all but 
unnoticed in that area. This is unfortunate.  One benefit of attending to Hobbes as a 
quintessential empiricist philosopher of mind is that the challenges and benefits of 
Descartes’ theory of mind come into greater relief by comparison.  The problems 
and advantages of characteristic rationalist and empiricist attempts at explaining 
mind create deeper understanding of both. 
  
In the second paper my focus turns to Locke’s ever-evolving account of volition and 
liberty.  Locke’s Chapter 13 entitled, of Power is the most vigorously revised and 
edited portions of his Essay.  In that chapter, Locke works to produce an account of 
freedom and volition that squares with his New Scientific and empiricist 
commitments.  As he moves deeper into the problem, his account of freedom 
becomes increasingly libertarian, and this creates increasing tension with his 
scientific worldview.  The end result is a text that has troubled commentators since 
the time of its publication. While many commentators have sought to defend 
Locke’s reputation by reading consistency into the text, my approach is different.  I 
find value in the way that Locke laid bare some of the very real tensions inherent to 
the combination of features of the New Science, empiricism, and mind.  For that 
reason, Locke ought to be considered an intellectual hero, struggling with genuine 
difficulties, rather than having produced a consistent text that he for some reason, 
neglected to make explicitly consistent. 
 
In the third and final paper, I apply some of the lessons learned from the first two 
papers, about the way that different aspects and features of the New Science and 
empiricism interact in explanations of mind.  In doing this, I take on Stephen 
Buckle’s recent argument that Hume ought to be considered a covert materialist, 
given the similarity that his view of mind holds to Hobbes’ view.  The error Buckle 
makes is illustrative of the kind of mistake one might make without appreciating the 
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role of variation in a thinker’s conception of the New Science and of empiricism.  I 
argue that in fact, Hume should not be considered a covert materialist—at least not 
for the reasons Buckle provides. 
Two Key Notions: Empiricism & New Science 
 
Both empiricism and the New Science are complex, imprecise notions that include a 
range of features, and that admit of a range of gradations.  A thinker can be 
committed to each of these notions in varying degrees, as well as in varying aspects.  
I begin by providing background on empiricism as a general approach, and then 
describe some sub-varieties of empiricism.  Following that, I provide some general 
remarks about the New Science, followed by some of its characteristic features.  
 
Traditionally, empiricism is the idea that all knowledge rests on a foundation of 
sense experience2.  Another formulation of empiricism is that there is nothing in the 
mind that is not first in the senses.  It’s important to be clear about the difference 
between empiricism and the empirical.  Rationalists like Descartes value and make 
use of empirical information.  At the same time, empiricism does not deny the 
possibility or significance of knowledge that comes from reflection or internal 
experiences.  The important difference between empiricism and rationalism lies in 
their orientation toward sensation.  The basic orientation of empiricism is toward 
sensation as foundational for knowledge.  By way of contrast, the basic orientation 
of rationalism is away from sensation as a foundation of knowledge.   
 
Some of the sub-varieties, or aspects, of empiricism derive from what one is 
empiricist about.  For instance, one can be an empiricist about psychological 
development.  As mentioned, one might be empiricist about the source of mental                                                         
2 Empiricists may hold a variety of positions on metaphysical matters, since 
empiricism is a view about what knowledge is, and how it can be acquired.  For 
example, one can be a materialist empiricist, as is Hobbes; an idealist empiricist, as 
is Berkeley, or metaphysically agnostic as is Hume.  Empiricism itself remains silent 
about metaphysical matters. 
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content, believing that this derives from sensory experience.  On this model, the 
mind is “empty” until the senses come into contact with the external environment.  
One might also be empiricist about mental development, whereby cognitive 
development takes place as the gradual acquisition of knowledge through 
experience.  Both of these would be aspects of empiricism that apply to the 
psychological. That is, one could, for example, believe that to have any mental 
contents requires experience with the external world, while mental processes are 
innate.  On the other hand, one could believe that both mental contents and mental 
processes are the result of contact of the sensory organs with the world.  What all 
empiricist approaches have in common, however, is that they emphasize the 
importance, and the role of sensory experience in knowledge.  Another sub-variety 
of empiricism pertains to justification. To be empiricist about justification is to think 
that the ground, or warrant for a belief has its foundation in sensory experience.  
Empiricism about justification may apply variously to philosophy of psychology, 
individual epistemology, and philosophy of science. In the case of individual 
epistemology, empiricism grounds the justification of individuals’ beliefs in 
experience.  One way that this relates to science is that what it is that justifies what 
constitutes a legitimate scientific methodology relies on appeal to experience. This 
applies specifically in philosophy of psychology.  In the case of philosophy of 
psychology, empiricism about justification means that claims about mental 
development are justified only on empirical grounds.  In each of these varieties of 
empiricism, one might hold this view in varying degrees.  For instance, it is possible 
to hold the position that empirical support from sensory experience is necessary but 
not sufficient, or that empirical support is both necessary and sufficient for 
justification.   
 
The second key idea that requires some explication is the New Science.  The New 
Science was a movement that was a rival and replacement for the Aristotelianism of 
the medieval period, and which dominated physical theory from the 1630’s to the 
middle of the 18th Century. The Modern period was witness to a self-conscious move 
away from Scholastic models of explanation that were rooted in Aristotle’s “first 
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qualities.”  On this model, “first qualities” were thought to be the causes of the 
properties and behaviour of bodies.  For example, sensible warmth might be thought 
to be caused by heat. During the medieval period, this kind of explanation was 
considered both satisfactory, and complete. But by the late 17th century, this model 
of explanation had become the object of not only literary satire, but also philosophic 
critique (Nadler 1998, 517-18). This kind of explanation came to be considered 
outmoded, occult, and mystical (Boas and Hall, 1959, 168). Boyle, for one, thought 
that explaining white colouration by means of ‘whiteness,’ failed to make any 
progress in advancing our understanding of the phenomenon.  It merely repeated the 
property or behaviour in a hypostasized form (Nadler, 527). Bacon thought this kind 
of explanation did nothing other than report on the fact that one type of change 
occurs in one kind of circumstance, while another type of change occurs in another 
sort of circumstance (Falkenstein, 1). An important problem with the Aristotelian 
view is that knowledge of the way substances work has to be discovered one by one, 
in experimentation. The task of finding out about the world by experimenting in 
various circumstances was an impossibly large research project. Cutting down on the 
amount of empirical work necessary to gain power over nature was an important 
reason for reconsidering this approach (Falkenstein, 2). 
 
By way of contrast with the Scholastics, Modern thinkers sought simple, non-trivial 
explanations about the causes of phenomena by describing not only how and why the 
phenomenon happened as it did, but also why it did not happen otherwise (Nadler, 
520). They shifted away from the view of active powers in nature, toward a view of 
nature that is passive and inert, which removed the mysterious, occult forces or 
qualities that would need to be discovered one by one by experience and 
experimentation.  This movement toward an inert view of nature ushered in a 
strategy for explanation that hearkened back to the ancient atomists.  Ease of 
explanation could be achieved by positing that nature was comprised of tiny 
homogenous particles in motion, governed by universal laws.  Movement and change 
took place in a way that was modeled by macro objects, like billiard balls. Movement 
and change were thus explained in terms of mechanism.  Mechanism is the view that 
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phenomena can be explained in terms of natural laws governing the motion and 
collision of matter. Macro-level properties were to be explained in terms of micro-
level properties. Mechanisms were thought to show how things work, to reveal the 
activities by which phenomena are truly brought into being, and to show how things 
actually are in nature, not just in our understanding.  It is contrasted with vitalism and 
teleology. 
 
This view of the movement of homogenous particles governed by “laws” of nature 
was a significant part of the mechanization of the world-picture. It is important to 
note that such accounts were more or less hypothetical. This is because the structures 
employed in explanations were inaccessible to observation, given their minute size.3 
Another feature of the New Science is its move away from an authoritarian approach 
to knowledge (Aristotelianism) and a move toward an anti-authoritarian approach to 
knowledge.  Knowledge was something that could be sought and attained by anyone, 
provided they used what were believed to be the proper method(s) to attain it.  In 
addition to this, there was a movement away from explanations that made appeals to 
final causes, or teleological explanations (although many such accounts were entirely 
consistent with the notion of God).  Only efficient causes were recognized or 
required for explanation. The mechanization of the world-picture also featured the 
introduction of geometrical concepts, as well as the mathematical concepts of 
classical mechanics, and a new emphasis on a central role of quantification in 
understanding nature. 
 
 
 
                                                         
3 Mechanical explanations might be thought as somewhat occult for the reason that 
corpuscles are not observed, but instead are theoretical posits. While Seventeenth-
century mechanists generally recognized the hypothetical nature of their 
explanations, this tended not to diminish their confidence, and their absolute 
certainty in their conclusions (Nadler, 521).  This picture of the world was not 
derived from the phenomena (Boas and Hall, 168). 
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Table 1 
      
New Science  Rival & replacement for Aristotelianism 
Anti-authoritarian in tenor 
Nature Natural world entirely passive 
Motion/change is not actualization of some power in the 
substance itself 
Elimination of powers from all natural substances 
Mode of explanation Macro-level properties explained in terms of lower level ones 
Removal of occult forces and powers 
Mechanism Mechanization of world-picture 
Nature described with mathematical/geometrical concepts  
Particles 
 
Simple, unified, deterministic, quantifiable 
Causation Only efficient causes recognized or required 
Rejection of teleology and final causes 
Cartesian New Science  
(Rationalist) 
Science is demonstrative as a series of valid deductions from 
self-evident truths, rather than as something rooted in 
observation and experiment. 
Sub-variety of Empiricism 
 
What is approached empirically  
Justification 
 
 
Philosophy of psychology (The science of mental development) 
Individual epistemology (Grounding justification of individuals’ 
beliefs) 
Philosophy of science (Scientific methodology) 
Psychology Source of mental contents 
Mental development over time 
The source of mental mechanisms 
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Starting point for science and physics is the existence of God (as 
described in Discourse on Method) 
 
Newtonian New Science 
(Experimental Philosophy) 
Self-conscious turn away from Cartesian scientific methodology 
Denies the metaphysics of essences 
Refrains from formulating hypotheses  
Admits no more causes of natural things than such as are both 
true and sufficient to explain their appearances 
Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is rejected 
Whether metaphysical, physical, based on occult qualities, or 
mechanical, hypotheses have no place in experimental 
philosophy 
Table 2  
Summary  
 
I wish to remind my reader that my aim is to gain clarity around the ways in which 
empiricism, the New Science, and aspects of mind are mutually supporting, as well 
as the tensions that are inherent in this constellation of ideas. My approach to this 
historical work is what I’ve called Historically Informed Philosophy (HIP) as 
opposed to Philosophically Oriented History (POH), so while I recognize the 
significance of context, this is not a highly contextualized approach. Instead, it is a 
close look at specific unit-ideas as they are expressed in a few key texts from 
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. 
A Final Caveat: Errors May Lie in Wait  
for We Non-Specialists 
 
Because studies that look at unit-ideas tend to cut across multiple fields, they are 
written and designed for a mixed academic audience, not for specialists in a single 
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field.  It’s important to keep in mind that there certain kinds of errors that lie in wait 
for the non-specialist.  For example, a non-specialist looking at historical figures is 
bound to exclude some of the nuance and subtlety that might appear in a specialized 
interpretation and analysis.  This is necessary in order to achieve the right level of 
generality to make claims that are more generally applicable.  In other words, detail 
gets lost as we move away from the highly specialized view.  But there are also 
virtues that are involved with moving away from the highly specialized perspective.  
Certain problems can’t be understood or resolved by looking too closely at a 
problem.  The trick is to find the right level of generality that a problem requires.  
There are many valuable outcomes that can be achieved despite missing out on some 
detail and nuance.   
 
In this study, there are several contributory outcomes I’m aiming at.  In making a 
contribution to the history of philosophy, one aim is to find ways of re-imagining 
past thinkers.  This involves releasing an old image of a thinker, and replacing it 
with something new and different.  In the case of Hobbes, for example, I aim to 
bring new light to the value and importance of Hobbes’ work in philosophy of mind. 
This can have important implications and influence on the way we read Hobbes’ 
social and political work.  Another example is the new image that I offer of Locke’s 
work on liberty and the will.  While this part of his corpus is usually seen as 
troubled, and perhaps even a source of embarrassment for Locke, I offer a 
celebratory view that focuses on the values that arise from the tensions created in 
Locke’s account. When we re-imagine past figures we can mine their work for more 
value. Another consequence is that it becomes possible to put to bed old debates.  In 
the case of Locke for example, I make the case that it’s not necessary to seek out 
Locke’s final position and trying to fit him into one of the three main categories in 
the free will debate.  Instead, we can simply recognize that he doesn’t fit into any of 
those categories, and move on to more useful questions. 
 
In making a contribution to philosophy of mind, my aim is to help to reorient some 
issues of debate by focusing on its historical dimensions.  If contemporary issues are 
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relevantly similar to the ones I discuss from the Modern period, then the potential is 
there to mine the past for more value, and to gain a greater understanding of what 
does, and does not work about a particular view.  The historical dimension is an 
important and even necessary filter for analysis.  Showing how exactly this is so 
often requires a close and detailed look at a relatively small issue, and drawing it out 
through to the contemporary context. 
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Chapter Two 
Hobbesian Mental Architecture 
 
The habits of an elementary particle of matter cannot change… the particle is itself 
an unchangeable thing ~ William James, The Principles of Psychology 
 
It is interesting to notice how some philosophers gain the adoration—or infamy—of 
posterity, while others lay by the wayside.  And it might seem that there are always 
good reasons why this should be so—that one thinker’s view is superior to another’s, 
or that an idea resonates more during one time period versus another.  For example, 
it might seem that there must be good reason why Hobbes is mostly passed over in 
favour of Descartes in the traditional history of the philosophy of mind. Twentieth 
and twenty-first century philosophers frequently recount this history beginning with 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. Even when it had become fashionable 
to treat Descartes as the favoured whipping boy and to blame him for setting us off 
on the wrong footing, at least his view was well known, and at least reasonably well 
understood by contemporary philosophers of mind.  Not so, for Hobbes. 
 
Although Hobbes was Descartes’ contemporary, and despite the fact they had some 
very interesting and important exchanges on issues of mind, Hobbes’ theory of mind 
is seldom mentioned or given much attention. For example, in “Mind-body 
problems” by Daniel Garber and Margaret Wilson (2008), Hobbes is mentioned only 
as being an outlier to the more mainstream dualist views of people like Descartes. In 
this case, Hobbes is ignored because he is not typical or representative, and the view 
is that in the 17th century, he can safely be ignored.  And because he is typical or 
representative in the contemporary context, his view is pedestrian and can therefore 
be ignored. Perez Zagorin’s (1990) recent meta-analysis of the Hobbes literature 
shows that Hobbes is universally regarded as a quintessential political theorist, and a 
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prime moral philosopher (317). His view of mind, however, is almost completely 
absent from the meta-analysis. 
 
One reason why it might seem reasonable that Hobbes is largely neglected in his 
views on mind is that the particulars of his view are out of step with modern 
concerns.  But in fact, this seems less true for Hobbes than it does for Descartes.  
Cartesian substance dualism is largely out of fashion.  At the same time, Hobbes’ 
materialism and empiricism seem much more aligned with contemporary approaches 
to mind.   Hobbes’ theory of mind actually appears to fit quite nicely with modern 
approaches.  On the other hand, it might be supposed that the reason why we tend to 
look to Descartes for epistemology and metaphysics, while on the other hand, 
looking to Hobbes for political and moral philosophy, is because of the 
predominance of epistemology in present-day concerns.  This is Sadler’s view 
(1990, 1099). But neither does this seem to be borne out by the facts. It is true that 
Descartes explicitly set out to “expound the basis” upon which “all human certainty 
can be founded,” and this puts his epistemological agenda front and centre.  And it is 
also true that Hobbes’ project was to justify political principles by appeal to the 
agreement that suitably situated, rational, free, and equal persons would make. But 
Hobbes’ moral and political theory is explicitly based on his view of the mind of 
man4.  This includes, importantly, what can be known, and how it can be known.  
For example, Hobbes begins his treatise on The Elements of Law with the statement 
that the explication of the elements of laws depend in part on knowledge of what 
human nature is (1). The Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan each share a 
structure that begins with questions about mind and works towards questions in 
political philosophy. A scientific account of human nature and volition was the 
foundation of Hobbes’ civil philosophy (Overhoff, 113). What appears front and                                                         
4 A note on gendered language: Since Hobbes refers to human beings as “man” I 
maintain this language myself when referring to Hobbes’ view. I adopt this practice 
to avoid anachronistically attributing to Hobbes a neutral position on gender, which I 
don’t think is warranted.  This should not be read as an implicit endorsement of the 
practice of referring to all humans as “man”, but instead as an attempt to remain 
historically accurate. 
 21 
centre in Hobbes’ corpus is his political and moral philosophy, but Hobbes’ 
approach to mind is neither more, nor less epistemologically driven than is 
Descartes’, even if their ultimate agendas were rather different.   
 
Another reason why it might seem justified to neglect Hobbes’ view of mind is 
because his physics turned out to be terribly mistaken. It is true that in fact, motion 
does not take place at all in the way that Hobbes thinks it does.  Hobbes has gained 
some notoriety for the weakness of his physics.  But this is not a problem that is 
unique to Hobbes.  For example, Descartes’ physics turns out also to be very much 
mistaken, as was the physical view of many of the thinkers in this time period.  A 
mistaken physics is not enough of a reason to fail to take Hobbes’ view seriously. 
 
If Hobbes’ view of mind ought not to be neglected because it’s out of step with 
modern concerns, perhaps it is neglected because it hasn’t been considered very 
good, and isn’t worthy of much consideration. Perhaps Hobbes’ view of mind was 
just naïve and simplistic.  Hobbes was a materialist who thought that everything 
could be explained in terms of matter and motion.  At first glance, it looks as though 
Hobbes might face some serious difficulties in explaining the complexity of mind 
with such austere conceptual resources.  How can something as complex and diverse 
as cognitive architecture be explained with only homogenous particles and 
movement?   
 
In this paper, I take this last concern very seriously, and look at how well Hobbes is 
able to explain the complexity of mental architecture in terms only of matter and 
motion.  I argue that, in fact, Hobbes accounts for the complexity of mind 
surprisingly well.  Hobbes’ view of mind is sophisticated, and worthy of more 
consideration.  While he does face some important difficulties, these are difficulties 
that are not unique to his view.     
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The Game Plan 
 
With this in mind, my interest is in taking a closer look at the way empiricism and 
the New Science gave shape to mental architecture according to Hobbes. I begin first 
by covering some key background conceptions, including the heterogeneity of the 
mental and some standard approaches taken to account for it.  I then explicate 
Hobbes’ unique flavours of both empiricism and the New Science, and lay out the 
picture of mind that Hobbes offers, which stems out of these commitments. From 
there, I analyze the view, highlighting some of the surprising successes, as well as 
one very difficult problem that it faces.  
Background Notions: Innate Heterogeneity, Innate 
Homogeneity, Derived Heterogeneity 
 
Mental life appears to be characterized by several different parts, functions, 
faculties, or modules.  These different functions have been labeled differently, and 
have been taxonomized in different ways.  In other words, there is a certain level of 
complexity, or heterogeneity to the mental. For example, mind is made up 
offunctions like thought, imagination, memory, volition, and perception. There are 
various ways that a theorist might deal with the complexity of mental life, namely, 
innate heterogeneity, innate homogeneity, and derived heterogeneity. The first 
approach to the apparent complexity of the mind is to assert that the mind is 
fundamentally heterogeneous. This is to say that the mind is, by nature, made up of 
different parts. This possibility would not be available to a thinker, like Hobbes, who 
proposes that the micro-level is comprised of homogenous particles.  The second 
approach, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is a complete denial of the 
heterogeneity of mind.  On this view, mind is thought of as a general purpose 
learning and reasoning machine. The view that the mind is “completely 
homogenous” is a denial of any real distinction between parts of mind.  A 
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philosopher like Hobbes, who acknowledges various parts of the mind working 
together does not have this option available.  A final approach to this issue is derived 
heterogeneity.  On this view, the mind is made up out of homogenous stuff, but at 
the higher level, it also has different parts that work together in the larger 
phenomena of mind.  Given Hobbes’ commitments to the heterogeneity of the mind, 
as well as to the kind of explanation that appeals to homogenous particles, he needs 
to tell a story of how we get derived heterogeneity of mind.5 
Hobbes’ Empiricism 
 
The specific nature of Hobbes’ pre-theoretic commitments to both empiricism and 
the New Science is important for understanding how these commitments shape his 
theory of mind. One of the simplest and most general ways of thinking about 
empiricism is that it emphasizes the role of the sensory in the production of 
knowledge.  While thinkers generally understood to belong to the rationalist 
tradition tend to acknowledge the importance of input from the sensory, they do not 
hold to the stronger view that empiricists do, namely that the sensory is necessary 
for knowledge, if there can be any knowledge.  For rationalists, there are some kinds 
of knowledge—knowledge of mathematical concepts, for instance—which do not 
require sensory experience.  Indeed, there are some kinds of knowledge that can’t be 
obtained through sensory experience.  Empiricists, on the other hand are 
characterized by the general view that the sensory is necessary for knowledge, 
although they may differ on the issue of whether the sensory is also sufficient for 
knowledge.  In other words, empiricists come in varying degrees of strength, 
although they all emphasize the role of the sensory in knowledge.   
                                                         
5 There are two senses in which heterogeneity might be ‘derived.’ The first is 
developmental.  This is so say that psychological development involves the 
evolution of increasing complexity of internal mechanisms, abilities, and 
experiences. The other sense is metaphysical.  This is to say that the stuff out of 
which mind is made is itself complex.  While I recognize this distinction, I leave it 
aside here. 
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As an empiricist, Hobbes is an interesting case. Hobbes is an empiricist in the sense 
that he does clearly and explicitly emphasize the role of the sensory in the 
production of knowledge. Throughout his works, Hobbes consistently takes 
sensation as the starting point of his theory of mind. For example, in Leviathan 
(1651) he writes, “there is no conception in a man’s mind which hath not at first, 
totally, or by part, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from 
that original” (1). The senses are at the front and centre of his view. He is an 
empiricist particularly as it pertains to individual epistemology, and psychological 
development, including both content, and psychological processes. Sensory learning 
is king in terms of Hobbes’ view of psychological development.  Thought requires 
sensory experience—there are no mental contents without sensory experience. 
Hobbes’ account of action, which I will briefly outline below, also requires the 
combination of thought and passion—both having originated in sensation.  
Deliberate action is, therefore, dependent on sensory experience. Because of this, 
the action required to enter, and engage in civil life, are all based on a foundation of 
sensation.  Hobbes’ empiricist leanings also appear in his political philosophy in 
other ways, too.  Hobbes asserts that the assumptions he uses in civil philosophy can 
be confirmed by experience.  He also insists on civil histories – records of 
experience—to support the conclusions of civil philosophy (Sorell, 140).  In many 
key and standard ways, Hobbes is a paradigm of an empiricist. 
 
On the other hand, Hobbes exhibits some rationalist leanings in other areas of his 
work, particularly in his view of science. Hobbes’ differences with the Royal Society 
over scientific method raised the question to what extent he is an empiricist in 
philosophy of science. While Hobbes emphasizes the influence of experience on 
thought, imagination and passion, he also tended to think that it was necessary to 
correct and revise experience by reason, in order to benefit people (Sorell, 134). 
What’s more, for Hobbes, experiment is not essential to science. He believes, for 
example, that if doing so helped explain a natural phenomenon, it is perfectly 
legitimate to postulate types of motion beyond the reach of the senses (134).  The 
impression that Hobbes had “anti-empiricist” leanings is supported by examination 
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of Hobbes’ method of physics, which does not give observation an important role, as 
described in Decameron Physiologicum (1678). The way Hobbes emphasizes reason 
in the scientific method is also apparent in Elements of Philosophy (1656), Part 1, 
section 4: 
 
[T]o those that search after Science indefinitely, which consists in the 
knowledge of the Causes of all things, as far forth as it may be attained, 
and the causes of Singular things are compounded by the Causes of 
Universal or Simple things, it is necessary that they know the Causes of 
Universal things, or of such Accidents as are common to all Bodies, 
that is, to all Matter, before they can know their Causes…Moreover, 
seeing Universal things are contained in the Nature of Singular things, 
the knowledge of them is to be acquired by Reason, that is, by 
Resolution (50). 
 
Hobbes’ unique position regarding empiricism and rationalism brings out an 
important point that warrants emphasizing.  There is a variety of different ways in 
which one can adhere to empiricism and rationalism.  As mentioned above, one 
might be an empiricist about justification, but a rationalist about psychological 
development.  It is also possible, for example, to be rationalist about individual 
epistemology at the same time as being empiricist about justification.  It might be 
thought that these categories of position are mutually exclusive, and it’s not possible, 
without inconsistency, to hold both rationalist and empiricist positions at the same 
time.  But it becomes clear that’s not so once we recognize that there are a variety of 
ways in which these distinctions apply.  What’s more, these positions are graded.  
This is to say that one can be more, or less extreme in holding to rationalism or 
empiricism. For example, Hobbes certainly emphasized the role of sensation in 
important parts of his view, and yet he took a softer view in other areas. In terms of 
gradation, Hume is much more extreme in his empiricism than is Hobbes.  At the 
same time, there isn’t complete overlap between the two thinkers regarding what 
they are empiricist about. There is a variety of axes along which these positions can 
 26 
be measured. Hume is more deeply empiricist in terms of what he thinks empiricism 
applies to, and the extent to which he is committed to empiricism in each case.  
Hobbes’ New Science  
 
In his allegiance to the New Science, Hobbes is much more a standard case. Hobbes’ 
views about nature and science are heavily influenced by Galileo, and other 
scientific innovators (Sorell, 133), and he made great efforts to distance himself 
from the Aristotelian tradition. He eschews talk of formal and final causes and 
provides explanations in terms of efficient causation and mechanism. Carlin (2009) 
calls Hobbes an “unrelenting mechanist” (33). In essence, this means that for 
Hobbes, all natural change is explained in terms of the mathematical properties of 
matter in accordance with the laws of nature. He believes that motion, in the sense of 
change of place of bodies or their parts, is a single universal cause of all difference 
and change. In Hobbes’ worldview, nature is passive and deterministic.   
 
He is also a materialist, and thinks that, like the natural world, the mind is comprised 
of tiny particles—everything that exists for Hobbes is matter in motion.  In the 
preface to the reader of Dialogus Physicus (1661), Hobbes writes, “Nature does all 
things by the conflict of bodies pressing each other mutually with their motions.” 
Hobbes thinks that no body can move itself, and that bodies are moved only by 
another body in motion that comes into contact with them.  Everything that exists is 
extended, or is found together with extension.  Thus, there are no “ghostly” 
substances to be appealed to in order to explain phenomena such as the mental. As a 
consequence, mind was also found with extension.  This will be taken up in the 
following section. 
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Hobbes’ Mental Architecture:  
Conceptions, Imagination, and Dreams 
 
Given that Hobbes allows himself only matter and motion, and that he is an 
empiricist in certain respects, as explained above, how well is he able to account for 
the heterogeneity of the mental?  In order to answer this question, it is necessary to 
get a clear grasp of his conception of mind.  That’s what this section is about.  Here, 
I will outline how Hobbes explained mind, and how he saw the varying parts of 
mind working together, yet all ultimately comprised of tiny moving homogenous 
particles. 
 
The general picture of mind that Hobbes set forth is that tiny particles, or atoms, 
make contact with the sense organs.  Hobbes thinks there are two kinds of motion: 
rectilinear and curvilinear.  When a particle makes contact with a sense organ, its 
motion creates an impression, or a motion “inward” into the body. Conceptions can 
be either thoughts or passions, depending on where they are located in the body. If 
they are located in the head they are thoughts, and if they are located in the heart, 
they are passions. It is in the nature of Hobbes’ conception of curvilinear motion that 
over time, this motion “winds down” or decays.  What this means is that once the 
objects making contact with the sense organs are no longer present, the conceptions 
in the mind have a limited shelf life, and over time they begin to decay. Because of 
this, mental images begin to become more obscure.  This “decaying sense” is what 
he calls imagination. He writes, 
 
any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it 
made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding and 
working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made 
weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence 
it followeth that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any 
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object, the weaker is the imagination.  (Hobbes, Leviathan, 88). 
 
For Hobbes, when we signify that the sense is decaying, we call it “memory.” 
Imagination and memory are one and the same—namely, they are those things 
formerly perceived by the senses—understood by two different names.  Hobbes 
thinks that a lot of memory is what we call “experience.” Imagination that is raised 
by words or signs is called “understanding.”  Dreams are imagination that takes 
place while asleep.  Since the brain and nerves—the organs of sense—are 
“benumbed” in sleep, dreams are the “agitation of the inward parts of man’s body” 
and these motions, which are imaginations made previously.  Dreams are, 
 
what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man’s body; 
which inward parts, for the connection they have with the brain and 
other organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in 
motion; whereby the imaginations there formerly made, appear as if 
a man were waking (ibid). 
 
Because dreams are caused by “inward” parts of the body, different feelings in a 
person cause different kinds of dreams.  Hobbes explains, 
  
And hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth 
the thought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the 
brain to the inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being 
reciprocal; and that, as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body 
when we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same 
parts causeth anger, and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an 
enemy…In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking 
imaginations, the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, 
and when we dream at another. (ibid) 
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The Hobbesian picture is one where motion and particles are sufficient to explain 
mental life, from memory to dreams, imagination, passions, and thoughts.  The 
motion of particles that make contact with the sense organs creates pressure 
inwards, and this pressure constitutes the varieties of mental experiences that we 
have. 
Mental Architecture: Ratiocination  
 
Hobbes took a language of thought view of cognition.  Basically, his view is that 
conceptions are mental items that can be labeled, or “marked” with words.  This 
marking allows for later recall, when the object, once pressed against the senses is 
no longer present. Hobbes writes that a mark is, “a sensible object which a man 
erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to remember thereby somewhat past, when 
the same is objected to his sense again” (Elements of Law, 17).  Such marks may 
then be “recalled to our mind [and] as are like those thoughts for which we took 
them” (Elements of Philosophy, 13). We mark conceptions not only so that we can 
recall them, but because doing so also allows us to think, or ratiocinate with them. 
Ratiocination is computation—a way of manipulating mental symbols or words.   
 
By RATIOCINATION, I mean computation. Now to compute, is 
either to collect the sum of many things that are added together, or 
to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another. 
Ratiocination, therefore, is the same with addition and subtraction; 
and if any man add multiplication and division, I will not be against 
it, seeing multiplication is nothing but addition of equals one to 
another, and division nothing but a subtraction of equals one from 
another, as often as is possible. So that all ratiocination is 
comprehended in these two operations of the mind, addition and 
subtraction. (Elements of Philosophy, 3) 
 
In Hobbes’ view, thinking is a simple process of addition and subtraction over marks 
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that are attached onto conceptions.  For Hobbes, “Reason…is nothing but reckoning 
(that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon, 
for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” (30).  
Mental Architecture: Passions 
 
Hobbesian passions are particularly seldom studied, and are, in general, not very 
well understood.  Very little has been written about the topic. Gary Herbert (1989) 
recognizes that the centrality of the passions in Hobbes’ account of human nature 
makes examining them carefully absolutely fundamental.  And at the same time, this 
is exactly what is lacking in most Hobbes studies (87). The lack of attention to 
Hobbesian passions can be seen among non-specialists who incorrectly hold that, 
according to Hobbes, reason and passion war with one another, and that what we are 
after is the triumph of reason over passion.  For instance, Arrigo Pacchi (1987) 
writes, “it is well known that the cornerstone of Hobbes’ political philosophy is the 
opposition between reason and the emotions” (111).  For Pacchi, passions are to 
blame for the ills of humanity: 
 
[the state’s] stability is threatened not only by ignorance but also by 
the disrupting influence of the passions…Passions such as “Hope, 
Fear, Anger, Pitty”, when deliberately aroused by orators and 
demagogues (who themselves are moved by ill-directed emotions 
arising from a thirst for power) turn men “out of fools into 
madmen”… “[Reason] will only attain results comparable to those 
of geometry if it is free from the interference of passion”. (111) 
 
Pacchi argues that Hobbes is best read as arguing for the “devastating, pernicious 
influence of the passions on the attainment of the chief desire of men, the 
preservation of life and welfare” [italics mine] (112). Kim Sungmoon (2011) takes a 
similar view, writing, “in the Hobbesian man, passion (that is reduced to power) 
overwhelms reason, instead of being controlled by it…one’s inner-world…is 
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nothing but a bundle of self-moving passions, driving civil society into the state of 
“civil war”” (293-294).  Slomp (1998) also sees the passions, and glory in particular, 
as “crucial destabilizing forces that bring about human conflict” (553).The idea that 
the passions stand in opposition to reason, create conflict, and must be overcome in 
the development of civil society, also shows up in Ian Tregenza’s (2003) 
presentation of Michael Oakeshott’s view.  Tregenza argues that for Oakshott, pride 
is a “volatile and dangerous passion” that is central to man’s makeup (172), and “a 
dangerous emotion that must be tamed before civil society can be effectively 
established” (173).  On Oakeshott’s view the “promise” of reason is peace, and it is 
man’s “rational” powers that makes it possible for the human race to be emancipated 
from the “frustrations of natural appetite” (92).  
 
The view that the passions stand in opposition to reason can only be maintained by 
focussing on Hobbes’ political writing, without the context of his broader view of 
the nature of mind.  In fact, for Hobbes passions are just particles in motion, as are 
thoughts.  They are not inherently normative one way or the other, and they are not 
in themselves something to be overcome.  
 
Susan James (1997) is much more accurate in her interpretation of Hobbes, which is 
that conceptions and passions are identified.  James writes, “emotions 
are…conscious thoughts, which are our experience of bodily motions” (129). 
Passions and thoughts are differentiated by their location in the body – in the head 
for thoughts, and in the heart for passions. This can be seen in the following passage, 
where Hobbes is explicit that conceptions are motions that can move from the head 
to the heart and can be experienced, for example, as pleasure.  Hobbes writes, 
 
[C]onceptions or apparitions are nothing really, but motion in some 
internal substance of the head; which motion not stopping there, but 
proceeding to the heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder 
that motion which is called vital; when it helpeth, it is called 
DELIGHT, contentment, or pleasure, which is nothing really but 
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motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion within 
the head; and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or 
delightful, or by some name equivalent. (Elements of Law, 28) 
 
The precise relationship between thought and passion is somewhat elusive and open 
to interpretation. With regards to Hobbes’ theory, Leo Strauss (1956) also interprets 
thoughts and passions as being singular, comparing them together as corresponding 
to what Descartes and Locke called “ideas” (178).  For Hobbes, everything that is 
“internal” is mind. The limit of the body is the factor that determines what is mind, 
and what is not mind.  This is why Strauss sees that the internal life of man is unified 
by the boundary of the body.  Passions are best understood therefore, as mind, 
combining with thoughts in various ways to create even more mental complexity.  
Passions and thoughts integrate with one another in the process of deliberation, 
which is what immediately precedes deliberate action. 
 
I remind my reader at this point that my aim is to analyze the extent to which 
Hobbes is able to account for the heterogeneity of the mental.  This is in search of a 
justified reason why Hobbes’ view of mind receives so little attention.  While I have 
already rejected other possible reasons for the neglect of Hobbes’ view, I look now 
to diagnose whether this is because his view is just too simple, and can’t account for 
the complexity of mind.  To this end, I have explicated a good portion of Hobbesian 
mental architecture, including conceptions, imagination, dreams, and ratiocination. 
The purpose of this is to show the details of how Hobbes achieves complexity from 
simple parts.  This is to support my position that Hobbes deserves more recognition 
as a philosopher of mind.  I’ve also illustrated the way Hobbesian passions are 
sometimes misinterpreted, and how this impacts interpretations of Hobbes’ political 
philosophy. From here, I focus on a more accurate view of the passions, and how 
Hobbesian passions and thought integrate to account for the rich variety of 
experiences.  I briefly discuss some of the influence of this on his political 
philosophy, before moving on to evaluate the success as well as the challenges to 
Hobbes’ view. 
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The Integration of Passion and Thought 
 
Hobbes categorizes the passions at the most basic level according to whether they 
elicit a movement toward or away from a stimulus, calling them either “appetitive” 
or “aversive” respectively. When the object that draws us near is pleasing, the 
internal motion is called “appetite” and when it is displeasing, the internal motion 
away is called “aversion” (Elements of Law, 28). Emotions are a solicitation, or 
provocations to come near to something that is pleasing, or to withdraw from 
something that is displeasing. 
 
Hobbes’ identification and classification of the passions appear in The Elements of 
Law, De Cive, Leviathan, De Corpore, and De Homine. Hobbes’ view of the way 
passions relate to thoughts can be considered a precursor to what in modern times is 
called a cognitivist, or appraisal view of emotion. On such views, emotions are 
understood as associated with cognitions. In his discussion of the passions, Hobbes 
described how various complex feelings require thought in order to exist, and 
carefully explicated how feeling is the result of the way one thinks about and 
understands a situation.  For example, Hobbes’ explanation of fear involves a 
solicitation to move away from something.  But it also involves and requires the 
thought of some particular, undesirable event that takes place in the future. Fear 
then, requires thought.  This is so for any number of passions as explicated by 
Hobbes.  For example, courage is described as the experience of being in the 
presence of evil, but not feeling fear.  This experience requires a conception of evil 
in the imagination, and a feeling response to that conception.  Similarly, he describes 
anger, or “sudden courage,” as overcoming a present opposition.  This experience 
also requires a conception of the self, the other, and the situation, in response to 
which feeling is experienced.  In Hobbes’ words,  
 
COURAGE, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the 
presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common 
meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a 
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man in the way to his end.  ANGER (or sudden courage) is nothing 
but the appetite or desire of overcoming present 
opposition…(Elements of Law, 38)  
 
Hobbes’ extensive explanations of various passions show that a feeling response 
requires conceptions in the imagination.  Hope and trust are both construed in terms 
of the conceptions of expectations.  In the case of hope, it involves conceptions of 
the future: “HOPE is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil” 
(39). Trust is construed as a passion arising from expectations of another person: 
“TRUST is a passion proceeding from belief of him from whom we expect or hope 
for good, so free from doubt that upon the same we pursue no other way” (40).   
 
There are myriad examples of passions that Hobbes explains in relation to 
conceptions. For example, Hobbes explains feelings of repentance as arising from an 
understanding of the purpose of some particular action.  He writes, “REPENTANCE 
is the passion that proceedeth from opinion or knowledge that the action they have 
done is out of the way to the end they would attain” (39). Similarly, humility results 
from an understanding of our own infirmity: “The passion contrary to glory, 
proceeding from apprehension of our own infirmity, is called HUMILITY by those 
by whom it is approved” (Elements of Law, 38). Pity involves imagining a negative 
future situation: “PITY is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, 
proceeding from the sense of another man's present calamity” (40). Shame, a 
complicated emotion, involves the “remembrance” of defect or infirmity in oneself.  
Hobbes writes, 
 
It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a good opinion of himself, 
and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of the 
forwardness which that passion begetteth, discover in himself some 
defect or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and 
this passion is called SHAME. (38)  
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Hobbes provides a complex explanation of the experience of indignation, once again 
deriving empirically observed heterogeneity consistent with empiricism about 
contents, and a simple materialism.  This experience requires both a feeling – grief—
and the conception of good coming to those considered unworthy.  Hobbes writes, 
 
INDIGNATION is that grief which consisteth in the conception of 
good success happening to them whom they think unworthy thereof. 
Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they 
think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they have, but 
also of their own virtues. (Elements of Law, 40) 
 
The passion of glory, for instance, is a passionate response to imagination and 
conceptions. The same is true for vainglory.  Of these, Hobbes writes, 
 
Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion 
which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own 
power, above the power of him that contendeth with us… as when a 
man imagineth himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some 
romant, or to be like unto some other man whose acts he admireth. 
And this is called VAIN GLORY…(36) 
 
Hobbes’ account of how thoughts combine with passions to create the richness of 
human experience is, then, an excellent example of how he establishes complexity 
out of simple parts.  It is in the combinations and arrangement of the simples that 
this is achieved.  With conceptions, along with appetite and aversion, Hobbes 
provides a plausible account of the most nuanced and familiar experiences such as 
repentance, humility, shame, indignation, and vainglory.  
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A Brief Aside: Implications for Hobbes’ Political Philosophy 
 
An interesting upshot of these reflections on mental architecture is that 
interpretations of Hobbes’ political philosophy that involve a war between reason 
and passion are essentially in opposition to his empiricist, mechanist picture of the 
nature of man. Working up from the movement of particles, the psychological view 
and the view of action that Hobbes presents does not make a firm distinction 
between thought and passion, both of which are conceptions.  It is clear that both are 
required for action.  
 
The development of commonwealth requires passion, as well as thinking, or 
ratiocination. The possibility of coming out of the state of nature consists for man, 
“partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason” (Leviathan, Chapter 13). There are 
particular passions that induce man toward peaceful living, in particular the fear of 
death.  This is “necessary to commodious living.”  As well, there is the hope of 
attaining a better life.  Chapter 13 of Leviathan has an entire section subtitled, The 
Passions That Incline Men To Peace. 
 
Not only are passions necessary for peace, it’s also Hobbes’ view that reason plays 
an important role in the causes of the state of war. For example, Hobbes describes 
how other animals, such as bees and ants, live successfully together socially 
precisely because they do not reason.  It is the ability to reason that causes men to 
see fault in one another, particularly in the administration of their common business. 
Everyone seems to think himself or herself wiser than the next person, and more 
able to govern, and this creates both distraction and civil war. By way of contrast, 
creatures without the use of reason, like bees and ants, don’t consider the way 
business is administered, and so they don’t have a reason for warring with one 
another.  In other words, lacking reason, we would lack civil war (Leviathan, 156). 
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Mental Architecture: Deliberation 
 
For many empiricists, thought and feeling work together in a much more streamlined 
way than they do for many rationalists.  This is because of the foundational role of 
sensation in the production of knowledge.  Remember that for empiricists, the basic 
orientation is toward sensation as the foundation for knowledge, whereas for the 
rationalist the basic orientation is away from sensation as the foundation for 
knowledge.  This means that for empiricists, sensation must be appropriately and 
relevantly related to reason in an account of knowledge.  In Hobbes’ case, there is an 
intimate and important connection between thought and feeling. This close 
relationship between conceptions and passions is crucial for understanding and 
appreciating his view of action, which involves both deliberation and volition.  
 
Reasoned action is the end result of a process of deliberation.  Hobbes describes 
deliberation as the arising of various passions when considering the consequences of 
a given action. A back and forth takes place, where various outcomes are envisioned.  
 
When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and 
Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately…the 
whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till 
the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call 
Deliberation. (Leviathan, 126) 
 
This view of deliberation as the alternating passions of appetite and fear also appears 
in various other texts, including Elements of Law. There Hobbes reiterates the 
process of deliberation as originating in the impact of external objects on the senses; 
from there conceptions arise, and thoughts give rise to passions.  The succession of 
various imagined outcomes requires both the thought of something to take place in 
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the future, and of the possibility of various outcomes.  Hobbes writes,  
 
It hath been declared already, how external objects cause 
conceptions, and conceptions appetite and fear, which are the first 
unperceived beginnings of our actions: for either the action 
immediately followeth the first appetite, as when we do any thing 
upon a sudden; or else to our first appetite there succeedeth some 
conception of evil to happen unto us by such actions, which is fear, 
and withholdeth us from proceeding...This alternate succession of 
appetite and fear, during all the time the action is in our power to do, 
or not to do, is that we call DELIBERATION. (61) 
 
Deliberation is an internal activity that takes place directly before action.  
Mental Architecture: Volition 
 
I want to mention one more example—volition.  In Hobbesian mental architecture 
volition, or the will, is identified with passion. The will is not a separate power or 
faculty, but is rather the last desire in a chain of inner motions that lead to outer 
motions. Hobbes clearly says that the will is “the last appetite” in deliberation: “In 
deliberation the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called WILL (viz.) the last 
appetite will to do; the last fear will not to do, or will to omit” (Elements of Law, 
61).  This idea is echoed in a later passage where he says that the passions are the 
will: “Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for 
they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary” (62).  Volition 
is more or less a matter of one’s sensory history: 
 
Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the causes 
of appetite and of fear are the causes also of our will. But the 
propounding of benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and 
punishment, is the cause of our appetite and of our fears, and 
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therefore also of our wills…(63) 
 
As in Hobbes’ entire system, volition operates mechanistically, which is to say that it 
is determined. Freedom of volition means freedom from constraint.  For example, if 
a man is locked in a room, then he is not free to leave that room should he desire to; 
the freedom of his volition is constrained.  But for Hobbes, there is no such thing as 
freedom in the sense of volition intervening on a thought process in order to redirect 
it to some alternate end.6 
 
The general picture that Hobbes presents is that the human being is a machine set in 
motion by external impulses.  Tiny particles make contact with the sense organs, and 
create motion by pressing inwards.  These external impulses thereby set up internal 
impulses.  The entire internal life continues to operate in terms of determinate, 
lawful motion. Hobbes’ psychology is an overtly materialist one, based on 
mechanical physiology.  All psychological phenomena are explained by reference to 
physiological causes.   
 
We are now in a position to appreciate that Hobbes creates complexity out of 
simples by putting them together in various arrangements.  This is to say that 
Hobbes establishes variation in terms of derived heterogeneity.  While each of the 
basic components out of which mind is made are simple, they combine in various 
ways to create heterogeneity.  Differing combinations of thoughts and feelings7 
create different internal experiences.  In the same way that an infinite quantity of 
numbers can be created by the various combinations of digits 0-9, likewise the 
whole array of mental elements and operations can be accounted for by different 
                                                        
6 Given that Hobbes thinks that the will, or volition is just a name for the last thing 
that happens before action, it is also possible to interpret him as arguing for the 
elimination of volition as a real part of mental life.  Either of these interpretations 
will do. 
7 While a distinction is sometimes drawn between “passion” and “feeling,” I use 
these terms interchangeably here. 
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combinations of simple elements.8  
 
Hobbes’ psychology does indeed provide for the combination of thoughts, which 
includes imagination and dreams, with feelings, which includes volition, to produce 
every imaginable internal experience.  Reason and passion are not two different 
things, as some commentators take them to be. Thought and passion are just one 
thing that functions differently.  Volition is also the same thing as passion, so one 
way of putting this is that the will is “reduced” to passion. Hobbes establishes the 
heterogeneity of the mind via the simple particles that combine and recombine in 
various ways, establishing complexity not within different kinds of things, but within 
complex arrangements. And this solution, in its broad approach, if not in its details, 
works.  Particles are homogenous, but perform different functions.   
 
Notice that this is not very dissimilar from modern explanations of mind that appeal 
to various organized patterns of homogenous particles, whether they are atoms, or 
neurons.  In contemporary discussions, it is not uncommonly held that the mind is 
identical with the brain, or realized somehow or other via the physical structure of 
the brain.  And the brain is comprised of about 100 billion nerve cells—neurons—
that share the same characteristics as other cells, as well as the ability to transmit 
certain kinds of messages.  Variation is explained in terms of structural and                                                         
8 Locke also articulates the sufficiency of a few simples to account for all the 
“fancies and opinions” of mankind, comparing it to the variety that can be achieved 
with the composition of only 24 letters.  In Locke’s words,  
 
Nor will it be so strange, to think these few simple Ideas sufficient 
to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish 
the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various 
Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we consider how many 
Words may be made out of the various composition of 24 Letters; 
or if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of 
combinations  may be made, with barely one of the above-
mentioned Ideas, viz. Number, whose stock is inexhaustible, and 
truly infinite: And what a large and immense field, doth Extension 
alone afford the Mathematicians? (Essay Bk.2, chpt.7, section 10)  
 41 
functional properties.  To draw on a familiar modern-day example, Patricia 
Churchland argues for a brain-based understanding of the mind, based on a 
computational model of cognition and perception.  In Churchland’s view, groups of 
neurons interact to enable an organism to see, decide, and move.  Networks of 
neurons represent and compute.  Physical properties are understood to code 
information (Churchland, 1992).  The modern-day view of the brain—and the mind 
as it relates to the brain—is somewhat more sophisticated than the view that Hobbes 
held, but in its basic form, it is very similar.  If this basic strategy of explanation that 
is so common in modern discussions is taken to be more or less acceptable, then 
insofar as it bears the right resemblances, the Hobbesian view of mind ought also to 
be considered more or less acceptable—at least in terms of its broad structure.  This 
is not to say that there are no problems with such a view.  It is to say, however, that 
the problem of explaining the complexity of mind on this model is not a decisive 
problem.  This is a problem that Hobbes took a sophisticated stab at. 
 
Hobbes accounts for the complexity of mind adequately according to his empiricist, 
mechanistic, materialistic view.  What’s more, Hobbes’ view aligns quite naturally 
with some important modern-day explanations of mind as it relates to brain and 
body.  His view of mind ought not to be ignored on the grounds that it fails to 
account for the heterogeneity of mind. 
Conclusion 
 
The Hobbesian view of mind is, in many ways, a sophisticated view of mind 
according to the principles of the New Science and a certain sort of empiricism.  
Explaining the various parts of the mind in a plausible way without appealing to a 
diverse range of occult internal powers is no easy task, and Hobbes’ view is 
surprisingly sophisticated.  This is not to say that the view does not face some serious 
problems. 
 
One problem is the important moral and ethical repercussions that arise out of 
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determinism.  This very issue was the subject of a famous debate between Hobbes 
and Bishop Bramhall, with Bramhall arguing passionately for the ability of man to 
choose otherwise.  One might take the view, as Hobbes does, that it’s necessary to 
accept this truth, since it falls out of what’s true about the world: mechanical, 
determinate nature precludes the intervention of a power of volition. The universe is 
determined, and that means that the psychological processes, as well as the 
behaviour of human beings, is also determined.  Our illusions about moral and 
ethical dimensions will have to be faced for what they are.  The determinate 
worldview might be unpalatable for these reasons, but it is not incoherent. This 
problem might be considered a matter of taste, rather than a decisive objection to the 
cogency of the system. 
 
There are, however, other important problems with Hobbes’ view.  First, it makes no 
reference to the phenomenon of consciousness.  Hobbes did not account for 
consciousness, since he did not even articulate any problem of consciousness at all.  
In this respect, Hobbes’ view of mind is incomplete, although we might be forgiving 
about this, since the lack of articulation about consciousness was fairly standard 
during Hobbes’ time.  There is, however, another serious problem with the view as 
Hobbes expresses it.  Even though he is able to explain the sophistication of the 
structure of mind, he gives absolutely no explanation of content.  What I mean by 
this is that the properties of the physical world are very different from the properties 
of the informational world, or of content.  How does a particle turn into an image?  
For Hobbes, particles make “contact” with the sense organs, and their rectilinear 
motion turns to curvilinear motion as they move “internally.”  But why should the 
change in direction of motion amount to a complete change in the semantic 
properties of that particle?  And how exactly does this take place?  It’s not just that 
Hobbes lacks a sophisticated account of content, but he lacks an account of content 
at all. The universe may be made of tiny particles in motion, but internal life doesn’t 
seem like tiny particles in motion.  What is required is at least a possible explanation 
of how this is so.  And yet this is just what is lacking in Hobbes’ account. Even so, 
the Hobbesian view of mind can be seen as anticipating modern-day explanations of 
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mind in terms of brain; Hobbes’ view of passion certainly anticipated modern-day 
appraisal theories of emotion.  His view is interesting and worthwhile to examine, 
and the failure to pay sufficient attention to Hobbes’ view of mind is unfortunate for 
several reasons.   
 
First, by failing to accord Hobbes equivalent examination to Descartes, it is easier to 
develop a skewed or inaccurate view of the state of philosophy of mind in the 
Modern period.  Without looking closely at empiricist explanations of mind, and 
Hobbes’ in particular, the work of that time can appear more unscientific and naïve 
than it was, and we may mistakenly believe that contemporary theorizing on mind 
has progressed much more than it actually has.  
 
Another reason for reconsidering Hobbes’ philosophy of mind is the fact that 
without it, our understanding of Hobbes’ political theory is diminished.  Hobbes 
modeled his political philosophy on the idea that the state is a man, “writ large.”  For 
this reason, he began Leviathan, as well as several of his other works, with an 
account of man.  Hobbes’ empirical approach to understanding the “inner workings” 
of humankind has thus made its way in to his understanding of political life in a deep 
way that is often overlooked.  Failure to appreciate the impact of Hobbes’ 
empiricism has eventuated in some important misinterpretations of Hobbes’ political 
writings.  For example, it is sometimes suggested that the Hobbesian state of war is 
the result of a conflict between reason and passion (e.g. Pacchi, 1987). This view is 
clearly at odds with what Hobbes wrote about the relationship between reason and 
passion in his view of the human being; indeed, it is at odds with empiricist 
explanations more generally of the relation between thought and feeling.  Further, as 
a result of this widespread, mistaken view about reason and passion, we may be 
limited in our understanding of other important aspects of Hobbes’ view, such as 
how his commonwealth was to be formed, and what moves the Sovereign. 
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Chapter Three 
Tensions in Locke on Free Will 
 
The concept of freedom is the stone of stumbling for all empiricists, but at the same 
time the key to the loftiest practical principles for critical moralists, who perceive by 
its means that they must necessarily proceed by a rational method.  
-- Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface 
The Trouble With Locke on Free Will 
 
Despite his reputation as a Western philosopher of the highest caliber, Locke’s work 
on free will suffers from a rather different reputation.  This portion of Locke’s 
corpus, the ever-evolving chapter, “Of Power” of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, is often regarded as a dark spot on what is otherwise a delicious, 
deep, intricate, and in many ways plausible, work. Locke’s work on free will is 
infamous for its difficulty of interpretation, its tensions, and its inconsistencies, and 
the text has been a source of frustration for commentators since the time of its 
publication. 
 
There are five editions of Locke’s Essay, and in each edition the chapter Of Power 
gets longer and longer. This portion of the Essay is the most heavily revised piece of 
his entire work.  It’s as though once Locke opened a can of worms, he could only fit 
them back into a bigger can.  And most intriguingly, the revisions Locke made in 
later versions created inconsistencies with his initial statements which he left, for the 
most part, intact. That is to say, Locke made statements that don’t cohere with his 
more general, foundational view, and did not make attempts to create consistency 
out of them.  At least so it appears. Having established a general framework that 
affirmed both the New Science and empiricism, Locke’s initial work on volition was 
very Hobbesian in tone and tenor.  Locke put forth a deterministic view of volition 
that fit well with his other theoretical commitments.  But having had “second 
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thoughts,” presumably about the impact of determinism on the moral dimension of 
volition, he makes changes that present a more libertarian conception of the will.  
These changes were made, however, without making the corresponding changes to 
his views of the New Science.  The later versions then—the ones that Locke had put 
more time and thought into—are more inconsistent and filled with tensions than his 
first attempts.  How to handle and interpret these revisions has been the subject of 
both confusion and controversy since the time of their publication (see, e.g., Harris, 
2007, Chappell, 1994; Yaffe, 2001).  
 
One of the significant disappointments of the chapter is that Locke never gives a 
straight answer to the question of whether the will is left at liberty by the influence 
of the motives. His account does nothing to allow us to answer the question whether 
a person who does action A could have done action B in that situation, without any 
change in the antecedent mental or physical circumstances (O’Connor, 116-17).  As 
a result, the text leaves open the question whether Locke was a determinist, a 
libertarian, or a compatibilist.  There is evidence that supports each interpretation. 
Both libertarians and determinists consider him part of their party.  During his own 
time, libertarians thought Locke gave too much to the necessitarian cause, while 
necessitarians thought he muddied a question that Hobbes had put clearly (Harris, 
21).  Given its inconsistencies, it’s all too easy to fit the text to a particular doctrine, 
and excuse those parts of the text that don’t fit.  This is just what many 
commentators do, charging Locke with “unfortunate phraseology” when he agrees 
with the opposing side (39).  
 
Rather than attempting to fit Locke’s text into one or another of the standard 
positions, we gain a deeper understanding of the underlying issues by looking at the 
tensions among the unit-ideas that create the inconsistencies.  Exposing these 
inconsistencies is one of the most valuable contributions of his work, and so it is 
very important not to read them out of the text.  These are real inconsistencies 
among the commitments to the New Science, empiricism, and free will.  The 
relationships among these unit-ideas can be captured in part by the following 
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triangle diagram.  At each corner of the triangle is one of the concepts, and they are 
each connected to one another via lines of tension.  These lines, which provide 
tension, combine with the concepts to give the constellation of ideas shape.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The mutually-supporting tensions 
 
Understood as connected to one another via a positive, shape-giving tension, we 
learn more about the way these notions are mutually supportive of one another.  
Depending on how each of these terms is defined and deployed, balance and stability 
are achieved.  But there is also a negative side to the tensions that hold these 
concepts together. In some ways these unit-ideas are mutually supporting, but in 
other ways, they seem to undermine one another.  With too much pressure placed on 
any one of the three points, the entire structure will become unstable, and collapse.   
 
In the case of Locke’s work on volition, the increasing importance he places on 
maintaining libertarian freedom of the will places unsustainable pressure on the New 
Science corner of his triangle.  Correspondingly, his initial framework that adheres 
to the tenets of the New Science creates too much tension with the notion of 
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Empiricism 
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libertarian free will at the right hand of the triangle.  The structure of the triangle 
falls apart with too-stringent requirements for freedom within a conception of the 
universe that doesn’t support that view.  Locke’s empiricism supports both his 
conceptions of the New Science, and his conception of volition.  But inconsistencies 
in Locke’s work take place along the bottom line of the triangle that connects the 
New Science with his account of volition.   
 
Looking for Locke’s final position is to speculate on how Locke might have made 
changes to one of the corners of the diagram, and thereby created a more stable, self-
supporting structure.  But this goes too far.  Locke didn’t make a different triangle.  
In this paper I give up the search for Locke’s final position, and instead analyze the 
source of the tensions in the work in terms of his competing commitments to these 
three. Discovering the reasons why the pieces of his puzzle just don’t fit together (it 
seems), no matter how much tinkering Locke does, reveals important insights into 
each of these presuppositions, and by extension, it provides insight into the model of 
mind operating in Locke’s thought. Locke’s seemingly troubled text ought not to be 
seen as the expression of a confused thinker; neither should it be seen as the result of 
an undisciplined editorial process, as some have argued.  Instead it should be seen as 
the exposure of the real tensions inherent in this combination of ideas.  
The Game Plan 
 
The game plan for this chapter is as follows.  First, I briefly explicate the three 
standard positions on freedom and responsibility.  This is intended to help orient my 
reader within the critical commentary that fits Locke into one of each of these 
standard positions.  From there, I reach back in history to the period just prior to 
Locke’s work on free will, specifically to the critical reception that Hobbes’ view of 
free will received.  Locke’s initial approach to free will is in many ways very 
Hobbesian, and he was very likely responding to the problems created by the 
Hobbesian picture.  With this background in mind we are prepared to look more 
deeply at Locke’s work and what likely motivated its various evolutions. Having 
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explored the terrain of Locke’s view(s), I then analyze the text in terms of the 
inherent tensions among Locke’s commitments to New Science, empiricism, and 
free will.  I highlight two conclusions that do not follow from this: the first is that 
Locke is a compatibilist; the second is that he failed to articulate the changes 
necessary to make his view consistent.   
Reminder: My HIP Approach  
 
I remind my reader that my approach to this analysis is historically informed 
philosophy (HIP), and so I focus primarily on analysis of the concepts as defined and 
structured by Locke.  I respect and appreciate the fact that context plays an important 
role in Locke’s work. I take it into consideration, especially regarding the impact of 
the critical reception of Hobbes’ work on Locke’s thinking.  Even so, my general 
approach is not philosophically oriented history (POH), which would involve a far 
greater focus on the details of Locke’s life and context in order to draw conclusions 
about what he might have thought. My HIP approach is less concerned with 
discovering what Locke in fact believed about liberty and volition.  It seems to me 
clear that Locke changed his mind and was unsettled about the matter.  My interest 
is the meaning of the ideas that he put forth, their strength, viability, weaknesses, 
and usefulness.  
Background: The Three Standard Positions on Freedom and 
Volition 
 
The free will debate is typically understood to admit of three standard positions.  
Each of these positions stakes a claim about the capacity that a person has to choose 
his or her behaviour, regardless of an antecedent causal chain of events.  The three 
standard positions are determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.9                                                           
9 Just as it is in most philosophical debates, the free will debate is replete with subtle 
distinctions and nuance, and these subtleties and nuances extend into the three 
standard positions.  This is to say that what follows is a “quick and dirty” summary 
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Determinism is commonly characterized as the view that every event is causally 
necessitated by antecedent events.  As a metaphysical thesis, this is the view that the 
facts about the past, and the laws of nature necessitate events in the future.  What 
this means is that given past events, combined with the fixed laws of nature, only 
one future is possible.  This position is essentially a denial that there is a kind of 
freedom that allows one to intervene on events by choosing differently.  If 
determinism is true, then events that took place in the past are sufficient conditions 
for one’s action.  On this view, the only kind of freedom there can be is freedom 
from constraint.  For example, the flow of a river can be constrained by a dam, and 
hence, is not free.  In the same way a person who is locked in a room from the 
outside is not free to leave—that person is constrained, and hence, not free.  For 
determinists, there is no other sense of freedom than this.  For “hard” determinists, 
this position is associated with a removal of the moral dimension to human action—
since human action operates in just the same way as a wind-up toy, praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness fall out of the picture.   
 
By way of contrast, the libertarian position is at the opposite end of the spectrum of 
standard positions. Libertarianism and determinism are mutually exclusive; 
libertarianism is the denial of determinism. According to libertarians, what comes in 
between past and future events is one’s will; one can and does change the course of 
events by virtue of one’s will to do so.  On this view our choices are free from both 
the determination of past events, and our ability to choose is free also from our 
nature.  This means that not only do antecedent causes not “force our hand, so to 
speak, but neither does our conditioning, or predispositions.  In other words, we 
always have a choice about what to do, except in conditions of constraint. On this 
view, freedom is the freedom to act contrary to one’s nature, predisposition, desires, 
and antecedent events.  No matter what a person does, it is possible that he or she 
                                                                                                                                                            
that shall suffice for the present purposes, and it is not meant to represent an 
exhaustive or rigorous explanation of these positions.   
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could have done otherwise. This position is a natural fit for our commonsense 
notions of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.  A person is praiseworthy or 
blameworthy because they are responsible for their choices.  
 
The third standard position, which should not be understood as a compromise, or 
“mid-way” position between determinism and libertarianism, is compatibilism.  
Compatibilism is essentially the denial of the claim that determinism is inconsistent 
with moral responsibility.  This position affirms that determinism and moral 
responsibility are compatible. Compatibilism is not the conjunction of libertarianism 
and determinism, nor is it a position affirming a kind of “limited free will.”  Instead 
it is the view that determinism is true, and at the same time, that humans can still be 
held accountable for their actions.   
 
Determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism are mutually exclusive, meaning 
that it is not possible to hold more than one of them at the same time without 
inconsistency.10 If Locke were a determinist, then he was not a libertarian or a 
compatibilist. Likewise, if he were a libertarian he were not a compatibilist or a 
determinist.  And if he were a compatibilist, then he was neither a determinist nor a 
libertarian.  On the other hand, he could inconsistently hold elements of each of 
these positions simultaneously. 
 
An important part of the free will debate rests on presuppositions about the nature of 
the universe we live in, and given a determinist universe, a determinist conception of 
volition seems to follow, barring an ad hoc justification that leaves space for 
freedom of the will. What this means for analyzing Locke’s work is that if Locke 
were a determinist, then he could not consistently provide a libertarian account of 
volition.   At least, we would expect him to provide a justification for the libertarian 
elements of his system.                                                          
10 Compatibilism and determinism are consistent in the sense that it is impossible for 
the will to intervene on a causal chain.  But they are mutually exclusive on the issue 
of what falls out of that view in terms of morality. 
 53 
Background to Locke on Free Will: The Hobbes-Bramhall 
Debate  
 
Before diving in to the details of Locke’s writings on free will it’s important to get a 
grasp of the issues of the free will debate that he was likely responding to.  Hobbes 
had made a splash with his view of hard determinism that was published just prior to 
Locke’s time.  Coming on the heels of Hobbes, Locke’s first edition of the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding was published in 1690—just 36 years after the 
unauthorized publication of Hobbes’ Of Liberty and Necessity, published in 1654.  
Hobbes’ determinist view of liberty had stirred up quite a fuss among critical 
commentators and moralists. Hobbes had developed an explanation of how mind 
could fit into the natural world according to the principles of the New Science.  
While the scientific picture of man was in many ways an advancement, the 
consequences for the way that subjectivity and morality fit into that picture—or 
failed to—were, at least to some, disquieting, or even disturbing. 
 
Recall from Chapter 1 that Hobbes is a staunch materialist and a mechanist, and that 
he understands man on the model of a machine. In his view, everything is matter in 
motion.  This means that tiny particles or atoms move according to universal laws, 
whether internal to the agent, or external to the agent.  Agents are themselves matter 
in motion.  When particles make contact with the sense organs, they exert a pressure 
into the interior of the human being.  This is how they become the stuff of 
subjectivity.  The explanation of this process is mechanical; the change works by 
contact and pressure.  External objects press upon the sense organ, and cause 
internal experiences by way of that pressure, just as the pressure of one billiard ball 
striking another creates change in the struck ball. Hobbes writes that in all cases 
sense is caused, “by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our 
eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 85).  
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Thoughts and feelings are the same sort of stuff—particles in motion—that function 
in somewhat different ways.  When it comes to actions thoughts present various 
alternatives while passion provides the motivation for action.  Volition, or the will, is 
identical with passion for Hobbes.  And since the movement of particles, and the 
trajectories they take, are determined by universal laws, all thoughts, passions, and 
volition are determined: “Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not 
called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not 
voluntary” (Hobbes, Elements of Law, 62).  It’s upfront in Hobbes’ view that the 
determination of the will depends on antecedent factors, and these are both its 
necessary and sufficient causes (Van den Enden, 188). For Hobbes, freedom means 
freedom from constraint.  An important consequence of Hobbes’ determinist view is 
that social institutions, including the legal system, turn out to be not only useless, but 
also unjust.  Of this, Bramhall writes, in A Defense of True Liberty (1655), 
 
For if that law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to 
do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is likewise 
unjust and tyrannical which commands him to will that which is 
impossible for him to will. (51)  
 
Hobbes’ determinism met with some harsh criticism, the most famous of which 
might have come from Bishop Bramhall.  John Bramhall, Anglican Archbishop of 
Armagh, had argued vociferously against Hobbes on the grounds that such a view 
would relieve individuals of moral responsibility. Bramhall does not deal directly 
with Hobbes’ reasons for determinism, but instead denies the position all together.  
Bramhall strongly asserts that inclinations and fears may be necessary causes for the 
will, but they are not sufficient.  Actions are free in their causes.  What comes in 
between feelings and action, says Bramhall, is a thinking or meditational process of 
rational deliberation and election.  From there we can choose which action we wish 
to take. We do not have to give in to our proclivities (52).  For this reason 
punishment by law remains just and appropriate, even if for no other end than 
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vindication: 
 
The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law respects both the 
evil act past and the good to come…It is not lawful to do evil that 
good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the 
admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an 
uncertain.  Again, though there were no other end of penalties 
inflicted, neither probatory nor castigatory nor exemplary, but only 
vindicatory, to satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice, by giving 
every one his own, yet the action is just and warrantable. (Ibid) 
 
Bramhall’s argument begged the question against Hobbes’ determinism.  But while 
his defense of moral responsibility and the justice of punishment did not actually 
engage with Hobbes’ argument, it does represent the strong disapprobation that 
Hobbes’ view received.  Hobbes’ view of the workings of mind was very 
theoretically consistent, and followed straightforwardly from his empiricism coupled 
with the mechanistic element of New Science. At the same time that it remained 
“philosophically sound,” Hobbes’ determinism did have the consequence of 
threatening the moral dimension associated with the ability to choose freely.  And in 
so doing, it seemed to threaten the justice of punishment.  These are strong 
countervailing influences against a determinist view of volition. 
Locke: The Great English Empiricist 
 
Like Hobbes, Locke too was an empiricist; his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding is considered one of the first great defenses of empiricism. Although 
Locke is received as one of the founders of empiricism, like Hobbes, his is not an 
extreme form of empiricism. Locke is a “conservative empiricist,” and recognizes 
that reason has a fundamental role in human knowledge (Rogers, 214).  He is also 
comfortable with admitting entities that are not observable.  Locke’s frequent 
strategy is to start from experience as his basic datum, and then to call upon 
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evidence to substantiate his claims (211). All the same, he emphasizes the role of 
sense experience in knowledge, writing that man first begins to think, “When he first 
has any sensation.” In Locke’s view, sensation is the most fundamental source of 
ideas. When Locke asks himself how men came to have ideas in their minds, he 
appeals to “everyones own Observation and Experience” [sic] (Locke, Essay, first 
edition, 37).   
 
There is a strong tie between experience and ideas for Locke.  Supposing that the 
mind is like a sheet of white paper, he affirms that knowledge is founded on 
experience:    
 
First, our senses, conversant about particular, sensible objects, do 
convey into the Mind, several distinct perceptions of things, 
according to those various ways, wherein those objects do affect 
them…This great source, of most of the ideas we have, depending 
wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to our understanding, 
I call SENSATION.  (37) 
 
It is because there are no ideas in the mind before the senses have “conveyed any 
in,” that ideas are coeval with sensation. Locke makes a distinction between ideas 
from sensation and ideas of reflection.  Ideas of reflection are those that come from 
perceiving the operations of our own minds, such as thought, perception, doubt, 
belief, and volition.  These are ideas that differ from the ideas that we have from our 
senses—the source of these ideas is man himself.  While the distinction between 
ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection might seem to suggest more of a rationalist 
leaning in Locke, it should be noted that ideas of reflection are logically dependent 
upon ideas of sensation.  In fact, Locke affirms that ideas of reflection might as well 
be called “internal sense” because without something for the mind to reflect upon 
from sensation, there would be no such ideas. Thus Locke’s paradigmatically 
empiricist answer to the question as to where man gets the materials of reason and 
knowledge is “in one word, from EXPERIENCE” (37).   
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Locke the New Scientist 
 
Like Hobbes, Locke is also strongly influenced by the development of the New 
Science.  His allegiance to it can be seen in the Epistle to the Reader in his Essay, 
where Locke famously describes himself as, “clearing the ground of rubbish” so that 
work done by the great scientists—Newton, Boyle, and Huygens—could proceed 
more effectively. The significance of Boyle for Locke is well accepted, especially in 
regard to the emphasis on empiricism in the natural sciences (Rogers, 1966, 205; 
Lennon 1993, 162).  Rogers argues that Locke’s thinking is extremely close to 
Boyle’s on a number of topics. It is universally acknowledged that Locke accepts a 
prominent place for corpuscularian mechanism (Downing, 381).  Margaret Atherton 
notes that, “it is close to becoming a contemporary orthodoxy than Locke’s motive 
in writing the Essay was to provide a foundation or defense for corpuscular 
mechanism” (Atherton, 33). Lisa Downing writes,  
 
Locke’s discussions of the primary/secondary quality distinction and 
of real essences cannot be understood without reference to the 
corpuscularian science of his day, which held that all macroscopic 
bodily phenomena should be explained in terms of the motions and 
impacts of submicroscopic particles. (Downing, 381)  
 
Peter Alexander reads Locke’s Essay as an attempt to help confirm the theory of 
Boylean mechanism by drawing out its implications (382).  Locke is explicit in his 
belief that the fundamental particles of matter have the properties of solidity, 
extension, figure and mobility.   
 
While Locke tries to avoid talking of metaphysical matters, like Hobbes, he does say 
that ideas are produced by motion: “all sensation being produced in us, only by 
different degrees and modes of Motion”. Locke argues that bodies operate on one 
another by impulse.  He also thinks that it is inconceivable that they should operate 
on that which they don’t touch, because they cannot operate at a distance.  Because 
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external objects are not united to our minds when they produce ideas in us, he 
reasons, then some motion must continue by our nerves, or “animal spirits”11.  
Locke writes, “Bodies must come from [the objects] to the eyes, and thereby convey 
to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas we have of them in us” (56).12  
The mechanical principle is clear and at work in Locke’s explanation of the way 
external objects create internal experiences.13 
Locke’s First Attempt (1690): Fitting Mind into the Natural 
World 
 
Locke’s adherence to both empiricism and corpuscularian mechanism aligns well 
with the Hobbesian view.  Sharing these similar presuppositions, it come as no 
surprise that the view of mind, and particularly the view of volition Locke 
articulates, is very similar to the view produced by Hobbes.  Like Hobbes, in his first 
attempt, Locke seems to think that the problem of free will can be cleared away once 
we get clear on the nature of power.  In Locke’s initial attempt at free will it appears 
that he views the issue as a pseudo-problem, or as a sort of category mistake. The 
basic problem, thinks Locke, is that people mistakenly believe that the will can be 
free when in fact, it is the person who is free.  Freedom is a “power” and so is the 
will.  Powers don’t apply to other powers, but instead they apply to agents.  The way 
to make clear the source of this error is by recourse to careful definitions.  
 
The general strategy in Locke’s first pass at the problem is to be clear about the fact 
that there are no faculties of the mind. There are dangers to thinking this way.  For                                                         
11 “Animal Spirits” here means a very subtle fluid. 
12 See also Bk.4, chpt.3, sections 26-28: “’Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and 
motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Colours, 
Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure, and Pain, etc. These mechanical Affections of 
Bodies, having no affinity at all with those Ideas, they produce in us…we can have 
no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience.”   
13 The qualities appealed to are those qualities that are required for thinking of 
bodies as interacting according to mechanical principles alone. 
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instance, doing so can allow us to conceive of faculties as distinct agents with their 
“several Provinces and Authorities” (Locke, Essay, 117).  In this case thinking of 
volition as a faculty could lead to thinking that a faculty can have a power, such as 
freedom.  It can also give the impression of being explanatory without doing the 
kind of explanatory work demanded by the mechanistic worldview. Explaining 
mental phenomena in terms of faculties is akin to saying that the “digestive faculty” 
is responsible for digestion, the “motive faculty” is responsible for motion, and the 
“expulsive faculty” is responsible for making things come out of the body (121).  In 
just the same way Locke argues, we might say that the “Understanding, understood; 
and the elective Faculty, or the Will, willed or commanded” (ibid). Thinking of the 
mind in terms of faculties is the result of the common use of language, not fitting for 
careful philosophical thought14.   
 
Clear in his conviction that mistaken talk of faculties is at the root of the non-
problem of free will, Locke then provides a definition of volition: 
 
Volition, ‘tis plain, is nothing but the actual choosing or preferring 
forbearance to the doing, or doing to the forbearance, of any 
particular Action in our power, that we think on.  And what is the 
Will, but the Faculty to do this?  And is that Faculty anything more 
in effect, than a Power, the power of preferring any Action to its 
Forbearance, or vice versa, as far as it appears to depend on us?  For 
can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a power to think on its 
own Actions, and to prefer their doing or omission either to other, 
has that Faculty call’d Will.  Will then is nothing but such a power; 
Liberty, on the other side, is the power a Man has to do or forbear 
doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance 
                                                        
14 Despite having said this, in the first edition, Locke presents the will as “that 
Faculty” that is the power of the mind to prefer any particular action to its 
forbearance, or vice versa (117).  He goes on further to discuss the will in its 
relationship to “commands” from the understanding.   
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has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the same thing as to 
say, according as he himself wills it. (119) 
 
On his first pass, Locke, like Hobbes, advances a view of the will that is consequent 
to his mechanistic empiricism.  The account is empiricist because of the empiricist 
dogma that all knowledge originates in the senses, combined with the basic 
orientation toward the senses as the source of knowledge. Given the corpuscularian 
universe—mechanistic and lawful—the movement of particles including those that 
comprise mental phenomena such as willing is determined. The will is thus 
determined.  What this amounts to is that once the will has “spoken,” a person has 
no choice to intervene or redirect it. This is evident when Locke writes, 
 
A Man in respect of willing any Action in his power once proposed 
to this Thoughts, cannot be free…for it being unavoidable that the 
Action depending on his Will, should exist, or not exist; and its 
existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination, 
and preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or 
not existence, of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he will 
the one, or the other, i.e., prefer the one to the other: since one of 
them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows 
by the choice and determination of his Mind; that is, by his willing 
it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. (122) 
 
A man cannot “will what he wills” – in other words, we do not have the capacity to 
change what it is that the will does or prefers—it moves according to antecedent 
factors.  Locke rejects the very idea that we could will what we will, on the grounds 
that this would invoke an antecedent will, and the very same question could then be 
posed regarding that will, and so on, ad infinitum.  He affirms: “where-ever one 
stops [in the regress], the Actions of the last Will cannot be free” (122). 
 
Rejecting the infinite regress consequence in the first edition, Locke’s alternatives 
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are either that our preferences are the product of chance, or that they are 
necessitated.  And if an initial preference was necessitated, then it must also have 
been involuntary.  Given that, then it appears that all of our actions spring from what 
is initially outside of our control.  Notice that as a consequence of the definitions of 
Locke’s terms, this would not make all of the actions that were to follow involuntary 
or unfree; they could still be said to be in accord with, or contrary to our preference, 
and as a result they would be voluntary.  But because freedom and volition have 
been defined by reference to preference, it would follow that preference itself is not 
something that could be properly said to be free. This may have been why Locke 
maintained that the notions of freedom and volition could not be applied to the will 
itself.  Since voluntary acts and free acts are defined in terms of preference, 
preference itself cannot be voluntary or free without circularity.   
 
Locke offers a justification for his view on empirical grounds.  He argues that it is 
manifest in “every one’s experience” that people don’t have the power to change 
what it is that they prefer. We are “indifferent” to what it is that pleases us.  He 
writes: 
 
…Volition or Willing…is nothing but the preferring the doing of any 
thing, to the not doing of it; Action to Rest, & contra.  Well, but 
what is this Preferring?  It is nothing but the being pleased more 
with the one, than the other.  Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased, 
or not pleased, more with the one than the other?  Is it in his choice, 
whether he will, or will not be better pleased with one thing than 
another?  And to this, I think, every one’s Experience is ready to 
make answer, No.  (123) 
 
It follows as a matter of Locke’s definitions that an individual’s will aims at what 
they understand to be the good for them. Problems arise, Locke explains, because we 
are apt to choose a present happiness over a long-range happiness (126).  “[W]hen 
we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future, we often make wrong Judgments 
 62 
of them, taking our measures of them in different positions of distance” (127). The 
remedy is to look beyond this world and consider the happiness that will attend us in 
eternal life.  Considering that “God the righteous Judge will render to every Man 
according to his Deeds” we would be wiser to look to the long-range happiness 
produced by genuinely good action” (ibid). 
Critical Reception by Locke’s Contemporaries 
 
Locke’s first pass at the issue of free will was not well received by his 
contemporaries. Joseph Priestley wrote that Locke’s chapter was “remarkably 
confused.”  He recognized the reason for this being that the general maxims were 
consistent with, and even implies the doctrine of necessity, which is inconsistent 
with liberty, which Locke attributes to man (Harris, 38). Famously, in a letter from 
Dublin, dated December 22, 1692, Molyneux remarked that Locke’s initial treatment 
of free will “seems so wonderfully fine spun…that at least the Great Question of 
Liberty and Necessity seems to Vanish.”  Molyneux identified the problem of 
intellectualism, making man’s wrongs spring from faulty understanding, and thereby 
undermining moral responsibility.  He wrote that the view, 
 
seem[s] to make all Sins to proceed from our Understandings, or to 
be against Conscience, and not at all from the Depravity of our 
Wills.  Now it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall be Damn’d, 
because he understands no better than he does. (Locke, 1978, 600-
601)  
 
This picture removed praiseworthiness and blameworthiness from human behaviour, 
and removed the moral dimension to acts of willing.  Given these and other 
problems, Locke, too, was unhappy with his first pass and decided to rethink his 
account.  His second pass would see Locke entrench more deeply into his empiricist 
leanings, focusing even more on what is true in one’s experience.  This 
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entrenchment into the subjective would butt up even more strongly against the 
principles of the New Science. 
“Second Thoughts” (1694): Focus on Self-Observation 
 
The second edition of the Essay came out in 1694, four years after the first edition.  
This version presents a longer, more complex view of volition. Locke made 
important changes to his view of mind that is at least partly, an attempt to deal with 
the critical reception of his first attempt.  In this version there is a greater focus on 
accounting for the empirical evidence that, people as a matter of fact, often do not 
choose to act according to the good.  This reaffirmation of the important role of 
empirical evidence—subjective though it is in this case—makes clearer Locke’s 
commitment to empiricist principles.  Yet at the same time, Locke also reaffirms and 
makes stronger his commitment to the moral dimension of conscious human action.  
The struggle of making these two consistent comes out clearly in the text.  The 
changes to the model of mind Locke presents include changes to the relationship 
between willing and preference, what motivates an agent, as well the suspension of 
the will.  
 
Firstly, the definition of volition Locke offers in the second edition changes 
significantly.  In the first edition will was identified with preference.  In the revised 
edition, volition is defined as an act of the mind, “knowingly exerting that Dominion 
it takes it self to have over any part of the man by imploying it in, or withholding it 
from any particular Action” (128). The will is no longer preference, which would be 
akin to feeling, but instead it is an act of the mind.  In the new conception the mind 
has the ability to direct both thought and preferences. Locke writes, “[T]he 
Mind…continues the Action or puts an end to it: Whereby it is manifest it orders and 
directs one in preference to, or neglect of the other, and thereby either the 
continuation, or change becomes unavoidably voluntary” (131).  This change is 
significant because it works to remove the brute emotionality or impulsive nature of 
the will.  The will is an act of the mind, where the mind is like a miniature agent that 
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makes choices and directs activity.  Responsibility for action falls naturally out of 
this conception.  Since this change in definition is stipulative, it doesn’t require 
argument or justification, nor is any provided.  This is just what Locke thinks in his 
“second thoughts.”  And yet this change has important consequences for his broader 
model of mind.   
 
When the mind is modeled such that it directs preference, an important move away 
from the Hobbesian picture has taken place.  On that model, feeling and thought 
work in tandem with one another to produce action: the thoughts conceive of 
possibilities while passion or feeling produces motivation and movement.  Each of 
these elements is necessary for action, and neither is more significant than the other; 
they do not exist in a hierarchy of importance or leadership.  But when the mind 
directs preference an important change in the role of feeling takes place.  Feeling 
loses its former significance as the motivator for action.  Consequently what we see 
in the 1694 version is additional changes to the account of motivation.   
 
In the first edition, Locke affirms that it is the “Good” that determines the will: 
“Good then, the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will”.   But in the 
second edition, and under “stricter enquiry,” Locke decides that, “good, the greater 
good” (135) is not what determines the will, until our desire is “raised 
proportionably to it, [and] makes us uneasie in the want of it”. This is very likely the 
result of Locke’s meditation on what experience shows.  In fact, experience shows 
clearly that people don’t actually often pursue the greatest good or act in accordance 
with it. In fact the “infinitely greatest confessed good [is] often neglected to satisfie 
the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles” (135). Locke’s strategy 
here is to take the empirical phenomena as his starting point and work to explain and 
justify it.  Since the good is also neglected because of the desire for something 
trifling, this requires a new role for desire in Locke’s account. 
 
In the first edition the will is moved by the desire for the good.  But since action 
does not necessarily point at the good, it doesn’t seem to make sense that a 
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privation—or something that is absent—could be motivational in the right sort of 
way.  In the second edition therefore, it is not desire for the good that moves the will, 
but instead it is something present: the uneasiness of our desires. Locke’s thinking 
seems to be that a person is moved by some thing, as opposed to being moved by the 
absence of something. What’s more, the will cannot be identical with desire, because 
we know from experience that the will and desire often run counter; action runs one 
way, while desire may run the other way. This is a significant change that helps to 
clear the way for a justification for the restoration of blameworthiness and the moral 
dimension more generally.  When it was the good that moved the will, people could 
only be blamed for not understanding what it is that the good consists in—and this is 
hardly ground for punishment.  Such a person ought rather to be the recipient of 
education.  But when it is the uneasiness of our own desires that determines the will, 
coupled with the claim that the mind directs preferences, then the groundwork has 
been laid for praise or blame to accrue to an agent based on how well one orders 
one’s preferences.  And this in fact, is exactly what Locke argues for. 
 
The third significant change Locke makes in the second edition is to claim that it is 
within a man’s power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness of something 
by considering the consequences of that action. Agents are responsible for 
conditioning themselves such that they desire the right sorts of things, and feel 
uneasy about the right sorts of things by directing the mind accordingly. “Men may 
and should correct their palates” (149).  We go against what our natural impulses are 
when it is in our best interest to do so.  For example, thinking of the health and 
strength that will result in taking an “ill relish’d potion” moves us to take our 
medicine.  The consideration of outcomes changes the way we feel about various 
actions.  Locke argues that it is our responsibility, and we ought to take pains to 
rectify, the wrong ideas we have as a result of bad habits.  Doing so helps us to take 
delight in it, and thereby create motivation, for something we would otherwise rather 
not do. In other words, by considering the end of any given action, with use and 
practice, we may come to feel differently about it.  Locke writes, “Habits have 
powerful charms, and put to strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we 
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accustom our selves to, that we cannot forbear to do” (149).  In other words, by 
considering long-range outcomes versus short-range outcomes, man can choose a 
better action.   
 
This claim seems to imply an ability to intervene on action that has all the requisite 
antecedent causes behind it.  And indeed, this is what Locke has in mind.  He writes 
that the mind has a “power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its 
desires.” This is a significant departure from Locke’s original straightforwardly 
determinist position, whereby antecedent causes are sufficient for action.  But 
without changing any of his previous statements about his commitment to New 
Science principles that are at the heart of his determinism, he simply affirms that 
ability to suspend the will.  Because of the significance of this claim, it is worthwhile 
to quote Locke in full on this point:  
 
For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a 
power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; 
and so all one after another is at liberty to consider the objects in 
them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.  In 
this lies the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right comes 
all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, we run into, in the 
conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we 
precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon 
before due Examination.  To prevent this we have a power to 
suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one dayly 
may Experiment in himself…For during this suspension of any 
desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which 
follow that determination) done, we have the opportunity to 
examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil of what we are going 
to do; and when, upon due Examination, we have judg’d, we have 
done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do. (141) 
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Locke affirms that it is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings that we can 
suspend desires and stop ourselves from determining our wills to any action until we 
have had the opportunity to examine the “good and evil of it” (143).  What this 
means is that agents are responsible for considering outcomes, and for ordering 
themselves accordingly. We mistakenly judge what is in our long-range interest 
because of what Locke calls “the weak and narrow Constitution of our Minds” 
(147).15 
 
By reverse-engineering these changes in his text, it is clear that they are designed at 
least in part, to account for the phenomenon of people making poor choices.  
Crucially for my themes, Locke takes this as empirical data and creates a place for it 
in his larger view.  But the changes also serve to affirm the moral dimension, and to 
justify punishment and blame.  Locke doesn’t simply account for the phenomenon of 
poor choices—he also makes significant changes to the structure of mind such that 
action arises as it does.  Without making changes to the New Science framework 
within which he works, Locke simply affirms that the agent has the ability to 
suspend the will—something that should not be possible on a deterministic view.  
Yet he gives no indication that he has abandoned the determinism that is part and 
parcel of his corpuscularian mechanism. Affirming that individuals can suspend 
their will, and that they can and should correct their palettes or condition themselves 
to want the right sorts of things, lends itself to a libertarian view of volition.  
New Problems 
 
The changes in the second edition created problems of interpretation, but they also 
created additional problems.  More specifically, these are the problems of 
intellectualism, not being explanatory, methodological problems, and theoretical 
problems.  I’ll take each of these in turn.                                                         
15 Of course, the charge of intellectualism raises its head again here.  If our minds 
are weak, can we be blamed for that?  If an agent fails to properly understand what is 
in his or her interest and thereby to act accordingly, they ought to be the recipient of 
education, not punishment. 
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In response to the first edition, Molyneux for one, identified the problem of 
intellectualism.  By making wrong action spring from failures of the understanding it 
becomes unjust to punish wrong action.  In the second edition, Locke runs into this 
problem in a different way.  By putting the mind or the understanding in the position 
of guiding and directing the preferences and the will, it is the intellect that is 
ultimately responsible for action. The problem is that if the understanding is 
responsible for right action, then failure to act rightly represents a failure of the 
understanding, and failures of understanding are not the kind of failures that warrant 
punishment.  Instead, they warrant compassion, education, and/or rehabilitation.  By 
putting the mind in the position of guide, Locke falls back into the problem of 
intellectualism. 
 
The second problem is that Locke’s account is not explanatory in the appropriate 
way.  Even if we accept that the mind can suspend or interrupt the will, Locke 
doesn’t provide any explanation as to how this can be so.  Within Locke’s 
explanatory framework, what is required is an account of by what mechanism this 
might take place.   And given Locke’s acceptance of the corpuscular theory, there is 
an especially important need to say something about how the antecedent causes that 
give rise to feelings and thoughts might be interrupted in a way that is consistent 
with that theory.  And yet, Locke provides no guidance on this matter.  His account 
lacks appropriate explanatory accountability.  
 
In addition to falling back into intellectualism, and not being explanatory, there is 
also a theoretical problem internal to this account.  In particular, when Locke 
separates the passions or feelings from the understanding to allow the understanding 
the right kind of dominion over the person, his account of action falls apart.  Like 
Hobbes, Locke thinks that passion is necessary for action, because it is motivational, 
while reason is, in itself, inert.  In separating passion and understanding there is no 
longer any explanation as to how action can arise.  Without passion to create 
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movement, it isn’t clear how it works together with thought to create action.  It is 
unclear how or why passion should be involved at all. 
 
Finally, the account suffers from a methodological problem.  The issue is this: it’s 
difficult to understand how observation of the behaviour of the mind could provide 
evidence for a non-deterministic conception of willing.  In other words, no matter 
what is observed in the mind, it is difficult to see what could, in principle, constitute 
evidence that the mind’s behaviour is not necessitated.  The issue of the necessity of 
behaviour or action is justified on extra-empirical grounds, so to speak.  It is a 
consequence of one’s theoretical commitments that have been made prior to internal 
observation.  Observation cannot provide evidence of a deterministic, or a non-
deterministic universe.  There is nothing in the phenomena that could be sufficient to 
warrant changing from a view that the will is determined to a view that it is free in 
the libertarian sense.  Even if there was something that could provide this evidence 
in principle, Locke does not offer any such evidence.   
 
Whether or not Locke was aware of all of the difficulties, it’s clear that he remained 
unsatisfied with his own account. He continued to rework the text up until the time 
of his death, revising it in a third, fourth, and fifth edition.  The changes are 
relatively minor in the third and fourth editions, and so I skip over those here and 
move directly to the fifth edition.  In this posthumously published edition, Locke 
entrenches his empiricism focusing even more on what self-observation shows. He 
also asserts even more strongly the responsibility that an agent has in acting rightly.   
Fifth Edition Revisions (1706) 
 
In the fifth edition, Locke again changes what it is that determines the will. This 
time, the will is determined by desire, and is guided by judgment.  In addition to this, 
Locke makes even more explicit his view that agents have the ability to suspend the 
determination of choice. It is as though Locke is making theoretical space for 
contemplation as a wedge into what would otherwise be determined.  Because of the 
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significance of this passage, and because of its openness to interpretation, I quote it 
here in full:  
 
But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of 
Willing, and that is the chusing of a remote Good as an end to be 
pursued.  Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being 
determined for or against the thing proposed, ‘till he has examined, 
whether it be really of a nature in its self, and consequences to make 
him happy or no.  For when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is 
become a part of his Happiness, it raises desire, and that 
proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his Will, 
and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that 
offer.  (Locke, 270)16 
 
The passage suggests that an agent can knowingly choose to condition his or her 
own desires through contemplation, and thereby causes their will to be determined to 
provide more considered, long-range happiness. Once again, it seems plausible that 
this is something that Locke finds when he looks to his experience.  So his 
empiricism, in one sense of that term, is playing a part.  But this change brings along 
with it some important theoretical consequences that don’t sit well with his 
commitment to the New Science. 
 
Firstly, the question arises why and how the ability to suspend should be possible 
only in certain cases? To be more accurate, only in a particular case?  It is as though 
the freedom to suspend volitional determinism is meant to apply in the case where a 
person really wants to gain a long-term benefit, even if that means suffering or pain 
in the short term.  And on a certain view of the phenomenon of choosing, this makes 
sense. It does seem as though people sometimes act on impulse, even though it is not 
to their benefit.  At the same time, there are many cases where individuals delay 
gratification, and don’t indulge their impulses. But hasn't Locke gone too far in                                                         
16 Fifth edition revisions are found in the Nidditch edition. 
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accommodating the phenomenon here?  This exception appears ad hoc, out of line 
with most of the rest of his view, and without any theoretical explanation or 
justification. 
 
There are several other places where Locke makes changes to his wording to reflect 
the ability of individuals to suspend short-term gratification.  For example, in earlier 
versions the text read, “This then is evident, A Man is not at liberty to will, or not to 
will any thing in his power, that he once considers of: Liberty consisting in a power 
to act, or not to act, and in that only.” In the fifth edition the same section reads,  
 
This then is evident, That in all proposals of present Action, a Man 
is not at liberty to will, or not to will, because he [can] forbear 
willing:  Liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, 
and in that only. (246) 
 
The change indicates a shift in emphasis to proposals of present action.  Once again, 
Locke is making a new distinction between the kind of choice a person makes that 
requires action in the present moment, and the kind of choice that allows for time 
spent in contemplation of outcomes. Re-establishing the moral dimension of volition 
may have been the very purpose behind this change.  In support of this 
interpretation, Locke alludes to the ways in which a person may “justly incur 
punishment.”  Locke acknowledges that a man wills what he thinks is the best 
action, and that action is judged to be good by the understanding.  And yet, this 
doesn’t excuse a man, because in choosing poorly, he conditions himself to be more 
likely to make a similar poor choice in the future.  He has thereby “vitiated his own 
palate.” It is as though there is desire that creates various impulses to action on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, there is judgment that takes a look at those options 
and chooses wisely, after careful consideration.  The more poor choices are made, 
the more likely they will be made in the future, because we become conditioned 
from past experience.  Just in the way that a bad habit is easier to stick with than to 
change, and a good habit is easier to stick with through practice, aiming at the good 
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is the agent’s moral responsibility because of the fact that we can think and choose 
accordingly.  That is to say, we have freedom of choice in the libertarian sense.  And 
this is why we can, and ought to be blamed, and punished, for bad actions.  Since 
one has the power to, “suspend his determination” in order that he might take care of 
his happiness and make choices that lead to happiness, punishment is just: 
 
And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly 
incur punishment, though it be certain that in all the particular 
actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that which 
he then judges to be good.  For though his will be always 
determined by that which is judg’d good by his Understanding, yet 
it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty choice of his own 
making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and 
evil; which however false and fallacious, have the same influence on 
all his future conduct as if they were true and right.  He has vitiated 
his own Palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness 
and death that follows from it…He had a Power to suspend his 
determination: It was given him, that he might examine, and take 
care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceived.  And 
he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not in a 
matter of so great and near concernment. (270-271) 
 
Close to the conclusion of the chapter, Locke writes that not only is there a case in 
which a man may suspend his choice, but even further, that he has the ability to 
suspend the satisfaction of any particular desire.  Locke thinks that the will can be 
suspended from any action until the good that might come out of it has been 
“maturely” examined. Locke affirms that if we were determined by anything other 
than desire guided by judgment, we would not be free. “The result of our judgment 
upon that Examination, is what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be 
free, if his will were determin’d by any thing, but his own desire guided by his own 
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Judgment” (283).  This appears to be full blown libertarian conception of free will.  
This is a complete reversal of Locke’s original view.  
Problems & Inconsistencies 
 
Over the course of the revisions to Of Power a number of internal inconsistencies 
and problems arise.  One of the most glaring inconsistencies is Locke’s adherence to 
both the corpuscular mechanistic framework that is married to a deterministic world 
picture, and a libertarian sense of freedom.  Locke doesn’t make any clear attempt to 
modify his commitment to the former.  Neither does he acknowledge the 
inconsistency.  This makes it unclear and open to interpretation whether he is in fact, 
a determinist or a libertarian.  One might think that given his apparent adherence to 
both views, the best interpretation is that Locke is a compatibilist.  But this doesn’t 
follow.  Recall that compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with 
moral responsibility.  Locke never argues for this.  What’s more, his view doesn’t 
amount to that claim—on Locke’s view moral responsibility derives from the fact 
that the individual can suspend the act of choice. 
 
Another problem that remains from the second edition through the fifth is that the 
charge of intellectualism still stands.  If desire is to be guided by judgment, then it is 
the understanding that is at fault for not correcting desire, and guiding it 
appropriately. What’s more, the question also arises as to whether judgment is itself 
determined.  If so, then we still do not have the freedom requisite to dole out just 
punishment.  And if not, then our failures of judgment are failures of the intellect, 
not moral ones.  If we fail to understand what is the good, then we ought to be the 
objects of pity and compassion, not blame and retribution.  Judgment functions 
normatively in Locke’s account.  But how the normative dimension enters into the 
account in a way that leaves judgment neither completely intellectual, and thereby 
inert, nor completely emotional, and thereby beyond the agent’s control, is not at all 
clear.   
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Finally, there is the problem of accounting for action.  If the intellectual, judging, 
part of the mind can intervene on impulses, then the motivational part of volition is 
suspended, and cannot do its work. Providing the understanding with the ability to 
intervene on the passions removes the important role that passions are meant to have 
as motivators for action.  If agents are not moved by pleasures or uneasiness, then 
it’s not clear how they are moved at all. 
Critical Reception of Later Editions  
From Locke’s Contemporaries 
 
Since Locke’s time, commentators have spilled much ink attempting to find Locke’s 
“final position” on liberty and volition.  The inconsistent text provides evidence that 
supports the interpretation of Locke as a hard determinist, a libertarian and a 
compatibilist, although these positions are mutually exclusive.  Harris recites some 
interpretations of Locke’s contemporaries.  Anthony Collins interprets Locke as 
supporting Hobbesian necessitarianism on the grounds that the essence of freedom, 
for Locke, is liberty from outward impediments, and not liberty from necessity 
(Harris, 36).  Supporting this is the fact that Locke expresses the absurdity in the 
question as to whether we are free in our choices.  For Collins, Locke simply 
confuses things by talking about the power of suspension.  Jonathan Edwards and 
Joseph Priestley also consider Locke a necessitarian who unnecessarily created 
confusion in his later attempts to accommodate elements of libertarianism (38).   
Joseph Berington and James Gregory argue that Locke was a libertarian.  A 
libertarian reading is encouraged by the fact that the doctrine of suspension implies 
the power of self-determination (39).  
 
Just as Locke’s contemporaries argued that he belonged to one or another camp, 
many modern interpretations of Locke argue in this manner also.  Such arguments 
often include the proviso that while Locke did hold such and such a position he did 
so not in the “usual” way.   
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A Libertarian Interpretation 
 
Chappell (1994) argues that Locke is a certain kind of libertarian, on the grounds 
that Locke believes in “human freedom” (101).  For Chappell, Locke’s conception 
of freedom is different from many libertarian philosophers because Locke argues 
that all actions have causes, including free ones.  Despite the fact that Locke argues 
at times that free action is impossible, he agrees with the usual libertarian that free 
actions depend on volitions (86).  Chappell concludes that Locke’s “final position” 
is that the idea of suspension is incompatible with volitional determinism.  Since 
there is suspension, then volitional determinism must be false.  Indeed, there are free 
volitions—occasions were a man is free with respect to his willing (103). Chappell 
deals with the inconsistencies in Locke’s text by claiming that Locke simply “did 
not make all the adjustments that a full change of view would have called for” (87).  
Despite arguing for a libertarian Locke, Chappell concludes, “Nothing that I have 
said in this chapter, however, should be taken to imply that…I even understand the 
general theory of will and volition that underlies Locke’s view of freedom” (104).   
 
This is, in my view, a good reason for dismissing this interpretation.  But another 
reason is that, given the extensive time and attention that Locke clearly spent in 
revising this work, it is strange to suggest that he simply failed to make all the 
necessary revisions to clean up the Hobbesian sections.  If Locke really did change 
his view wholesale, and he bothered to make extensive revisions to the text, it is 
mysterious why he would not indicate that in his revisions, which he clearly spent 
much time and attention on. 
A Compatibilist Interpretation 
 
Prolific Locke scholar, Gideon Yaffe (2000) argues for a compatibilist Locke.  This 
is on the grounds that it is “possible for Locke” to arrange the connection between 
our choices and the good even if man is “under necessity” (373).  Yaffe admits that 
there is an interpretive problem of how to reconcile the “seeming Hobbesianisms” of 
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the first thirty sections of the chapter together with the “seeming incompatibilism” of 
the later sections of the chapter (387).  Yaffe deals with the inconsistencies by 
arguing for a “philosophically radical” conclusion.  He argues that, “when we talk 
about free will…we are not talking about an ability to choose or refrain from choice” 
(373).  He writes, 
 
When we use the term ‘free will’ the word ‘free’ doesn’t mean what 
we naturally think it means. This doesn’t tell us what we really 
mean by the term, but it does open the door to a particular strategy 
for answering the question: perhaps a proper account of freedom of 
will tells us what we need to be like if we are to exemplify the ideal 
of agency after which we strive. (387) 
 
Yaffe’s interpretation also faces some important problems.  The first is that his view 
is, as Chappell rightly puts it, “sometimes so intricate and subtle as to be hard to 
follow” (Chappell, 422). It also seems strained, and incompatible with what Locke 
says in his text.  Locke never says that there is something more to genuine free 
agency than freedom of action.  On the other hand, in one passage, Locke seems to 
say that this is all the freedom that there is (Chappell 423). Even if such an 
interpretation could be defended, it still doesn’t answer the question as to what it is, 
for Locke, that confers upon human action what Yaffe calls “the Elusive Something” 
that makes out the difference between action that is fully morally accountable and 
that which is not (Lowe 2005, 130).  Another problem is that nowhere does Locke 
make an explicit argument to the effect that he understands freedom to be 
compatible with necessitarianism.  Neither does Locke make any argument against 
Hobbesian necessity, nor does he make a case for its incompatibility with freedom 
and moral responsibility (Harris 2007, 20-21).  In other words, Locke never argues 
for compatibilism.  
 
Given that Locke’s initial formulation reads as straightforwardly determinist, and 
there is no reason to think that Locke gave up on the view of the workings of the 
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universe that leads to determinism, one might think that his apparent defense of 
freedom in later editions amounts to compatibilism.  Given that Locke seems to 
argue both for a universe comprised of tiny particles operating according to 
universal laws, and for freedom of choice, compatibilism seems like a natural 
interpretation.  But what’s missing is an account of how both can be true. Harris 
(2007) emphasizes there is no indication as to how experience might be made 
consistent with the mechanistic worldview.  Unlike Locke, for example, Hume does 
provide such an explanation in his compatibilist account of volition.   
Real Tensions 
 
There are some real and important tensions underlying Locke’s position on liberty 
and volition that are the result of the constellation of unit-ideas of the New Science 
and empiricism, as they are deployed to explain a libertarian sense of free volition. 
There are three broad tensions that I discuss here.  The first is the tension between 
the New Science view that the natural world is passive, and Locke’s formulation of 
volition as being a power.  The second is the tension between the New Science tenet 
that efficient causation is necessary and sufficient for explanation, combined with 
Locke’s appeal to final causes for at least some human behaviour.  And the third is 
between Locke’s adherence to the mechanical world picture and the priority and 
importance that he gives to the experience of freedom and suspension.  Without an 
adequate explanation of how content gets into this framework, the experiential 
aspect of Locke’s empiricism appears to be smuggled in.17 This is a tension between 
New Science and Locke’s empiricism. 
 
                                                        
17 To see this clearly, contrast this view with Descartes’.  The experiential or 
phenomenal aspects of experience need not be derived from the mechanical picture 
for Descartes, since mind is made of a different kind of stuff than the natural world.  
Descartes runs into the problem of interaction—explaining how the material and 
immaterial worlds interact.  But this is a different problem from explaining how 
subjectivity fits into a mechanical picture. 
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It is a tenet of the New Science that the natural world is entirely passive.  In contrast 
to the Aristotelian view, motion or change is not an actualization of some power in 
the substance itself—there is a global elimination of powers from all natural 
substances according to the New Science.  There is a mechanization of the world 
picture.  Explanations of macro-level properties are explained in terms of particles 
operating according to universal laws.  These laws are deterministic.  Efficient 
causation is necessary and sufficient for explanations—appeal to final causes is 
eschewed.  Having been reminded of this, it begins to get clearer in what ways this 
conflicts with Locke’s libertarian leanings.  In his formulation of mind, Locke 
defines volition as a power. Recall that this was at the heart of his initial rejection of 
the idea of free will in the first edition.  Locke argued that powers don’t have 
powers—agents do.  So in construing volition having power, Locke is either 
stepping away from a consistent view of the natural world as passive, or he is setting 
at least some aspects of mind apart from the natural world.  Neither of these is 
consistent with the idea that the mind is part of the natural world, and that the natural 
world is passive. 
 
Secondly, while efficient causation is supposed to be both necessary and sufficient 
for explanations of the natural world, Locke appeals to a final cause in his 
explanation of volition.  Locke affirms, for example, that the will is determined by 
the good.  We could interpret him as saying that agents act as they do, that volition 
acts in the manner in which it does, because they aim at the good.  True enough, 
Locke abandons this view in the fifth edition.  In the fifth edition Locke argues that 
agents choose as they do to avoid some uneasiness or desires.  But this is just as 
suggestive of final causation as is the good.  The final cause is the end, or the sake 
for which a thing is done.  For example, the end of walking might be losing weight.  
Just so, the end of free will is to relieve the uneasiness of desires.  In this case, the 
result of the relief of uneasiness is not just a coincidence—it is the sake for which 
the action is done.  Contrast this with the kind of explanation offered in terms of 
efficient causation: the cause of behaviour is the movement of particles. Final causes 
refer to teleological explanations, which make reference to the telos or the end of a 
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process. Locke’s later position appears to be a psychological teleological model.  In 
other words, this move represents the psychologizing of at least some aspect of the 
natural world.  The virtue of appealing to final causes is that they explain the 
regularity of the connection between phenomena.  Why does human action regularly 
take place the way that it does?  This is because of the urge to avoid uneasiness.  The 
final cause enters into the explanation as something that is good for the person—the 
person is better off for it18. 
 
It is understandable why Locke appeals to the desire to be relieved of uneasiness.  
We need only look to the reasons he provides, namely that it is manifest that this is 
so, from experience.  As mentioned, the later evolutions of Chapter 13 rely 
increasingly on fidelity to what Locke observes about internal experience. Harris 
(2007) rightly focuses on the emphasis of the role of experimental philosophy 
Locke’s revisions. Harris reminds us that Locke is interested in more than the 
concept of freedom, but that he also intends to be true to the experience of freedom.  
Locke seeks to be true to the experience of what choice making and deliberation are 
actually like (20).  Harris sees Locke’s changes as designed to capture the 
“phenomenology” of freedom that seems to disappear in his first edition (27).  Harris 
sees Locke as self-consciously turning away from metaphysical issues (derived from 
the New Science), and toward an accurate account of the experience of freedom 
(41).  Locke’s desire to be true to the experience of choosing—which is an 
expression of his empiricism—butts up against the mechanical world picture that he 
also endorses.  Taking seriously the internal experience of freedom and treating it 
unproblematically—in other words, taking it as what it seems—creates a real tension 
with the other theoretical commitments Locke has.  One might maintain consistency 
by claiming that the experiences of freedom and of “suspension” are illusory, but 
this is not the option Locke takes. 
                                                        18 At least, what the person takes to be good motivates their action. 
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The Trouble With the Search for a “Final Position” 
 
While I understand and sympathize with the search for a “final position” for Locke 
on liberty and volition, I think it is wrongheaded.  Firstly, because the text just is 
inconsistent, it legitimately admits of more than one interpretation.  Each 
interpretation, though supported by evidence, also suffers from serious problems 
given inconsistent remarks from Locke. It can’t be decisive, therefore, to point to 
evidence supporting one or another interpretation.  What is needed is an argument 
that one interpretation or another is supported by the text exclusively, or that there 
are countervailing reasons for rejecting alternate interpretations.  The claim that 
Locke simply didn’t bother to make his revisions in later editions invites a view of 
Locke as lazy and undisciplined—a strange view given how much time, attention, 
and effort he clearly put into revising “Of Power.”  What’s more, it is possible that 
Locke did not make the adjustments necessary to make his text consistent for the 
reason that he did not give up his commitment to those parts of his view that would 
have called for adjusting. 
 
For Locke to give up the Hobbesian portions of his work, Locke would have been 
giving up on something that was apparently very important and fundamental to his 
system.  The view of the universe as passive, lawful, mechanistic, and deterministic 
as articulated by the New Science was something held by almost all significant 
thinkers of the Modern period, and Locke particularly.  It’s not that the New Science 
is incompatible with libertarianism.  After all, Descartes adhered to the New 
Science, and held a libertarian view of volition.  But this option was available to 
Descartes as a dualist—it is only the material world that operates according to the 
principles of the New Science.  That which is immaterial operates differently.  And 
as a rationalist, Descartes could avail himself of the intervention of rationality on 
impulse.  In a rationalist’s model like Descartes’, reason is higher than the bodily, 
animalistic side of the human being, and it is meant to intervene on that side.  But 
for the empiricist, knowledge, and thus reason, is intimately tied to the body. Since 
there is no knowledge without sense experience, the entire internal system of the 
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human being rests on a foundation of a kind of trust in the body.  This makes it very 
difficult to consistently and plausibly make the case for a view of volition that 
intervenes on impulses.  The first question for the empiricist who claims this is: why 
should one part of the mind intervene on another?  The second is: how could such a 
thing happen? 
 
What the textual evidence makes clear, I think, is the fact that Locke remained 
troubled by the issues of free will until the time of his death.  His posthumously 
published revisions reflect that he moved even further from the position he took in 
the first edition.  Each time he published revisions, Locke continued to struggle, 
making Chapter 13 longer and longer.   For Locke to have had a “final” position 
implies that the matter was settled for him.  It also seems to imply a consistent 
position—or at least one position that uniquely fits the text and excludes other 
possible positions. But there is no reason to think that this is so.  The text admits of 
multiple possible positions, and this is evidence of the fact that Locke remained 
unsettled.  Rather than give up on theoretical commitments that were clearly 
important to him and fail to indicate that, what’s more likely is that Locke did hold 
both positions.  In other words, Locke was both an adherent to the New Science and 
Empiricism, and he believed in justly punishing those who acted badly.  It doesn’t 
follow from that that Locke was a compatibilist.  He certainly didn’t argue for a 
compatibilist position or gesture consciously that this was his aim. What follows 
from this was that he did not immediately see how to make these two go together.  
 
It’s not that Locke was entirely unconscious of the inconsistency—on the contrary, it 
appears that he was working hard to perfect his views on liberty and volition.  It 
often happens in human psychology that disparate views are held simultaneously.  
Reasoning through how to create consistency, or else drop one of the views, is a 
process that takes time.  So, the fact that these two don’t seem to go together is not 
evidence that he didn’t hold both of them.  It is entirely plausible that he held 
inconsistent views.  It appears that Locke was looking for a way to theorize how 
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both could be true, but thought that he just hadn’t articulated that yet. It is 
inconsistency that is the impetus for belief revision, belief merging, and negotiation.   
 
What the search for a final position reflects is a kind of philosophical bias toward 
completion, decidability, and consistency. The demand for theoretical consistency is 
only appropriate insofar as the theory is accurate—this is to say that if the universe 
cannot be theorized within the confines of a consistent model, then inconsistency is 
appropriate.  The universe may not lend itself to description within one consistent 
scheme.  Empirical science teaches us, perhaps, that there is a fundamental 
inconsistency in the features of the world (Cartwright, 2006).  If this is indeed what 
the empirical data show, then we might conclude that the world itself is inconsistent.  
We might also conclude that an empiricist approach will not provide the kind of 
theory that we desire, or that the combination of New Science and empiricism 
produced the tensions in Locke’s account.   
Conclusion 
 
Given the realness of the tensions among the New Science, empiricism, and volition, 
we ought not condemn Locke for changing his mind and being inconsistent.  And 
given the real tensions among the different versions of Locke’s text, each 
interpretation of a standard position requires selectively ignoring other important 
elements.  It is fairly standard in a certain approach to philosophy to think of 
consistency as an overriding virtue.  But consistency for its own sake surely ought 
not be considered this way.  It’s important to remember what we want consistency 
for, as well as to remember the virtues of inconsistency.   We ought not try to 
salvage Locke’s reputation by forcing him into one position or another.  The 
difficulty of interpretation arises from the fact that the text allows for multiple 
interpretations.  It is, in effect, “undecidable” because support can be found for a 
number of positions.  What we ought to do in this case is concede that there is no 
settled, consistent, well-defined position.  What’s important from my HIP 
perspective is not what Locke the man thought, understood as his psychology.  
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Instead, what is important is what follows from the ideas that are in his text, how 
they work, or don’t work in combination with one another.  Just as much, if not 
more value might be had by understanding tensions and problems as might be had 
from over-emphasizing consistency.  For example, Hobbes’ work on volition is 
remarkably consistent—and yet it leaves the image of the human being as a 
clockwork entity.  It leaves out some important elements that are important to not 
only our conception of us, but also to making sense of our behaviour.  True, we 
might affirm that freedom of choice is a kind of illusion, and thereby also affirm that 
the moral dimension is a kind of illusion.  But we would still be left in need of an 
explanation as to how such an illusion could be possible.19 
 
I suggest that we ought to appreciate the fact that Locke was willing to work out his 
ideas publicly, making clear and exposing the problems inherent to that particular 
constellation of ideas.  From the vantage point of the 21st century it may appear 
obvious that these notions don’t go together.   It is at least partly because of the work 
that Locke and others like him did, that this may appear obvious.  Certainly what 
was entailed by the mechanistic worldview was not obvious during the time in 
which Locke wrote.  Newton, for example, had argued against advancing 
mechanistic explanations, although he did adhere for the most part, to the tenets of 
the New Science.  How exactly to apply the New Science to philosophical problems 
was an open question.  There is a great deal of value in witnessing how problems are 
created and arise, not just in coming up with a resolution (which are also, almost 
without fail, subject to their own corresponding objections and problems).  Locke 
ought to be considered an intellectual hero for his drive to resolve the problem, and 
to “show his work” publicly. 
 
 
                                                          
19 We might affirm an empiricist standard of semantics, and claim as Hume does, 
that such talk is meaningless, and thus needs no explanation.  But there are 
countervailing reasons why this might not be an attractive option over all.  There are, 
after all, few empiricists as extreme as Hume for good reason. 
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Chapter Four 
Hume the Metaphysician?  A Response to Buckle 
We are to admit not more causes of natural things than such as are both true and 
sufficient to explain their appearances ~ Isaac Newton 
Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters, the works of both Hobbes and Locke have served as 
examples of the range of possible constellations of empiricism and the New Science 
available to a philosopher in the Modern period, as they attempt to explain aspects of 
mind.  In the second chapter we saw the surprisingly strong model of mind that 
Hobbes produced out of austere conceptual resources.  These resources were 
constrained by Hobbes’ doctrine that everything which is in the mind was first in the 
senses, coupled with the constraints imposed by the New Science, particularly the 
view that mind be explained with the properties that were attributed to the natural 
world. In the third chapter, we saw that Locke’s subsequent attempt to explain a 
libertarian kind of volition within the confines of the properties of the natural world 
created important problems.  These problems are particular to the empiricist, who 
opts to explain phenomena fundamentally by reference to sensation and sensory 
experience.  What these examples show is how some aspects of mind can be 
explained within the space allowed by these conceptual constraints, and how the 
conceptual tools afforded by empiricism and the New Science work together to 
produce a certain kind of view. Like any framework however, there are problems 
that arise as well.  The adequacy of the framework and conceptual tools depends in 
part on the particular way that they are deployed.  The kind of empiricism, and the 
degree of it are important factors in developing a relatively stable and plausible 
model of mind.  So too, as we will see in the present paper, are the parts of the New 
Science that a thinker takes on, and which ones are left out. Understanding this is 
important for correctly identifying the sources of tension within a system or model 
of mind.  Without having this understanding, it becomes possible to get our lines 
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crossed about which theoretical commitment is the source of a particular problem 
that appears on the surface of the model.  
 
In this paper I expose just this kind of mistake. More particularly, I look at Stephen 
Buckle’s recent misinterpretation of Hume on volition. Based on the striking 
resemblance Hume’s account of volition bears to Hobbes’, Buckle argues that 
Hume’s view is implicitly materialist.  Here I show that it is not any implicitly 
shared materialism between Hume and Hobbes that accounts for their similar views 
of volition. Instead, what accounts for the similarity is the similar constellation of 
ideas that combine in each thinker’s commitment to both empiricism and the New 
Science.  Given that Hume’s refrain is that he is not engaged in metaphysics, all 
other things being equal, the interpretation that respects those assertions is the better 
one.  What Buckle’s mistake illustrates and emphasizes is how important the 
analysis of unit-ideas is to accurately understanding and interpreting the 
relationships among empiricism, New Science, and aspects of mind. 
 
The game plan for this chapter is as follows.  First, I provide an overview of 
Hobbes’ account of volition as it is grounded in his understanding of both 
empiricism and the New Science. Following that, I provide exegesis on Hume’s 
version of both empiricism and the New Science, paying particular attention to how 
it is similar to, though distinct from, Hobbes’. Finally, I analyze Buckle’s case.  I 
argue that while he gets both Hume and Hobbes mostly right on volition, it is his 
failure to recognize and appreciate the way that the constellation of concepts is 
involved in both empiricism and the New Science that produces the broad similarity 
between Hume and Hobbes, while at the same time the small but relevant 
differences and nuances between them account for their differing metaphysical 
positions.  
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Reminder: POH and HIP 
 
Before getting to that, I wish to remind my reader one last time of my 
historiographical approach.  Once again, my approach to historical philosophy is not 
the approach that I have termed philosophically oriented history (POH).  In POH, the 
focus is more heavily on the impact and influence of the historical context in order to 
understand and reconstruct what a thinker might have thought, and why.  I opt 
instead for the approach I have called historically informed philosophy (HIP).  With 
this approach my focus lies more heavily on analysis of the concepts at play within a 
given system.  I recognize and respect the importance of historical context on 
adequately analyzing historical work, and this dimension comes to the fore more 
strongly in this paper than it does in the other two, because understanding how 
Hume conceived of, and implemented, changes in the New Science, depends on 
historical circumstances.  On balance, however, my approach is to focus more 
squarely on the role and evolution of unit-ideas than it is to focus on the way 
elements of texture from the time period bear on what was said.  
Hobbes’ Empiricist Account of Mind & Volition 
 
It is helpful in understanding Hobbes’ account of volition that it be examined within 
the context of his general economy of the mind. There are three broad concepts that 
act as tools and constraints giving shape to Hobbes’ picture of mind, and thereby, of 
volition: materialism, empiricism, and the New Science.  From within this 
framework, a model of mind emerges that exhibits telltale features that are shared 
with other Modern empiricist, New Scientist accounts. 
 
Recall that Hobbes believes that everything is matter in motion. For Hobbes, the 
particles out of which everything is comprised behave according to deterministic and 
universal laws of nature. Hobbes’ commitment to materialism is an expression of a 
metaphysical commitment that is logically separate, though consistent with, his 
commitment to empiricism.  Hobbes’ materialism gels cleanly with his commitment 
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to the New Science.  He affirms that motion operates in a mechanical fashion based 
on contact, and this is consistent with the empiricist orientation toward the senses as 
the source of knowledge. 
 
Hobbes’ empiricism is expressed in his foundational belief that everything that is in 
the mind was first in the senses.   Unlike Descartes, Hobbes orients himself toward 
sensory experience as a source for, and foundation of a theory of knowledge.  
Because the sensory is fundamental for knowledge for Hobbes, the sensory organs 
and by extension the body, are directly implicated in the development of knowledge.  
This contrasts sharply with the rationalist orientation away from the senses as a 
source and foundation for a theory of knowledge.  This difference can be seen very 
clearly by looking at Descartes as a relevant foil to the empiricist position.  
Descartes is “struck by the large number of falsehoods” he had accepted as true 
based on data from the senses; “I have found that the senses deceive, and it is 
prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” 
(Descartes, 12).  The distrust Descartes feels toward the senses as a foundation for 
knowledge motivates him, according to his Meditations, to look for another source 
and foundation for knowledge.  In search of this, he orients himself inward, asking 
himself if there is anything in his experience that cannot be doubted.  This method of 
“radical doubt” is a step in Descartes’ search for knowledge in the ability to grasp 
truths through the understanding: 
 
I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses 
or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this 
perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from 
their being understood; and in view of this I know plainly that I can 
achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than 
of anything else. (22) 
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Because of his initial move away from the body to establish knowledge, Descartes 
must eventually re-establish the connection between the “internal” and the 
“external” worlds in a different way. 
  
This difference in orientation toward the senses between Hobbes and Descartes 
deeply impacts the way each explains the relationship between mind and body, or 
corporeality. Descartes affirms a strong distinction between mind and body on the 
grounds that such a distinction can be “clearly and distinctly” perceived by the mind.  
In other words, he appeals to what can be thought to ground his account of the 
relationship between mind and body.  Because it is the mind’s powers that ground 
knowledge, what the mind can clearly and distinctly perceive can be trusted.  But 
because Hobbes orients himself toward sensation as the foundation for knowledge, 
this appeal to what can be “clearly and distinctly perceived” by the mind is not 
justifiable, from his perspective.  This important difference about what one can 
appeal to in order to justify a knowledge claim comes out in Hobbes’ Fourth 
Objection to Descartes’ Meditations on the nature of the human mind. In this 
objection, Hobbes again takes issue with Descartes on the matter of his distinction 
between mind and body.  Descartes had presented the argument that, because he has 
a clear and distinct idea of the mind, and a clear and distinct idea of the body, it 
follows that the two are distinct.  This is because anything that can be clearly and 
distinctly conceived of, God can create. Hobbes writes,  
 
There is a great difference between imagining, that is, having an 
idea, and conceiving in the mind, that is, using a process of 
reasoning to infer that something is, or exists.  But M. Descartes has 
not explained how they differ…Now, what shall we say if it turns 
out that reasoning is simply the joining together and linking of 
names or labels by means of the verb ‘is’?  It would follow that the 
inferences in our reasoning tell us nothing at all about the nature of 
things, but merely tell us about the labels applied to them; that is, all 
we can infer is whether or not we are combining the names of things 
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in accordance with the arbitrary conventions which we have laid 
down in respect of their meaning.  If this is so, as may well be the 
case, reasoning will depend on names, names will depend on the 
imagination, and imagination will depend (as I believe it does) 
merely on the motions of our bodily organs; and so the mind will be 
nothing more than motion occurring in various parts of an organic 
body (Descartes, 125-126).  
In response, Descartes directs his reader to the proof of the “real distinction” in the 
Sixth Meditation. There, Descartes argues that the “real distinction” between mind 
and corporeality is “clearly and distinctly” perceived. In Descartes’ second reply he 
admits that metaphysically, if not conceptually, it is possible that there is no real 
distinction between mind and body when he writes, 
 
[Hobbes] is quite right in saying that ‘we cannot conceive of an act 
without its subject’.  We cannot conceive of thought without a 
thinking thing, since that which thinks is not nothing.  But then he 
goes on to say, quite without reason, and in violation of all usage and 
all logic: ‘It seems to follow from this that a thinking thing is 
something corporeal.’  It may be that the subject of any act can be 
understood only in terms of a substance (or even, if he insists, in terms 
of ‘matter’, i.e. metaphysical matter); but it does not follow that it 
must be understood in terms of a body. (123-124) 
 
 The contrast between Hobbes and Descartes highlights the differences that arise in 
their accounts of mind on the basis of their orientation toward sensation.  Rather 
than mistrust the senses, Hobbes turns toward them in giving his account of mind.  
In order to expose how his empiricism, materialism, and New Science commitments 
eventuate in a very particular view of volition, I present Hobbes’ theory of 
psychology. 
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According to Hobbes, tiny particles make contact with the sense organs, and these 
motions work on the nerves and the brain to produce internal experience.  They can 
be experienced variously—as conceptions, if they are thoughts in the head, or 
passions if they are in the heart. Passions and conceptions have different properties, 
and they function in distinct ways.  Thoughts are images, and these images can be 
“marked” internally with symbols or words, and this is how they can be organized 
and recalled for later deliberation or reasoning.  Hobbes thinks reasoning is 
essentially syllogistic.  He calls reasoning ratiocination or computation.  Thoughts 
are objective in the sense that the symbols they represent can be made available for 
inter-personal evaluation.  For instance, two men can argue between themselves over 
inferences made in an argument, and so long as they both follow correct rules of 
reasoning, they can come to agree on the same view.  This is one way thoughts differ 
from passions.  Because they are inherently subjective, passions are not similarly 
available for evaluation by others. For this reason feelings are not moral objects.   
Hobbes calls passion an internal “endeavour”, which means that passion solicits 
movement. They are essentially provocations to draw near something that is 
pleasing, or away from something displeasing.  When the movement is toward what 
is pleasing it is appetite; when the movement is away from that which is displeasing, 
it is aversion.  At the experiential level, feelings are pleasures and pains.  Passions 
create movement in the body, and supply the motivation necessary for action. In 
combination with thoughts, they create the full range of subtle and diverse human 
experiences, including glory, fear, dread, and hope.  
 
According to Hobbes, many of the problems that we have in thinking about volition 
come from the mistaken idea that volition, or the will, is a faculty.  In fact, volition is 
nothing more than the motion of particles. Perhaps because it motivates action, in 
Hobbes’ view volition is identified with passion, namely the last appetite or aversion 
that occurs before action takes place.  Hobbes writes, “In deliberation the last 
appetite, as also the last fear is called WILL (viz.) the last appetite will to do; the last 
fear will not to do, or will to omit.  It is all one therefore to say will and last will” 
(Elements of Law, 61). The causes of appetites and fears are also the causes of our 
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wills.  Hobbes writes, 
 
Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the causes 
of appetite and of fear are the causes also of our will. But the 
propounding of benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and 
punishment, is the cause of our appetite and of our fears, and 
therefore also of our wills […] (Elements of Law, 63) 
 
Passions are not voluntary: “Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not 
called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not 
voluntary” [italics mine] (Elements of Law, 62).  Volition cannot be free from the 
universal laws of nature, and thus cannot be free from the consequences of previous 
events or actions.  It can be free only in the sense of being unencumbered or 
unconstrained.  For example, a person in a locked room cannot voluntarily leave that 
room, constrained as they are by the lock.  In this sense, the person’s will is not free.  
By way of contrast, a person in an unlocked room is “free” to leave, being 
unconstrained.  But there is no sense of freedom over and above this one; Hobbes is 
clear that volition, as well as everything else, occurs as the result of antecedent 
causes.20   
 
To summarize: mind is particles in motion.  Thoughts and passions interact to 
produce inner experience; they also work together to create deliberate action.  
Volition is passion, more particularly, the last appetite or aversion that takes place 
before action.   Because the universe is lawful, everything moves according to these 
laws in combination with antecedent events or causes. Hobbes’ account of volition 
fits squarely and consistently within his general view of mind as it is informed and 
constrained by materialism, empiricism, and the New Science.   
 
                                                        
20 Hobbes is often understood to be a compatibilist in contemporary terms. 
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Hume’s Empiricist Approach to Mind 
 
Before we can see the reason why Hume’s account of volition aligns so neatly with 
Hobbes’, it’s important to understand the nature of Hume’s version of empiricism 
and his understanding of the New Science.  Hume is empiricist in the sense that has 
been discussed already—he believes that sense experience is fundamental to 
knowledge, and he orients himself toward the senses as a foundation for knowledge, 
as opposed to away from it.  Hume is a New Scientist in the sense that he affirms the 
new paradigm that replaces Aristotelianism, and is anti-authoritarian in tenor.  He 
does not offer teleological explanations, nor refer to occult forces and powers as 
explanatory.  However, Hume’s empiricism is distinct from Hobbes’ and Locke’s in 
important and relevant ways. Hume’s conception of the New Science also differed 
in important ways, in particular on the matter of efficient causation. 
 
Hume is sometimes thought to have endeavoured to more fully develop the 
consequences of Locke’s more cautious empiricism.  Like Locke, Hume thinks that 
the mind is a blank slate at birth.  He affirms that there are no innate ideas within the 
mind; everything is acquired through experience.  Hume aims to establish a science 
upon cautious and judicious observation of human life, and he thinks that 
understanding the workings of mind is key to understanding everything else. This is 
because while humans are the scientists studying nature, we cannot know for certain 
what the external world is like without turning our inquiries inward, toward the 
human being.  Understanding human nature promises to provide a foundation for the 
rest of the sciences. Getting clear on the nature of human understanding is a crucial 
first task in developing an understanding of the natural world. Thus, human beings 
are also the objects of scientific scrutiny. Hume opines, 
 
‘Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to 
human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run 
from it, they still return back by one passage or another.  Even 
Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in 
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some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie 
under the cognizance of men, and are judg’d of by their powers and 
faculties.  (4) 
 
Hume writes, 
 
‘Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might 
make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the 
extent and force of human understanding, and cou’d explain the 
nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in 
our reasonings…we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, 
but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.  (4) 
 
According to Hume, the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other 
sciences, and the bedrock of the science of man is experience and observation. 
Legitimate science—and all knowledge—rests on a foundation of empiricism.    
Impressions & Ideas  
 
Hume’s view of mind begins with a distinction he makes between impressions and 
ideas. These differ in the degree of force and liveliness that they strike the mind with 
and make their way into consciousness.  Forceful perceptions are impressions, and 
these include sensations, passions, and emotions. Impressions are immediate 
sensations as they are taking place.  By way of contrast, ideas are “faint images” or 
copies of impressions that are derivative of sense experience.  Hume explains, 
 
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive 
heat or cold, thirst, or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or 
other.  Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which 
remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea.  This 
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the 
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new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may 
properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from 
it.  These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and 
become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other 
impressions and ideas.  So that the impressions of reflection are only 
antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of 
sensation, and derived from them.21 (11) 
 
All simple ideas are derived from impressions which are correspondent to them, and 
which they represent exactly. Impressions and ideas are constantly conjoined, and 
experience shows that simple impressions always precede their correspondent ideas.  
On the other hand, the contrary never appears. Impressions have a position of 
priority, and thus Hume concludes that they are the causes of our ideas, and not the 
reverse (9).   
 
Hume confirms this empirically with the observation that when sense organs are 
obstructed in their operations, not only are the impressions lost, but so are the 
corresponding ideas.  No trace of them ever arises in the mind.  This is true not only 
when the sense organs are destroyed, but also where they have never been put into 
action to produce a sensation.  Without having actually tasted a pineapple, for 
example, we cannot formulate to ourselves an idea of it.  
Hume’s Semantic Empiricism 
 
Hume employs a standard of semantic empiricism to determine whether or not a 
statement or term has meaning. For example, Hume argues that the idea of 
substance, if it has any meaning at all, must be derived from some impression of 
sensation or reflection. When we closely examine the idea of substance, we find that                                                         
21 Hume goes on to say that the examination of sensation is an area that belongs 
better to anatomists than to natural and moral philosophers, and so he puts the 
subject aside.    
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it is neither a colour, nor a taste, nor a sound.  In fact, “substance” isn’t anything that 
is directly sensed. Because we don’t have any idea of substance distinct from a 
collection of particular qualities, we don’t have anything else in our minds when we 
talk about it.  The idea of substance turns out to be nothing but a collection of simple 
ideas united by the imagination.  Hume writes, 
 
[…] I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or a 
sound, or a taste.  The idea of substance must therefore be deriv’d 
from an impression of reflection, if it really exist.  But the 
impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and 
emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance.  We 
have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection 
of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we 
either talk or reason concerning it. (16) 
 
Insofar as our idea of substance goes beyond those impressions of particular 
qualities that are derived from the senses, it is “chimerical.” We can’t come to a 
satisfactory notion of substance either by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by 
means of definition.  For Hume, this is a sufficient reason for “abandoning utterly 
that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul,” and it makes 
him, “absolutely condemn even the question itself”22 (153).     
Hume, Newton & Formulating Hypotheses 
 
Hume rejects metaphysical hypotheses, on the grounds that they are not directly 
grounded in experience. Such hypotheses may be true, but because we can’t 
establish any empirical foundation for them, we are not warranted in drawing them.                                                         
22 Hume argues that since we have no perfect idea of anything but a perception, and 
a perception is different from a substance, we have no idea of substance.  The 
question, therefore, Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial 
substance? cannot be answered because we do not have an understanding of the 
question. 
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Hume’s “radical” version of empiricism demands that, “we cannot go beyond 
experience”23 (5).  Hume was influenced by Newton’s view of the way science is 
properly done. Contemporary historians agree that Newton’s empiricism involves a 
career-long rejection of “hypotheses” in natural philosophy.   Newton’s version of 
the New Science differs from the Cartesians’ and others who had no compunction 
about positing causal explanations and metaphysical suppositions. Rather, Newton 
strives strenuously to sever all ties between his investigations and a commitment to 
metaphysical “first principles” (Domski, 525). Newton railed against hypotheses, 
which are conjectural causal explanations, in fulfillment of his aim to preserve the 
certainty of scientific principles.  He believes that a more certain science involves 
formulating theories in terms of observed properties, without any causal 
explanations.  Newton’s famous dictum, hypothesis non fingo is an expression of his 
commitment to the kind of empiricism that does not go beyond the phenomena.  He 
writes, 
 
Hitherto we have explained the phaenomena of the heavens and of 
our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the 
cause of this power…But hitherto I have not been able to discover 
the cause of those properties of gravity from phaenomena, and I 
frame no hypotheses;24 for whatever is not deduced from the 
phaenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, 
whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this 
philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the 
phaenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus                                                         
23 To drive this point even further, Hume offers the following maxim that is 
“condemn’d by several metaphysicians” to the effect that “an object may exist, and 
yet be no where” (154).  This is the case with all our perceptions and objects, except 
those of sight and feeling.  Not only do objects and perceptions like moral 
reflections not require any particular place, but they are “absolutely incompatible 
with it” (155). 
24 Newton’s “hypotheses non fingo” is variously interpreted as, “I do not feign 
hypotheses”. 
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it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive 
force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were 
discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity does really exist, 
and act according to the laws which we have explained, and 
abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial 
bodies, and of our sun [sic]”.  (Newton, 1159) 
 
While the “mechanical philosophy” was popular in the late seventeenth century, by 
the mid eighteenth century it had become a narrower term used by Leibniz and the 
Cartesians to specify a position in opposition to Newton (Sapadin, 341). 
 
Hume follows Newton in his rejection of the practice of formulating hypotheses 
beyond deductions from phenomena.  When Hume speaks of the “experimental 
method” he is referring to Newton (337). In The History of England (1778) volume 6 
he writes, “Newton…shewed…the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy” 
(542).  Like Newton, Hume firmly believes that we ought not to go beyond 
experience in developing the science of man. He writes, “any hypothesis, that 
pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to 
be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical” (5).  He continues, “[A]s the science of 
man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation 
we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation” (4).  
Hume’s rejection of metaphysical hypotheses creates significant differences from the 
more moderate empiricists, Hobbes and Locke.  For example, Hume employs an 
eviscerated concept of causation.   
 
Hume takes the notion of causation to be subject to his standard of semantic 
empiricism.  He proposes to, “turn the ideas of cause and effect on all sides,” 
looking for the impression from which these ideas arise. Thinking that the idea of 
causation must derive from some relation among objects, Hume finds that it is 
contiguity and succession that are the essential relations among cause and effect.  In 
other words, Hume denies the ordinary sense of causation and replaces it with one 
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that acknowledges only that we observe that one thing follows from another.  He 
argues that motion in one body is regarded as the cause of motion of another upon 
contact.  When we pay careful attention we notice that one body approaches the 
other, and that its motion precedes the motion of the other.  He writes,  
 
Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of 
motion in another.  When we consider these objects with the 
utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the 
other, and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but 
without any sensible interval…we can go no farther in considering 
this particular instance. (Treatise, 54-55)  
 
We can’t establish any necessary connection from the known qualities of objects.  
About this, Winkler (1991) writes,  
 
According to Hume, our only causal conceptions (of any sort) are 
captured either by his own definitions, or by the loose and 
inaccurate ideas against which he argues…Necessity as we 
understand it lies entirely in the mind…This cuts off belief in 
objective necessary connection…without positively denying its 
existence. (576). 
 
There is no case in which the ultimate connection between any objects can be 
discovered either by our senses, or by reason.  We cannot penetrate into the essence 
and construction of bodies, but can only observe their constant union.  Instead, what 
we experience is constant union, and it’s from this that we get the idea of necessity 
(257).  The mind draws an inference about causation from the experience of one 
thing following from another.  But causation itself is never directly experienced.   In 
Book II, Part III, section I of the Treatise, Hume writes, 
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If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with each 
other, we shou’d never arrive at any idea of cause and effect; and 
even after all, the necessity, which enters into that idea, is nothing 
but a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual 
attendant, and infer the existence of one from that of the other.  Here 
then are two particulars, which we are to consider as essential to 
necessity, viz. the constant union and the inference of the mind; and 
wherever we discover these we must acknowledge a necessity.  As 
the actions of matter have no necessity, but what is deriv’d from 
these circumstances, and it is not by any insight into the essence of 
bodies we discover their connection, the absence of this insight, 
while the union and inference remain, will never, in any case, 
remove the necessity.  (257-258) 
 
The inference Hume is talking about here is the habitual determination of the mind 
to form a lively idea of the effect upon having an impression of the cause.  While it 
is true that we infer the one from the other by observing their constant union, it is 
essential to remember that, “the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the 
imagination” (261). When we call one object the cause, and the other the effect, and 
consider them in themselves, distinct and separate from each other, we can’t infer 
one from the other.  The connection between the two is a perception of the mind.  
When we observe the same union, we have the idea of causes.  “From this constant 
union [the mind] forms the idea of cause and effect, and by its influence feels the 
necessity” (261).  In other words, Hume’s sense of causation is not metaphysical, but 
it points instead to the way that our minds habitually perceive things. 
 
Hume’s extreme form of empiricism lead him to refrain from positing causal 
explanations, as well as metaphysical suppositions that go, “beyond the 
phenomena.”  While Hume was committed to the New Science, his understanding of 
it differed in important ways from other major thinkers during his time.  His view 
was not mechanistic, which can be seen from the sense of causation at play in his 
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system.  The fact that Hume is not a mechanist does not mean that his view is 
inconsistent with mechanical explanations.  Hume certainly does not deny 
mechanism.  He simply advocates restricting causal and metaphysical claims to what 
is warranted only on the basis of the phenomena.  For this reason, his view is a kind 
of “metaphysical agnosticism.”  He seeks to remain silent on metaphysical matters.  
This is not because he thinks metaphysical statements are false, but because his 
concern is about developing knowledge that is warranted by his empiricist 
presuppositions. 
Hume’s View of Volition 
 
Hume calls the will the most remarkable of all the immediate effects of pain and 
pleasure (Hume, 257).  The will is not, strictly speaking, a passion—Hume’s 
taxonomy of the passions includes desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, and fear—but it 
is necessary to the explanation of the passions.  By “will” Hume means, “the 
internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to 
any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind” (257).  Hume’s 
understanding of the will as an impression is a forceful perception of the human 
mind.  Impressions for Hume are sensations, passions, and emotions.  The notion of 
volition Hume espouses then, is that it is a sensation, feeling, or passion that is 
experienced via the senses, and which produces motion in the body.  It is not a 
faculty.  The similarity with Hobbes is clear.  Both Hobbes and Hume arrive at this 
similar view because of the empiricism behind the view.  Both Hobbes and Hume 
orient toward sensation as the foundation of knowledge, which places sensory 
experience at the centre of what can be experienced and known.  While Hobbes 
gives a more in depth account of how objects interact with the senses to produce 
experience, Hume does not.  He is interested in what can be known from experience, 
and therefore does not attend to metaphysical questions.  As Hume mentions, 
questions of physiology are ones that he leaves to the anatomists. 
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Buckle’s Argument 
 
In his 2012 paper, “Hume on the Passions” Stephen Buckle makes a case that Hume 
is a covert materialist.  This argument is particularly relevant because the errors 
made in this argument depend on a failure to appreciate the way Hume’s version of 
the New Science and empiricism work together to produce his view of volition. 
Buckle’s argument draws on the similarity between Hobbes and Hume on volition to 
claim that, since Hobbes and Hume are so similar on the structure of volition, and 
since Hobbes is a materialist, then inference to the best explanation is that Hume too, 
is a materialist.  But as I’ll show, the similarity between Hume and Hobbes derives 
not from any shared metaphysical view, but instead, is the result of their shared 
empiricism combined with their commitment to the New Science.  Because Buckle 
doesn’t take account of the Newtonian nuance of Hume’s approach to the New 
Science, he conflates it with the approach of the Cartesians—an approach that Hume 
was clearly in opposition to.  
 
First, I show that the relevant parts of Hobbes’ account of volition are rooted in his 
empiricism, not his materialism. Second, I expose why the variation among the 
notions of empiricism and New Science is sufficient to account for the shared 
similarity between Hume and Hobbes on volition.  Neither of these views implies 
materialism.  Inference to the best explanation, therefore, is that Hume is not best 
regarded as implicitly materialist—at least not for the reasons Buckle provides.    
Contrasts Between Hobbes and Descartes 
 
In laying the groundwork for his case, Buckle begins by setting up a contrast 
between two kinds of explanation of volition.  The first is materialist—the one that 
Hobbes offers—and the second is dualist, and this is exemplified by Descartes’ 
account. Buckle shows the alignment of Hume’s view with Hobbes’, pointing out 
that the rest of the contrasts also hold between Hume and Descartes.  Namely, he 
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argues that since Hobbes differs from Descartes on the issue of materiality, Hume 
must also differ in just the same way.25 
 
Beginning with Descartes and Hobbes, Buckle points out that both philosophers 
agree that the passions have a bodily origin.  Since Hobbes believes that everything 
is matter in motion, passions are matter in motion.  Because thought and passion are 
metaphysically identical, the materialist does not set up a hierarchy among them, the 
way that a dualist can.  Thought does not “rule” passion in any way, whereas for the 
dualist, just such a hierarchy can be invoked.  Thus, it is difficult for a materialist to 
provide an account of volition whereby the rational part of the human being—the 
thinking part—intervenes on the passionate impulses.  Instead, volition is subject to 
the same natural universal laws that govern matter.  Volition is governed by 
deterministic laws, and is itself determined.  By way of contrast, while the dualist 
can affirm that passions arise as a result of material motion in the brain, he denies 
that the mind is constituted by those brain events.  Instead, the mind stands apart 
from feelings and passionate impulses, and is capable of judging and intervening 
upon them. The mind is immaterial, and is independent from the passions, which are 
bodily, and hence material.  The immaterial mind can exercise control over bodily 
processes.  Because of the separation of mind from passion, a libertarian conception 
of volition becomes possible.  In Buckle’s words, 
 
[T]he dualist will affirm that the human being is rational and free.  
The materialist in contrast, can be expected to resist any separation 
and independence of the mind from those processes which occur in it 
because of motions in the brain and body: thought, volition and 
passion should all occur on the same level, such that no part of the 
mind – in particular no rational part – can claim rule over the rest.  
                                                        
25 It’s important to keep in mind that while Hobbes and Descartes disagree about the 
materiality of mind, they do not disagree about the materiality of the natural world.  
Hume, on the other hand, strives to draw no such conclusions at all, restricting his 
views to only what is warranted on the basis of the phenomena. 
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(192-3) 
 
Buckle calls this the litmus test for distinguishing dualist and materialist positions.   
Contrasting Descartes’ dualism with a materialist perspective, Buckle draws 
attention to a patterned set of conceptual relationships.  Buckle writes, 
 
The materialist, in contrast [to the dualist who affirms the human 
being is rational and free], can be expected to resist any separation 
and independence of the mind from those processes which occur in it 
because of motions in the brain and body: thought, volition and 
passion should all occur on the same level, such that no part of mind 
– in particular, no rational part – can claim to rule over the rest. 
This is precisely what we find in Hobbes.  He denies the very 
possibility of control over the passions by denying any space for 
reason or volition that is independent of passion: instead, he defines 
volitions by reference to the passions themselves…He also treats the 
passions as a species of imagination: just as ‘sense is motion in the 
organs and interior parts of man’s body’, so ‘it is evident that the 
imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary 
motion’…This commits Hobbes to determinism.” (193) 
 
It’s true that Hobbes denies the possibility of control of the passions by reason, and 
that his account of volition is deterministic.  But the story that Buckle tells is that 
this is because of Hobbes’ materialism.  Materialism is consistent with this way of 
structuring mind, but it’s not the case that if mind is structured this way, then the 
account is materialist.  Hobbes’ account is structured as it is in large part because of 
his empiricism.  It is the empiricism in Hobbes’ account that leads him to understand 
mind as bodily.  Since mind is body, then there are no divisions among kinds of 
things that make up the human being—there are not material parts and immaterial 
parts that need to find a way to interact, and which structure themselves in a 
hierarchy.  There is no hierarchy because both thoughts and passions are body.  
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Notice that this view does not imply materialism.  One can hold that thoughts and 
passions are bodily—whatever it is that body turns out to be, notwithstanding. 
The Function of Empiricism in Hobbes’ Account 
 
In making his case for Hume the materialist, Buckle begins by setting up a set of 
contrasts between the paradigmatic dualist—Descartes—and the paradigmatic 
materialist—Hobbes.  Because these thinkers are exemplars of dualism and 
materialism, it is understandable why Buckle might treat them as foils on account of 
their complementary metaphysical commitments. It’s not their metaphysical 
commitments, however, that are driving the sets of contrasts at issue.  Instead, it is 
their epistemological ones.  While Descartes is a dualist, he is also a rationalist.  And 
while Hobbes is a materialist, he is also an empiricist.  The important distinction 
between Descartes and Hobbes is the way each one orients his view toward the role 
of sensation in the production of knowledge.  
 
Recalling our earlier discussion, what’s clear in Descartes’ account of mind is that 
he makes a conscious move away from sensation, focussing on the “large number of 
falsehoods” the senses have produced in him, thereby creating a doubtful edifice 
upon which all his views were based.  An important aim of his Meditations is to 
demolish everything of this edifice and start again from the right foundations, in 
order to establish knowledge in the sciences that could be stable and lasting.  In so 
doing, Descartes finds the senses to be deceivers, writing, “Whatever I have up till 
now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the 
senses…I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust 
completely those who have deceived us even once” (Descartes, 12).   Given that this 
is so, Descartes’ method is to look “inward” to the mind to develop a rationalist 
foundation for knowledge. This is to say that he turns consciously and explicitly 
away from sensation and the senses as a reliable source or foundation for knowledge.  
Descartes is a staunch rationalist. 
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Contrast this with Hobbes who, on the other hand, consciously and explicitly turns 
toward the senses as a foundation for knowledge.  Hobbes affirms that the 
foundation for all knowledge is sensation, writing, “there is no conception in a 
man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by part, been begotten upon the 
organs of sense.  The rest are derived from that original” (Leviathan, 85). This very 
different initial orientation makes all the difference for the resulting view of the 
production of knowledge for each thinker.  Since the sense organs are a kind of 
conduit for knowledge according to Hobbes, the body is directly implicated in the 
discovery or discernment of information.  We look to the senses to tell us what the 
case is. 
 
It is important to note that neither empiricism nor rationalism entail any 
metaphysical position in particular, nor do they entail that a metaphysical position 
must be taken at all.  As epistemological positions, they are about what can be 
known, or the sources of knowledge—not about the nature of things.  There are a 
great variety of possible positions among the various metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments involved here.  For instance, it is possible in principle 
to be a rationalist materialist, idealist, or dualist.  It is possible to be a rationalist who 
is agnostic, or remains silent about metaphysical matters.  Likewise, depending on 
the degree and type of empiricism at issue, it is possible to be an empiricist 
materialist, dualist, idealist, or to remain metaphysically agnostic on the matter of 
metaphysics.  These notions can combine in various ways, so that it’s not the case 
that if one is a rationalist, as is Descartes, one is also a dualist, as Descartes happens 
to be.  What is at issue in the contrasting set of commitments between Descartes and 
Hobbes is their opposing epistemological positions—not their metaphysical ones. 
 
This can be seen in two ways.  First, by looking at what follows from each 
metaphysical position.  There is nothing inherent about dualism that entails a 
libertarian view of volition.  True, the dualist has an easy way to appeal to 
libertarianism by conceptualizing mind and body as distinct kinds of things.  But this 
appeal is not as problem-free as it first might appear.  The renowned problem the 
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dualist faces is the problem of interaction: if there are two kinds of things in 
existence, how can the one interact with, or influence the other?  The details of how 
the immaterial mind causally—or even more precisely, mechanistically—impacts 
the material body are in short supply.  Without such an account, the dualist’s claim 
to free and easy libertarian free will is rather hand-wavy.  But more importantly than 
that, libertarianism doesn’t follow from a dualist position.  One might be a dualist 
and nevertheless deny that there is such a faculty as volition, and further deny that 
one is free to intervene on causal processes. 
Finding the Right Contrasts 
 
The mistake that Buckle makes in drawing his parallel between Descartes and 
Hobbes is that, while he intends to compare and contrast dualism and materialism, 
what he is actually contrasting is materialism and rationalism. It is not the position 
that two kinds of things exist that moves Descartes to structure his account of mind 
such that the thinking part can rule over the passions.  No internal mental/bodily 
hierarchy is implied at all by dualism itself.  Instead, it is Descartes’ rationalism that 
moves him to structure the mind this way.  It is that part of the mind that can attain 
to truth independently of the senses that provides the human being with reason and 
knowledge.  This falls out of Descartes’ self-conscious move away from sensation as 
a foundation for knowledge.26 Rather than orient toward sensation as a foundation 
for knowledge, Descartes instead builds his foundation of knowledge in a 
paradigmatically rationalist way. This is what leads him to structure his account of 
mind and passion as he does—that which cannot be doubted turns out to be the fact 
that Descartes is in meditation, in thought.  He writes, “At last, I have discovered 
it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me.  I am, I exist—that is certain” 
(Descartes, 18).  The mind itself is the foundation for knowledge.  This 
epistemological claim is separate from the dualist metaphysic that Descartes argues                                                         
26 Because Descartes finds the senses to be deceivers, he begins his meditations by 
stopping up his senses and doubting everything that can be doubted.  In so doing, he 
turns “inward” to establish a different foundation for knowledge—one based on 
rationality. 
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for. Descartes’ metaphysics supports and is consistent with his rationalism, but 
neither of the two entail or imply one another.   
 
The problem with comparing and contrasting materialism and rationalism is that 
materialism is a metaphysical position, while rationalism is an epistemological 
position. Not realizing this inappropriate set of contrasts, Buckle provides evidence 
of Hobbes’ denial of the possibility of control over the passions by reason as support 
for his conclusion that Hume was a materialist.  For example, Buckle writes, “The 
materialist, in contrast can be expected to resist any separation and independence of 
the mind from those processes which occur in it because of motions in the brain and 
body…This is precisely what we find in Hobbes” (Buckle, 193).  He then continues, 
 
Hobbes thus offers an account of the relation between reason, will, 
imagination and passion that is wedded to his materialism.  This 
account is explicitly materialist by explaining all psychological 
phenomena by reference to physiological causes.  But it also shows 
how a theory could be implicitly materialist: by avoiding the 
physiology, but affirming the conjunction of doctrines about reason, 
will, imagination and passion that is distinctive of the Hobbesian 
theory.  Hume’s theory does just this.  (195) 
 
  What Buckle’s argument implies is that the source of Hobbes’ view of mind, 
particularly the relations between reason, passion, volition, and body, is his 
materialism. This is mistaken.  While it’s true that each of the elements of this 
constellation of relations is consistent with materialism, is also consistent with any 
number of metaphysical positions.  Refraining from asserting a bifurcated mind-
body system is not equivalent to the claim that everything that exists is matter.  Even 
more to the point: this constellation of ideas is consistent with metaphysical 
agnosticism.  It is conceptually possible not to make claims about the ultimate nature 
of reality, and mind in particular, and still maintain the general structure of mind 
that Hobbes offers, whereby volition is a passion that causes motion, and creates 
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action and behaviour in the human being.  Instead of materialism as the source of 
Hobbes’ view of mind, it’s his empiricism that creates this constellation of ideas.    
Parallels Between Hobbes and Hume 
 
After drawing up the ways that Descartes and Hobbes contrast with each other in 
their accounts of volition, Buckle takes himself to have articulated the key 
differences between a materialist and a dualist account.  In the second part of his 
argument, he compares the accounts of Hume and Hobbes with one another, with the 
aim of showing their patterned similarity.  As several commentators have noted, 
Hume and Hobbes both offer very similar accounts of volition, and mind more 
generally.  Buckle calls Hume’s account, “pure Hobbism” and writes, “Hume’s 
definition of the will could have been written by Hobbes himself” (197).  There is no 
contest to the fact that the two accounts are very similar.  The issue is not about 
whether the similarity exists, but instead the issue is about the source of the 
similarity.  Buckle reasons that Hume’s view is “implicitly materialist” because his 
view of the will is “nothing more than an experience that attends, or is part of a 
chain of causes and effects” (197).  Buckle quotes Hume saying, “by the will, I mean 
nothing but the internal impressions we feel and are conscious of, when we 
knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind” 
(ibid).  According to Buckle, the resembling feature of Hume’s account with 
Hobbes’ is that, 
 
Hume’s argument, like Hobbes’, reduces freedom to the power to 
choose…Hume’s compatibility argument is not to weaken the case 
for determinism, but to remove any objection to it…In affirming 
these two aspects of Hobbes’ determinism, Hume thereby endorses 
doctrines that are key elements of Hobbes’ materialist account of the 
human being. (198) 
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Because the views of Hobbes and Hume are similar, and yet given that Hume is not 
a materialist (as he explicitly denies taking any metaphysical position, and condemns 
materialism particularly), the similarity must lie elsewhere.  With another source of 
this similarity, Hume doesn’t have to be an implicit materialist.  This is a better 
interpretation because it accords with Hume’s avowed position.  The similarity 
between Hobbes and Hume isn’t rooted in a shared materialism, but in the 
combination of empiricism and New Science. 
 
Hume and Hobbes are both determinists.  But in what sense is Hume a determinist? 
Recall Hume’s eviscerated sense of causation, as explicated in Part I. For Hume, 
causation is about the way human beings experience phenomena, not a statement 
about the way the world actually is in its nature, or its underpinnings.  Hume doesn’t 
believe in causation in any metaphysical sense.  He’s clear that causation is an 
inference of the mind, resulting from the fact that we experience objects as being 
constantly conjoined. Hume writes,  
 
It has been observ’d already, that in no single instance the ultimate 
connexion of any objects is discoverable, either by our senses or 
reason, and that we can never penetrate so far into the essence and 
construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on which their 
mutual influence depends.  ’Tis their constant union alone, with which 
we are acquainted; and ‘tis from the constant union the necessity 
arises.  If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with 
each other, we shou’d never arrive at any idea of cause and effect[…] 
(257). 
 
Observation of constant union creates an “inference of the mind” that there is a 
necessity between the two.  And, “’Tis the observation of the union, which produces 
the inference” (258).  Hume is consistent and careful in maintaining that humans 
experience and understand events to be necessary based on the habitual inferences of 
causal chains based on the experience of constant conjunction.  In other words, his 
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view regarding determinism is not based on any metaphysical ones.  Rather, it’s 
based on his empiricism.  Hume appeals to what we observe and infer from 
experience to justify his sense of causation, and hence determinism.  It is the shared 
commitment to empiricism that leads both Hume and Hobbes to their determinism. 
The determinism that underlies both accounts offered by Hume and Hobbes leads 
both thinkers to deny libertarianism.  But materialism isn’t the source of their shared 
determinism. 
 
Similar to the mistake he makes in his first set of comparisons, Buckle goes on to 
offer more evidence in favour of the view that Hume is an implicit materialist.  This 
time, the evidence is the fact that Hume and Hobbes have very similar views on the 
relationship between reason and passion. Like Hobbes, Hume also thinks that reason 
can’t oppose a passion—only another passion can do so.   Impulses of feeling can be 
opposed only by other such impulses.  Unless reason has the capacity to oppose such 
an impulse, it is impossible that it should have any efficacy in directing the will.  We 
can see this where Hume writes, 
 
‘Tis impossible reason cou’d have the latter effect of preventing 
volition, but by giving an impulse in the contrary direction to our 
passion; and that impulse, had it operated alone, wou’d have been 
able to produce volition.  Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse 
of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever 
arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence 
on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act or 
volition.  But if reason has no original influence, ‘tis impossible it 
can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever 
keep the mind in suspence a moment.  Thus it appears, that the 
principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with 
reason, and is only call’d so in an improper sense.  (266) 
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For Hume, reason cannot oppose a passionate impulse, and does not cause or hinder 
any volition.   For Buckle, the fact that Hume utilizes the language of “impulse” 
implies a mechanical picture of causation. Buckle calls “impulse” the “sine qua non 
of mechanical causation” (199).  He interprets this to mean that passions have 
impulsive force, and therefore, they are not merely impressions. He then concludes, 
“thus Hume’s subordination of reason to passion, and his related incorporation of 
volition into the same overall account, commits him to determinism, and, implicitly, 
to materialism” (200).  It’s true that Hume is committed to determinism in his sense. 
But Hume’s use of the word “impulse,” surely is not sufficient to convict him of 
intellectual dishonesty about his metaphysical views, or to commit him to 
materialism particularly.  A mechanical picture of causation is just that: a picture, or 
a model.  One can make use of a model without thereby implying a certain 
metaphysical stand about the real nature of that which is being modeled.  
Materialism hardly follows from the word “impulse.”   
 
What’s more, it’s possible that Hume was not making use of a mechanical metaphor 
at all when he used the language of “impulse.”  One set of meanings of the word 
“impulse” is a force, impetus, or strong and unreflective urge or desire to act.  A 
more consistent interpretation is that Hume intended the word to be understood in 
this sense, in which case it captures the general meaning of the term “passion.” 
Hume’s Metaphysical Agnosticism  
 
Buckle’s view of Hume the implicit materialist rests on establishing that Hume 
endorsed a mechanical picture of the universe.  The reasoning is that, if the 
mechanical view implies materialism, and Hume endorses the mechanical view, then 
Hume must also endorse materialism.  In support of this, Buckle argues that it was 
Hume’s aim to, “explain the passions entirely in terms comparable to modern 
mechanical science” (2012, 190).  It’s not clear exactly what this means, since it’s 
not clear in what sense an explanation might be comparable to modern mechanical 
science. This might only mean that it was Hume’s aim to provide a scientific 
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account of the passions.  It might also mean that Hume’s account is not inconsistent 
with modern mechanical science.  Because Hume remained metaphysically agnostic, 
he does not reject any particular metaphysical view as false.  Just so, Humean 
passions are explained in a way that is consistent with modern mechanical science.  
But since this doesn’t amount to a mechanical explanation, not much hangs on this. 
Yet Buckle seems to think that more does hang on it.  It was, Buckle admits, “a 
hallmark of the mechanical philosophy to explain the passions in this way” (ibid) 
and that, “For [early] modern philosophers – of all stripes – the passions were 
understood to be the mental effects of bodily motions” (191).  But notice that 
understanding passions as the effects of bodily motions does not amount to a view 
about what “bodily motions” are, metaphysically.  Accordingly, Buckle 
acknowledges that Descartes, the paradigmatic dualist, offered just such an account, 
as did Malebranche, Hobbes, and Spinoza (190). Because Modern philosophers of 
all stripes talked in terms of mechanism regarding the passions, this is not the feature 
that distinguishes materialists from non-materialists. Nor does it indicate that a 
metaphysical position has been taken.  The use of mechanistic metaphors or models 
does not imply the acceptance of any kind of ontology in particular, or of adherence 
to any metaphysical position in general.  The fact that Hume’s account was not 
completely divorced from the mechanical philosophy does not mean that he 
endorses the mechanical philosophy.  Hume’s Newtonian version of the New 
Science relies on his eviscerated notion of causation.  Hume’s view of causation is 
not mechanical—as an inference by the mind, it is more psychological than it is 
mechanical.  As such, it implies nothing at all about his metaphysical commitments, 
except that he refrains from making any. 
 
Buckle bolsters his case for Hume the mechanist by virtue of the way Hume treats 
physiology.  Buckle admits that Hume does his best, throughout the Treatise to 
“avoid appeal to physiological explanations” (195).  But, Buckle argues, Hume 
doesn’t deny physiology, and at times appears to appeal to it.  For example, in Book 
1, he appeals to brain physiology to explain errors in reasoning (196).  He adds that 
he hasn’t made more use of physiology, not because doing so is specious and 
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implausible, but instead because doing so would go beyond experience.  Hume 
writes that the reason he avoids this topic is because “’twas more in prosecution of 
my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience” (44).  Hence 
Hume does not talk much about physiology for the very reason that he finds those 
concerns irrelevant to the matter that really concerns him: how the mind works.  Yet 
it’s true that at times, Hume explains sensation by reference to the body as the result 
of physical contact with the external world, or from the body’s own inner motions.  
For Buckle, this is an endorsement of materialism.  If Hume is prepared to accept a 
physiological account, Buckle wonders, why he doesn’t just spell this out as his 
preferred view? (196)  Because doing so is wide of his purpose, is the answer Buckle 
provides.  “But not only is he prepared to enlist psychology to his cause, where 
necessary; the psychological account he offers is entirely parallel to Hobbes’ overtly 
materialist account” (197).  Buckle affirms that Hume’s account implies a 
background physiology, and that such a physiological account is “fully in accord 
with mechanical materialism” (202).   
 
Once again, understanding the particulars of Hume’s version of empiricism makes 
clear how and why Hume remains metaphysically agnostic even given his occasional 
appeal to physiology.  Because Hume is metaphysically agnostic, he does not affirm 
or deny any particular metaphysical position.  Hume thinks that the asking and 
answering of metaphysical questions is inappropriate, because it requires us to go 
beyond the phenomena. Just so, Hume does not deny physiology, or reject the 
possibility of physicalism, because doing so would be dogmatic.  Hence Hume’s 
account is consistent with contemporaneous physiological explanations.  But it’s not 
the case that Hume’s account originates from physiological explanations.27  His lack 
of denial of physiology should not be taken as a metaphysical stance.  It’s not that 
we would expect Hume to deny physiology.  Hume is in no way anti-materialistic, 
because taking that position would be to enter into the debate about the ultimate 
nature of reality.  It’s not Hume’s view that physicalism is in any way incoherent, as                                                         
27 What’s more, the discipline of physiology does not depend on a materialist 
metaphysic.  
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someone like Berkeley might assert.  It’s Hume’s position that such questions are 
distractions.  Metaphysical explanations are not necessary, and can’t be answered 
according to his empiricist commitments. 
 
Rather than any shared materialism, it’s his empiricism, and more particularly, the 
role that sensation plays in Hume’s approach to volition and mind more generally, 
that account for the way that his view maps onto Hobbes’. Experience and 
observation are the basis for knowledge for Hume, and these are mediated via the 
senses.  This position can be, and is coherently taken by Hume, without implication 
for what the nature of the body is.  And it is this central role for sensation that leads 
both Hume and Hobbes to affirm hedonism, as well as the view that reason is inert, 
the conception of emotion as motivational, to consider volition as a feeling, and to 
determinism.  For Hume, determinism is not a claim about the ultimate nature of 
reality; it is an observation about a habitual inference of the mind when it encounters 
constant conjunction.  Hence Hume’s determinism falls directly out of his 
empiricism. 
 
Buckle’s position is that there is a constellation of ideas that work together in 
Hobbes’ account of volition. In particular, Hobbes treats thoughts and feelings as of 
the same metaphysical kind, and hence does not separate mind and body.  Passions 
are motivational, and they create movement, while thoughts are inherently inert.  
Volition is passion, and cannot be intervened upon by thoughts.  The account is 
hedonistic determinism. Hobbes’ psychology is overtly materialist, backed up by a 
mechanical physiology. This constellation of ideas shows up in almost the exact 
same ways in Hume’s account, according to Buckle. Since this is so, they must share 
the metaphysical presumption that is explicit in Hobbes’ account: materialism. Like 
Hobbes, Hume denies that there is a faculty of the will, calling the will an 
impression that accompanies action.  Hume is a compatibilist; Hobbes is also 
sometimes understood to be a compatibilist.  Hume also “subordinates reason to 
passion.”  Buckle writes,  
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Taken together, then, these elements comprise a mutually-
supporting network of theses corresponding almost exactly to the 
Hobbesian account of the human being as a machine.  It is not 
credible to suppose that these resemblances are accidental, or that 
Hume did not see their significance.  To hold, then, that Hume’s 
account of the passions is implicitly materialist is simply to affirm 
that he knew what he was doing.  (204)28 
 
Buckle’s argument is a kind of inference to the best explanation position. But 
understanding Hume as a materialist is not the best interpretation for the following 
reasons.  First, the parallel between Hobbes and Descartes picks out the differences 
in their epistemological positions, not their metaphysical ones.  Therefore, the set of 
parallels that we find between Hobbes and Hume don’t contrast with the dualist 
account by virtue of their underlying metaphysics, but instead, they contrast on the 
basis of their epistemological commitments.  It is the shared empiricism that 
produces the patterned sets of commitments, and it’s Descartes’ rationalism that 
produces his contrasting set of commitments.  What’s more, given Hume’s 
Newtonian approach to science, which influenced his particular version of 
empiricism, the most consistent interpretation of Hume is that he is, as he says he is, 
metaphysically agnostic.  In other words, since we can interpret Hume’s view of 
volition without appeal to metaphysics, then the best and most charitable 
interpretation is that he in fact holds the position that he says he does.  
Conclusion  
There are several interpretive problems with Buckle’s account of Hume as a 
materialist.  I’ve uncovered many of the most important ones.  The two most 
significant errors Buckle makes are first, thinking that Hobbes’ materialism is what                                                         
28 Part of Buckle’s argument is that, in claiming not to engage in metaphysical 
theorizing, and yet knowing what he was doing, Hume was intellectually dishonest.  
This is a serious charge, and one worthy of refuting. 
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underpins the features of his view of mind and volition that are at issue here.  In fact, 
Hobbes’ materialism is logically separate from his empiricism, which is the real 
driving force behind his view.  So while Hobbes chose to affirm materialism, as far 
as his account of mind is concerned, he need not have in order to arrive at the 
structure of mind he advances.  The second major error Buckle makes is in thinking 
that Hume is a mechanist.  This interpretation can only be sustained with cherry-
picked evidence.  Given Hume’s reiterated avowal of his intention to refrain from 
metaphysical theorizing, all other things being equal, this is the better interpretation. 
Hume’s view of the New Science follows the Newtonian method, whereby one does 
not go “beyond the phenomena”.  This is about strict adherence to observation 
without formulating hypotheses. Hume’s views of both causation and determinism 
align with this practice.  The senses in which he affirms causation and determinism 
are minimal, proportional to what he can affirm with observation.  Nevertheless, his 
views are consistent with physiological accounts of passion and sensation.  But this 
does not create any inconsistency for two reasons.  The first is that, even if 
physiology implied materialism, Hume’s view is consistent with materialism without 
implying it.  The second reason is that physiology does not imply materialism.  
Physiology is the study of natural bodies, while materialism is a theory about the 
basic constituents of reality.  Physiology does not make a statement about the basic 
constituents of the natural body, or of reality generally.   
 
Clear understanding of Hume’s empiricism and his version of the New Science is 
sufficient to explain how and why his view of volition aligns so nicely with Hobbes’, 
without having to attribute a metaphysical view to him. This is the simpler 
explanation, and it doesn’t require us to consider Hume intellectually dishonest.  
Hume ought not to be considered a covert materialist—at least not for the reasons 
Buckle provides.  And yet, Buckle’s argument provides ground from which we can 
appreciate the various subtleties and nuances involved in accounts of mind that 
emerge from the constellation of empiricism and the New Science.  Buckle’s view 
provides an excellent example of the importance of understanding the relations 
between empiricism, New Science, and aspects of mind as they were theorized in the 
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Modern period.  Without having picked apart these notions carefully, and seeing 
clearly how and why they fit together the way they do, we might be persuaded of 
this inaccurate view of Hume.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones. 
~ John Maynard Keynes 
Unit-Ideas - Revisited 
 
In this dissertation I’ve analyzed issues pertaining to aspects of mind in the history 
of philosophy, by way of unit-ideas.  Analysis in terms of unit-ideas is an alternative 
historical approach to contextualist approaches, which place primary emphasis on 
the historical conditions, and the intellectual context of a given historical era, in 
order to understand a certain discourse.  Analyzing in terms of unit-ideas puts the 
ideas themselves as the central subject.  In working with unit-ideas, old arguments 
and views are broken down into their component parts.  This allows those 
components to be re-examined in a new, different organization.  It becomes possible 
to bring those parts into new relations, and view them from the standpoint of a 
specific purpose.  The purposes, aims, and values of this historical approach are 
many. Analysis in terms of unit-ideas allows different patterns of the same 
component parts to be identified across key texts.  Finding these patterns can provide 
insight into the evolution of ideas and frameworks.  It also facilitates understanding 
how certain groupings of components can offer mutual support to one another, while 
others produce negative tensions.   
For History of Philosophy 
 
When we understand how different unit-ideas work together, and how others don’t, 
we are in a position to re-conceive old arguments.  Recognizing them as 
constellations of familiar components, it becomes possible to evaluate them in a 
novel way.  Understanding that many philosophical systems are original or 
distinctive not so much in their components, but rather in their patterns can help to 
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provide a new perspective on “old” positions.  Different logical combinations of 
elements of a philosophical doctrine are not always readily recognizable, but in 
recognizing various evolutions of these patterns, we can come to see and understand 
theoretical systems at a deeper level. Doing this helps expose similarities among 
theoretical systems that at first appear to be dissimilar, and we can find surprising 
connections across texts. 
 
One aim of this approach is to take note of some of the most significant influences of 
bodies of thought, and to see how later generations may have derived conclusions 
from them that are very different from what their originators might have thought. 
Appreciation of this is very helpful when it comes to identifying and situating 
evolved iterations of those ideas.  This puts us in an excellent position to identify 
problems that are new iterations or previously articulated patterns comprised of 
these units.  Recognizing evolutions of patterns of already familiar theories creates 
deep understanding and insight into resolving, or abandoning these issues. 
For Contemporary Philosophy 
 
Historical analysis in terms of unit-ideas can also provide deeper understanding and 
evaluation of our current unit-ideas by exposing their evolution from earlier 
versions.  In so doing, it creates space for us to recognize new possible combinations 
of these unit-ideas, and to recognize novelty in our present theorizing, not just in 
new components of our theories, but in novel patterns.  It enriches the conceptual 
resources at our disposal, allowing us to understand the landmark positions that 
frame contemporary discussions.  Making our unit-ideas and their organization 
explicit exposes underlying assumptions that are too familiar to be easily noticed, 
and which may be deeply embedded, un-argued for, or even un-avowed.  Identifying 
these assumptions helps us to ask better questions, diagnose current ills, and attend 
more perceptively to the ways that philosophers have been “received.” 
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 Specifics: Empiricism, New Science, and Aspects of Mind 
 
In this dissertation, I have examined the problem of how to fit mind into the natural 
world, given the presuppositions of empiricism and the New Science.  In order to do 
that, I’ve articulated a variety of empiricisms, as well as broken apart various tenets 
of the New Science, in order to observe their various combinations in key texts.  
Table 1 is a reminder of some important aspects of empiricism 
 
Table 1 
 
While empiricism exists in various formulations, the fundamental idea is that the 
senses are the foundation of knowledge. Empiricist thinkers orient themselves 
toward sensation as a source of knowledge, as opposed to rationalist thinkers, who 
are oriented away from sensation as a source of knowledge.   
 
Table 2 is a reminder of many of the components of the New Science.  As we have 
seen, it is possible for a thinker to accept some of these components, and reject 
others.   Components of the New Science can be used in various ways along with 
different components and degrees of commitment to empiricism in order to fit mind 
into the natural world. 
Sub-variety of Empiricism 
 
What is approached empirically 
Justification 
 
 
Philosophy of psychology (The science of mental development) 
Individual epistemology (Grounding justification of individuals’ 
beliefs) 
Philosophy of science (Scientific methodology) 
Psychology Source of mental contents 
Mental development over time 
The source of mental mechanisms 
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New Science  Rival & replacement for Aristotelianism 
Anti-authoritarian in tenor 
Nature Natural world entirely passive 
Motion/change is not actualization of some power in the 
substance itself 
Elimination of powers from all natural substances 
Mode of explanation Macro-level properties explained in terms of lower level ones 
Removal of occult forces and powers 
Mechanism Mechanization of world-picture 
Nature described with mathematical/geometrical concepts  
Particles 
 
Simple, unified, deterministic, quantifiable 
Causation Only efficient causes recognized or required 
Rejection of teleology and final causes 
Cartesian New Science  
(Rationalist) 
Science is demonstrative as a series of valid deductions from 
self-evident truths, rather than as something rooted in 
observation and experiment. 
Starting point for science and physics is the existence of God (as 
described in Discourse on Method) 
 
Newtonian New Science 
(Experimental Philosophy) 
Self-conscious turn away from Cartesian scientific methodology 
Denies the metaphysics of essences 
Refrains from formulating hypotheses  
Admits no more causes of natural things than such as are both 
true and sufficient to explain their appearances 
Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is rejected 
Whether metaphysical, physical, based on occult qualities, or 
mechanical, hypotheses have no place in experimental 
philosophy 
Table 2 
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My purpose here is to assess these constellations for their adequacy in fitting mind 
into the natural world.  In order to do that, I’ve chosen three case studies that 
highlight some of the virtues as well as some of the drawbacks of this class of 
framework.  The fundamental idea that structures this dissertation is that these 
varying constellations of ideas reside in ways that are mutually supporting, and 
which are productive in explaining mind, while at the same time they create negative 
tensions, and new problems. 
Three Case Studies: Hobbes, Locke and Hume 
 
In the first paper, I looked at how Hobbes’ particular conception of empiricism and 
his version of the New Science support one another in his account of mental 
architecture.  This analysis also showed that while Hobbes’ framework fits mind into 
the natural world seamlessly, it leaves out some important components of mind that 
don’t fit within that framework.  In particular, the Hobbesian system does not 
explain how content fits into this system. 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, commentators have long been spilling ink in search of 
Locke’s “final” position on the question of freedom of the will. The trouble Locke 
had with this portion of the Essay might appear as weakness, but when analyzed in 
terms of his constellation of empiricism and the New Science, a very different image 
appears. Here we see that Locke exposes some of the real tensions in the 
presumptions of his framework. In seeing the source of these tensions, we can see 
that Locke didn’t have a settled or consistent position on freedom of the will, and so 
we can put this old debate to bed. 
 
In the fourth chapter I analyzed Hume’s view of volition as it relates to his 
commitments to empiricism and the New Science. Both Hume’s empiricism and his 
version of the New Science differ in important ways from those of his predecessors.  
Yet, Hume’s account of volition is still very similar to Hobbes’ account.  This is not 
because Hume was a covert materialist.  Analysis in terms of unit-ideas exposes the 
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source of the similarity as a new combination of empiricism and New Science.  This 
chapter functions to highlight the kind of error of interpretation that can arise from 
lack of clarity on the relationships between unit-ideas in general and New Science 
and empiricism in particular. 
Limitations:  
 
Analysis in terms of unit-ideas is not designed for the specialist.  It is intended for a 
more general audience of philosophers.  Because of this, there are limitations of 
detail in dealing with some of the texts.  A specialist in Hobbes, Locke, or Hume 
might take issue with a given interpretation of each thinker’s view, based on a more 
detailed understanding of that thinker.  This type of analysis also stands to miss out 
on some of the nuance involved in each thinker’s system.  In attending to unit-ideas 
as they appear, and reappear in new patterns across various texts, what falls out of 
the analysis is nuance in other areas.  It’s important to keep in mind, however, that a 
highly specialized perspective also excludes relevant information. Because of the 
coarse-grain level of analysis, the application of my findings is limited to problems 
and issues that are of a similarly coarse grain.   
 
Findings – Empiricism & New Science 
 
Empiricism, as we have seen, comes in a variety of kinds and degrees.  They all 
orient toward sensation as the foundation for knowledge.  As an epistemological 
view, empiricism does not imply any metaphysical position, although it can be 
consistent with different metaphysical positions.  Empiricisms vary also according to 
whether or not the formulation of “hypotheses” is justified.  According to Humean 
empiricism, for example, no hypotheses are warranted that go beyond observation.  
This is why Hume advances a concept of causation, for example, that is not 
mechanistic, but rather an inference of the mind.  As far as Hume is concerned, we 
cannot penetrate into the “inner” workings of appearances. 
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These variations of empiricism combine with the tenets of the New Science in ways 
that are generally mutually supporting.  For instance, in its rejection of Aristotelian 
substances, the New Science accords with empiricism—inhering substances are not 
themselves directly observed, and ought not to be admitted within an empiricist view 
that affirms only what is directly observed.  In its anti-authoritarian tenor, the New 
Science is also mutually supporting with empiricism, which “democratizes” 
knowledge by putting a priority on observations anyone can make. Both New 
Science and empiricism affirm that occult forces and powers have no place in 
explanation. 
 
There are parts of the New Science and empiricism that create negative tensions with 
one another.  The New Science, as it was taken up and advanced in the Early 
Modern period, implies a certain metaphysical view.  Namely, that the world is 
made up of tiny particles, that macro-level properties are to be explained in terms of 
micro-level properties, and that change occurs mechanistically.  This is at odds with 
“radical” empiricism of Hume’s type, since this kind of empiricism affirms the 
inappropriateness of such metaphysical theorizing.  The Newtonian version of New 
Science accords well, however, with Humean empiricism. 
 
Fitting Mind into the Natural World  
The question remains about how well each of these combinations of New Science 
and empiricism succeeds at fitting the mind into the natural world.  Hobbes’ 
explanation of mind as fitting in with the natural world succeeds by essentially 
leaving out certain properties of mind by construing man as a machine. But Hobbes’ 
does not explain how content gets into the system, nor does he explain how it could 
possibly get into the system.  There is no indication that Hobbes was even aware of 
this problem. One strategy for avoiding this problem is to say that content just is 
physical or material in one way or another, and hence that it does have the same 
properties as the natural world, viewed from the appropriate level.  With this 
strategy, we still require an account of how it is that content is physical.  Without 
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this, there is no explanation.   
When analyzed from the perspective of unit-ideas, Locke’s particular constellation 
of empiricism and New Science creates negative tensions when it comes to fitting 
mind into the natural world. Locke’s orientation toward sensation, and thus his 
approach of looking internally for data and evidence, combines with the tenets of the 
New Science he endorses to produce the various problems and tensions with his 
account of free will.  Some of the most problematic tensions are that he invokes 
teleology within his explanation of volition. The teleological aspect of his account of 
volition does not fit within the empiricist-New Scientist framework that is 
deterministic and seeks to explain phenomena in terms of efficient causation only.  
Locke’s idea of the suspension of the will does not fit with his apparent 
determinism, which arises from his adherence to the New Science.  Contrary to what 
some of Locke’s critics on liberty and volition have argued, these inconsistencies 
run deeper than a few edits that Locke failed to make.  Locke would have been 
unable to create consistency at the surface without making changes to his more 
fundamental commitments, and there is no evidence that he was willing to do that. 
This is a feature of Locke’s commitments to the New Science, as well as his 
fundamental orientation toward sensation as a foundation for knowledge.  These 
tensions don’t arise for Descartes, who is committed to the New Science, but is 
oriented away from sensation as a foundation for knowledge. His orientation away 
from sensation as a foundation for knowledge allows him the theoretical space to 
invoke a second ontological category.  Thus he posits the immaterial, by way of 
which he explains mentality.  In forming a fundamental separation between mind 
and matter, Descartes is thus able to avail himself of a libertarian account of free 
volition that is free for the taking.  What this helps us to see is that it is the 
combination of the New Science and empiricism that causes negative tensions when 
Locke attempts to provide a libertarian account of free will.   
 
Understanding the way that Hume’s version of the New Science and his version of 
empiricism meet to create his broader framework has served to highlight the 
relevance of the variation that is possible within this constellation of unit-ideas.  
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Marrying this view of empiricism within the intellectual culture of New Scientism 
created an important evolution of thought on how mind could be explained.  
Following Newton in refraining from formulating hypotheses, Hume illustrates what 
an empiricist-New Scientist framework could be like without metaphysical 
“baggage.” Insofar as it is satisfying and possible to fit mind into the natural world 
without attending to metaphysical issues, Hume’s view is consistent. 
 
Future Directions 
 
In Chapter Two, I briefly discussed the significance of the combination of Hobbes’ 
empiricism and New Science for his political philosophy.  For Hobbes, 
understanding the nature of mind, and particularly the mind of man is the foundation 
for his political philosophy.  Hobbes does not think, as I gestured at, that reason and 
passion are at war with another.  Mapping out exactly how and where the 
empiricism and New Science that underpin Hobbes’ view of mind impact his 
political philosophy is one possible future direction of this research. 
 
Another future direction of this research might involve exploring the value-added 
concepts that evolved from Locke’s wrestling with the issues of self-observation, 
volition, and suspension of the will.  In particular, the development of Locke’s 
concept of consciousness as it relates to his empiricism and his New Science 
commitments could inform how the notion of consciousness has evolved in the 
literature. 
Conclusion 
 
I began this dissertation lamenting what appears to me to be an unfortunate tendency 
in contemporary philosophy of mind to treat issues and problems of mind as 
essentially ahistorical.  This is the tendency to regard philosophy of mind as 
progressed beyond what historical figures have to teach us.  There is a general sense 
of confidence, it seems, that problems of mind can, and will be answered with 
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enough scientific research.  But for reasons I’ve already mentioned, I don’t share 
this confidence.29  And looking at problems of mind from a historical perspective 
engenders precisely the healthy skepticism about this prospect that is needed.   
 
By looking at the way the greatest thinkers of their own time, and more generally of 
the last several hundred years, struggled with fundamental confusions and problems, 
we gain a more conservative sense of our own place in history, and in the process of 
understanding mind.  Contemporary thinkers using the same cluster of ideas 
discussed here may benefit from thinking of this approach as belonging to a lineage 
of similar attempts to resolve problems, and explain aspects of mind.  Doing so 
engenders a strong sense of humility about modern-day progress.  These are virtues 
of a well-rounded philosopher, but they are also attitudes that orient research 
questions.  Without a historical perspective to draw on, we are limited in what can 
be imagined, understood, and created. 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                        
29 As Hume says, Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to 
discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate 
the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanc’d 
before them. (Treatise, 3) 
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